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Abstract 
 
Though cotton only represents a very small share in world merchandise trade, it is an 
indispensable commodity in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Productivity and profitability of 
cotton production and processing are key determinants of growth in cotton producing 
countries. This study analyses the SSA cotton sector. The first section will use value chain 
analysis to trace the value creation process from the raw material stage to final retail 
products. The second section analyses the sector from an industrial organizational 
perspective, highlighting how the sector’s specific features have influenced reforms 
outcomes and comparing experiences to other reformed SSA crop sectors. The purpose of 
section three is to shed light on Research and Development in cotton in SSA, framed in a 
broader picture of agricultural research in SSA. The final section analyses the issue of quality 
in cotton and tests the assertion that fully implemented reforms have undermined quality 
performance of the cotton sector in SSA.  
Keywords sub-Saharan Africa Cotton Sector, Cotton Liberalization, Cotton R&D, Cotton 
Quality 
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Introduct ion 
 
The world’s major cotton producers are China, the U.S., and India. Although Africa is not 
among the first four world cotton producers, taken together, the countries of francophone 
Africa are the world’s third major exporter, together with the U.S., Uzbekistan, and Australia 
they account for more than two-thirds of global cotton exports (Baffes, 2007). Most 
importantly, francophone Africa is the world’s lowest-cost cotton producer (the 
International Cotton Advisory Committee rates Benin, Mali, and Burkina Faso as the three 
lowest cost cotton producers).  
Cotton only represents 0.12 percent of world merchandise trade (Baffes, 2007); nonetheless, 
it is an indispensable commodity in a large part of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In Africa, 
cotton is typically produced by smallholders. More than two million rural households rely on 
cotton production to earn their living (Baffes, 2007). In some regions, it is the only cash crop 
and as such it represents the most important economic activity. The cotton sector’s share in 
the total merchandise exports of West and Central Africa (WCA) ranges from 25 to 45 
percent, while its share in GDP ranges from 3 to 6 percent (World Bank, 2004). Although 
Africa’s overall share in world agricultural trade declined from 1980 to 2005, the share of 
cotton trade more than doubled over the same period (Tschirley, Poulton, and Labaste, 
2009). This is due to a three-fold increase in cotton production from 1960 to 2001. These 
facts explain why the productivity and profitability of cotton production and processing are 
one of the key determinants of growth and of poverty across much of the continent. Minot 
and Daniels (2002), for example have estimated a 7 percent decrease in rural per capita 
income as a consequence of a 40 percent decrease in the cotton price received by growers in 
Benin. 
Although cotton is the most common natural fibre and has been known and used for at least 
5000 years, it was only introduced into most of SSA in the twentieth century during 
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colonization (anglophone Africa) or right after independence (francophone Africa). The 
main reason for its introduction was the need to supply the coloniser’s (or ex-coloniser’s) 
textile industry. The sector was initially a state monopoly throughout the region. Nowadays, 
the cotton sector varies considerably from West to East Africa, due to the reforms that 
occurred during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Such differences in the organization of the sector reflect the pattern of colonisation in Africa: 
while anglophone countries have adopted reforms resulting in a more competitive system 
and a marginalisation of state intervention, most francophone countries still retain the 
traditional statist system. Nevertheless, reforms have been attempted even in parts of 
francophone Africa, though the outcomes have generally been more limited as far as 
competition is concerned. Reforms in the sector have been supported by the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund which devised what has been seen as a standard reform 
package with the stated objectives of scaling down the role of the state, developing the 
private sector, and enhancing competition in both input and output markets1 inspired by 
Industrial Organisation theories.  
Industrial organization (IO) studies the functioning of markets. This can be either from an 
empirical or a theoretical perspective. The “Harvard tradition” developed the “structure-
conduct-performance” paradigm, which emphasises that market structure shapes firm 
conduct, and in turn market performance. The “new theoretical IO”, uses theoretical tools to 
help analyse markets, but also makes practical contributions as a consequence to positive 
analysis (describing the industry). IO tends to see different structures emerging in different 
industries reflecting specific features of the production technology and the character of retail 
markets (Tirole, 1988). IO theory relates the concentration in an industry to the degree of 
attainable scale economies (Viner, 1932). Few economies of scale will result in many small 
size entities in the sector and consequently a more competitive system, while large returns to 
                                                
1 The EU and national development agencies such as DFID UK (Department for International Development) 
have embraced the same goals. 
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scale result in few large entities and oligopolistic or monopolistic systems. 
Monopolies/monopsonies usually have a negative connotation of being related to price 
distortion, loss of social welfare (dead-weight welfare loss), loss of efficiency, and so forth. 
On the other hand more competitive systems are considered in theory as efficiency-
increasing, cost minimising and as such, social welfare enhancing.  
The cotton sector in SSA seems to challenge some aspects of IO. In general, more 
competitive cotton sectors have shown to be more efficient as far as prices received by 
farmers and cost efficiency are concerned, but have also shown that incentives for horizontal 
coordination among firms can be compromised undermining input provision. Such 
coordination is necessary to avoid free-riding risks and consequently allow for input credit 
and extension provision.  
Actually, Tschirley, Poulton and Labaste (2009) argue that results of the sector liberalization 
to date appear mixed. They state that in East Africa, where reforms were adopted first and to 
a greater extent, liberalisation has shown a positive impact on prices received by farmers, but 
a negative impact on the quality of seed cotton; prices and quality being the two key issues in 
the sector. In those francophone Africa countries where reforms have been adopted, the 
result according to these authors has most often been that of switching from a state 
monopoly to a private or semi-private monopoly with no major changes for the claimed 
ultimate beneficiaries of the reforms: smallholder farmers.  
Initially it may seem that price levels result solely from the sector structure and governance, 
but at a closer look other key determinants, such as quality and research, also play an 
influential role. Indeed, African cotton can differ in price considering quality premiums, 
which are partly due to the co-ordination inside the supply chains that can result in the 
monopolisation of the sector. It seems apparent that competition has consequences not only 
on seed cotton price, but also on the services provided to producers (such as the provision 
of credit for input, extension and research) and ultimately on cotton lint quality. Therefore, 
  
12 
even if these structures are theoretically more efficient, it is not clear whether smallholder 
cotton farmers are better off under this system than in a system in which they receive lower 
prices but have access to input credit and extension.  
This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate on reforms of the SSA cotton sector. 
Although there are recent buildups, as for example Swinnen et al. (2011) and Delpeuch et al. 
(2011) who discuss contract enforcement as a new pivotal variable, literature on this subject 
generally individuates the collapse of the input credit system as the main cause of the failure 
of reforms in the sector. The latter is arguably one important cause in the disappointing 
outcomes of the liberalized SSA cotton sectors, but it is not to be considered the one and 
only such cause. Along with input provision I consider maintenance of quality as an equally 
important feature to the survival of the sector. Although a fall in quality following 
liberalization is actually often mantioned in literature, it is rarely treated in depth. Considering 
its importance over the long run, the purpose of this research is to contribute to the existing 
literature in that it sheds light on this critical feature. More specifically, the purpose is to 
understand if a liberalization of the SSA cotton sector has the positive effects claimed by the 
IFIs (International Financial Institutions) from a quality perspective considering the link with 
prices obtained on the world market. The objective is tackled from multiple perspectives, 
starting from an analysis of the SSA cotton sector, its dynamics and individuation of its 
critical peculiarities; ending with an empirical analysis of the effects of liberalization on what 
here is recognised as the critical feature of the SSA cotton sector other than input credit 
provision.  
Section one lays out the bare bones of the cotton value chain, singling out each stage in the 
value chain: from the production of the raw material to the retail product. The purpose is to 
give a comprehensive overview of the present cotton-to-textile sector in SSA. The analysis 
also answers the question why grand part of the value added is not retained in the producing 
region.  
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Section two comprises two parts. Part one shapes the dynamics of the SSA cotton sectors 
from an Industrial Organization perspective, eventually reflecting industry-specific features. 
Furthermore, an Industrial Organisation analysis of the evolution of the sector from the 
nineteen sixties to nowadays is given, including an up-dated bird’s eye view of reform 
experience per country. Part one ends with identifying which critical features in the SSA 
cotton value chain are sensitive to the changes in sector design.  
Part two of the section analyzes three other SSA success cash crops (coffee, cocoa and tea) 
which have according to literature more succesfully become competitive. The purpose is to 
eventually draw a comparison with the cotton experience. 
Section three and four focus on two sensitive features of the cotton sector: research and 
quality.  
Section three gives a bird’s eye view of the status quo of research and development (R&D) 
units devoted to cotton in selected SSA cotton producing countries, framed in a broader 
picture of general agricultural research and development system. Further, data on R&D 
expenditure are considered in the attempt of understanding if reforms and design changes 
have had any influence on the public expences directed to R&D in cotton in SSA.  
The final section is devoted to a distinguishing feature of cotton production that is the 
presence of externalities in relation to the quality of cotton lint. Demand for quality in cotton 
lint has increased over time, due to the evolution in the spinning technology and to a 
saturation of the world cotton market. Lint quality is determined by the quality of the cotton 
fibre itself and by contamination (twigs, leaves etc.) thus involving a number of stages in the 
cotton value chain. The fibre characteristics of African cotton are in general superior to those 
of the cottons considered in calculating the Cotlook A Index and handpicking, which is 
general throughout Africa, can in principle ensure low contamination resulting in cleaner lint 
with fewer neps and can thereby obtain a premium on the world market. However, the 
achievement of such premiums is not inevitable. An analysis of the quality issues of cotton 
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and related externalities is drawn, eventually considering if reform experiences have affected 
this feature through an econometric analysis of data on prices and premiums (or discounts). 
The combination of the theoretical approach set out in sections 1 and 2 with the empirical 
analysis set out in section 4 have the purpose to provide systematic and comprehensive 
analysis. The empirical part of the dissertation includes data – average export premia for 
cotton before and after reforms - from the ASTI, the ICAC and Cotlook Ltd. This study 
should help analyze the success and failure of the African cotton reforms experience and the 
discussion of future policies both on the part of the producers and donors.  
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Chapter  I   
 
Mapping the SSA Cotton Sector  
 
 
Introduct ion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the subject of cotton and its value chain in sub-
Saharan Africa. I start with some “background information” on cotton in general and then 
pass to cotton in sub-Saharan Africa. In paragraph 1.3 I describe the cotton value chain more 
or less in general -keeping an eye on the cotton value chain in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)- and 
finally, in paragraph 1.4, I focus on the peculiarities/criticalities of the chain in SSA. 
 
1 Some general  background in formation  
The cotton plant belongs to the variety genus Gossypium. Although in the wild the plant 
grows up to ten metres high and is a perennial crop, for commercial cultivation it has been 
domesticated through breeding to range between one to two metres -in order to facilitate 
picking- and to be an annual crop. Regardless of its form –herbaceous or ligneous-, it thrives 
in dry tropical and subtropical areas. Among about fifty species of cotton plants within the 
world only four are cultivated for their fibres. The most commonly cultivated species of 
cotton in the world are Gossypium hirsutum and Gossypium barbadense. Gossypium hirsutum, 
oroiginally from Mexico, accounts for more than 90% of world fibre production. Gossypium 
barbadense, of Peruvian origin, accounts for about 5% of world fibre and includes some of the 
most precious species. The cotton plant is almost exclusively cultivated for its oleaginous 
seeds and for the fibres growing from them (i.e. cotton, strictly speaking). Cotton fibre is 
broadly classified into three categories based on the staple length; the short staple cotton has 
a staple length from one to two centimetres (cm). This kind of coarse cotton is used for 
carpets, blankets and coarse fabrics. The medium staple cotton fibre has a staple length in 
the range of one point five to three point five cm (American upland cotton belongs to this 
category). Long Staple (LS) and Extra Long Staple (ELS) cotton has staple lengths varying 
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between two point five cm to six point five cm. This is the highest quality fibre which 
includes varieties as Sea Island, Egyptian (Giza) and Pima cotton.  
The importance of cotton has changed in time: although it was the prime driving force for 
industrialising  Western Europe and the USA during the 18th and 19th Centuries, nowadays 
it only represents 0.12 percent of world merchandise trade (Baffes, 2007). Nonetheless, it is 
still the world’s leading natural fibre used in the textile industry (UNIDO 2007) and one of 
the most important and widely produced agricultural crops in the world with around seventy 
countries producing the crop and one hundred and fourty countries involved in the export or 
import of cotton (FAO, 2006). Out of the sixtyfive cotton-producing countries in 2007/08, 
fiftytwo were developing countries, twentyone of which were indexed by the United Nations 
among the least developed countries (LDCs). Cotton is actually crucially important to several 
developing countries (UNCTAD). In a large part of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) it is 
considered a critical cash crop with a role in poverty alleviation. 
Table 1- Cotton producing countries per area 
 Developed countries 
Developing countries 
Total 
LDCs Transition Other 
Africa  18  9 27 
North and Central 
America 1   1 2 
South America    8 8 
Caribbean    1 1 
Asia 1 3 6 12 22 
Europe 3  1  4 
Oceania 1    1 
Total 6 21 7 31 65 
Source: UNCTAD  
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In general at the country level cotton contributes to national economic growth, employment 
and trade earnings, through exports of the raw material and through the provision of the raw 
material for domestic or international textile production. Cotton exports give access to 
foreign exchange. At the household level, cotton is an important cash crop for millions of 
farmers worldwide particularly for a large number of the rural poor in least developed 
countries. The income generated from the crop contributes to rural household food security 
and cash for non food purchases, especially in developing and least developed countries. 
UNIDO (2007) reports there are millions of people worldwide who derive their livelihood 
from the cotton’s value chain and furthermore people are employed in the associated 
activities of trading and transportation of cotton. 
World Cotton product ion trend 
Over the past few decades world cotton production has steadily increased (FAO, 2007), 
mostly driven by the increase in yield since over the past fourty years the land cultivated with 
cotton has relatively stabilized while the average yield has doubled. A significant growth in 
production has also been registered in Africa (figure n.2) where production has increased by 
eighty-one percent from 1980 (FAO, 2005), though this was due to an expansion in 
cultivated land. In fact, many major producing countries in SSA such as Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Mali and Zimbabwe have seen their output more than double in the past twenty years and 
West and Central Africa (WCA) has gained importance in terms of production. When WCA 
countries are considered together, these are among the major cotton producers in the world. 
In the 1960s major cotton producers were the United States, China, India and Pakistan and 
as shown in figure n.1, little has changed since.  
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Figure 1. Cotton production from 1960 to 2011 for the world major cotton producers 
     Unit of measure: 1000 480 lb. Bales   Source: USDA 
Figure 2. Cotton production in SSA 
 
Unit of measure: 1000 480 lb. Bales   Source: USDA 
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influenced by trade in textiles and clothing. Although a large number of countries (nearly one 
hundred and fourty in 2006, FAO) are involved in the export or import of cotton, trade in 
cotton is dominated by a few importers and exporters. Four dominant exporters – USA, 
Francophone Africa, Uzbekistan and Australia - account for more than two-thirds of 
exports. China, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand and Bangladesh accounted for sixty-four percent 
of world cotton imports in 2006 (FAO). In particular, China imported nearly forty-four 
percent of the world cotton traded (2006) becoming the leading importer of cotton, in line 
with the expansion in its spinning and textile industries. The past decades have been 
characterised by a shift in the geographic location of the cotton consumption and cotton 
yarn and fabric production from developed to developing countries as a consequence to the 
decline in cotton mill use in industrialised countries - namely in North America, Western 
Europe, Australia and Japan - and to the removal of textile and clothing quotas in 2005 
(UNIDO). A rapid increase in mill consumption has contextually taken place in Asia which 
resulted in an increase in the demand of cotton with a consequential shift in trade flows from 
the four main exporting countries/regions to Asia, which now accounts for around seventy-
five percent of world cotton imports (UNIDO, 2005). Over the past decades SSA countries 
have gained importance as a source of exports: Burkina Faso and Mali are estimated as the 
world’s seventh and ninth largest exporters in 2012 (USDA). 
Figure 3. World major cotton exporters
 Unit of measure: 1000 480 lb. Bales   Source: USDA 
-­‐5000	  
0	  
5000	  
10000	  
15000	  
20000	  
1950	   1960	   1970	   1980	   1990	   2000	   2010	   2020	  
USA	  AUSTRALIA	  BRAZIL	  INDIA	  SSA	  
  
20 
Prices  
Cotton is in general priced in line with the Cotlook A Index pricing system although there 
exist a variety of pricing systems2. The Cotlook A Index is an index of the level of offering 
prices on the international market. The daily quotation is an average of the cheapest five 
quotations from a selection of sixteen upland cottons traded internationally. Prices are 
expressed in US dollars (or cents) per lb, c.i.f. (cleared, insured and forwarded) for delivery at 
a Northern Europe port. Premiums and discounts above or below the A Index are obtained 
in relation to various components. In addition to the A Index, there are quotations for 
coarser quality of cotton (the B Index), which is the average of the three least expensive of 
eight styles. 
As for other major commodities, world cotton prices have been under intense pressure with 
a downward turn since the mid-1990s (figure 4). A number of factors are generally adduced 
to explain the instability and significant downward trend in prices. On the supply side, 
fluctuation in world market prices is influenced by unpredictable fluctuations in production 
in and export from India3, Pakistan and China. The three countries are major producers and 
contextually major consumers of cotton; as a consequence lint is only exported when the 
cotton harvest is larger than domestic demand. China4 in particular, is the main ‘swing’ factor 
in world cotton trade and has a very strong impact on cotton prices. Other reasons 
advanced, are supportive government policies enacted by few developed cotton producing 
countries, which are considered to have been to the detriment of world cotton prices. The 
immediate effect of subsidies is to increase and maintain cotton production at otherwise 
unprofitable levels, mostly in industrialized countries. The excess supply that is induced by 
such subsidies has a depressing effect on the world market price. The claimed magnitude of 
the impact varies from one study to another due to the range of assumptions used. Among 
                                                
2 In the US, domestic cotton is priced against the NYMEX cotton contract. 
3 This year’s repeated news on India’s ban on cotton exports has had an immediate (boost) effect on world 
cotton prices (Cotton Grower) 
4 in particular its decisions regarding cotton stocks 
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others, according to Poulton (2008), US, EU and Chinese subsidies depress world cotton 
prices by around ten to fifteen percent in the short-medium term, reducing returns to 
producers in other major exporting regions such as West Africa, that do not benefit of such 
protective policies. Other estimates (Marianne citing Badiane et al. 2002) suggest, that the 
removal of US subsidies would lead to a substantial fall in US production, with a 
consequential rise in the international price in the short term by as much as 12 cents per 
pound. On the demand side, demand for raw cotton is driven by demand for textiles which 
in turn depends upon population increase, economic growth, and the price of man-made 
fibres, particularly of synthetic fibres which fiercely compete with cotton. Synthetic fibres 
have increased their share of the textile fibre market from fourty eight percent in 1995 to 
fifty five percent in 1999 (Minot and Daniels, 2002). This has further depressed demand for 
cotton and cotton prices (Baffes, 2002). 
Figure 4. World cotton price trend 
Source: ICAC 
 
Consumption 
Independently from its price trend, consumption of cotton has stayed quite steady when 
considered per person and has generally been growing in line with world population. Things 
change when we consider the ratio in world total fibre consumption. Until man-made fibres 
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appeared in the market (1940) cotton consumption was more than eighty percent of world 
total fibre consumption (from the beginning of the 20th century until the end of the second 
world war). In the 1940s, when man-made fibres appeared, a decreasing trend in cotton 
demand started and hasn’t stopped since. Cotton demand is strongly influenced by prices of 
man-made fibres (artificial and synthetic fibres) and since the early 2000’s, cotton 
consumption has fallen to roughly thirtynine percent of world fibre consumption. 
Contextually, the share of synthetic fibres rose to fifty-eight percent up from five percent in 
1960. Cotton consumption is higher in developed countries than in developing countries, but 
it is considered that the latter could play a key role in driving the increase in cotton 
consumption in the future. The current cotton consumption level in developing countries is 
actually very low, less than twenty-five percent of that in developed countries in 2004, but 
preliminary results of FAO/ICAC world cotton market projection for year 2015 suggest that 
world cotton production and consumption will continue to grow considering population 
growth and economic expansion.  
2 Cotton in SSA 
 
Cotton, which is an important cash crop as well as the major export commodity in many 
parts of the world, has an even greater importance in the African continent where the crop 
thrives thanks to climatic conditions. In Africa there are six cotton basins, the largest being 
the West African basin which stretches from Senegambia to South-Eastern Chad and even to 
the heart of the Central African Republic. Most importantly, cotton is a critical commodity in 
a large part of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which is acknowledged to be among the poorest 
regions in the world and where cotton is produced using relatively low levels of inputs and 
relatively cheap family labour compared to many other cotton producing regions in the 
world (UNIDO, 2007). In SSA, cotton production is mainly rain-fed and is concentrated in 
the tropical zone where dry seasons and humid seasons alternate. In SSA cotton is typically 
produced as a cash crop by smallholder subsistence farmers, on small family farms, with an 
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average size being less than one hectare. In West and Central Africa5 (WCA) more than two 
million rural households rely on cotton production to earn their living (Baffes, 2007). The 
number increases to some 15 million people when the indirect dependence on the crop is 
taken into account (UNIDO, 2007; UNCTAD). In some regions cotton is the only cash crop 
and as such it represents the most important economic activity. In the Sahel for example 
there have historically been very few alternative crops. In terms of exports it ranks second to 
cocoa, but is more widespread through SSA and although we will not find Africa among the 
three world major cotton producers (table 1), West and Central Africa (WCA) alone is the 
world’s third greatest cotton lint exporter (table 3). At the country level, cotton is also an 
important source of foreign exchange earnings and income from taxation for cotton 
producing countries in SSA. The cotton sector’s share in the total merchandise exports of 
WCA ranges from 25 to 45 percent, while its share in GDP ranges from 3 to 6 percent 
(World Bank, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Out of the 12 leading African cotton-producing countries, eight are in West Africa. 
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Table 2. Macro-economic importance of cotton in selected cotton producing countries  
Average for 2006-
2010 
Cotton Lint 
Exports  
(in million US $) 
Share in Country’s  
Agricultural 
Exports 
Benin 135.3 28,69 % 
Burkina Faso 184.5 60,87% 
Cameroon 88.1 11,47% 
Chad 37.4 38,75 
Mali 119.2 42,62% 
UR Tanzania 65.7 8,39% 
Zambia 45.9 12,14% 
Zimbabwe 112.7 16,65% 
         Source: Faostat 
Moreover, in contrast with the rest of agriculture, the sector has shown a three-fold increase 
in production from 1960 to 2001 and still shows to have an important growth potential on 
the world market due to the high intrinsic quality of the African fibre and to its relatively low 
unit production costs.  
Cotton has been regarded as a major example of a “success story” in the agricultural 
development in SSA as confirmed by the big dimensions of the sector in most of the region. 
As such it is critical to rural economies and has consequences on macroeconomic stability. 
Consequently, world cotton price developments have major implications in the war against 
rural poverty. For example, it has been estimated that a forty percent decline in price would 
lead to a seven percent reduction of the rural income in Benin (Minot and Daniels, 2002). 
The role of cotton as a major source of income, employment, foreign exchange, and tax 
revenues and thus as a pro-poor growth critical factor is generally recognised.  
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History 
Cotton was only introduced into most of SSA in the twentieth century during colonisation 
(anglophone Africa) or right after independence (francophone Africa). The main reason for 
its introduction was the need to supply the colonisers’ (or ex-colonisers’) textile industries 
which had been deprived of their major sources of supply as a consequence to major strikes 
in India (1850’s) and later the Civil War in the US (1861-1865) which resulted in the 
disappearance of the unpaid labour of slaves. The combination with the rapid development 
of the textile industry in Europe resulted in the pressure for new sources of cotton and 
European governments turned to their African colonies. In 1903, the English established in 
Nigeria the British Cotton Growers Association (BCGA) following the trials in The Gambia 
and Sierra Leone. The French government engaged in a few unsuccessful trials in the Senegal 
Valley, where a long-standing cotton tradition was already present, then the Casamance, and 
Mali. Finally, it was the savannahs of French Equatorial Africa (AEF), lying between 
Cameroon, Chad, and the Central African Republic, that constituted the first successful 
cotton basin. Since the 1970s, the latter is still the most important basin in the region (42% 
of West African production) ahead of the Nigerian basin (38%). In WCA cotton production 
was also given the role of engine of development in a broader rural scenario and 
governements assumed a primary role from the beginning. In those areas, cotton played a 
major role in rural development by facilitating input supply for other crops in cotton zones 
and helping farmers invest in animal traction and other equipment that improved overall 
farm productivity and incomes. In East and South Africa (ESA) instead, cotton cultivation 
originated from commercial or missionary activity, and local governments assumed a role in 
the sector only later on. A part from these differences, throughout SSA the sector was 
organised as a state monopoly6 , resulting in vertical integration and public companies 
providing factors that are to date still considered critical to the sector: input credit, research, 
                                                
6 Actually the organisation was a monopsony for seed cotton purchase and a monopoly for cotton input sale. 
  
26 
extension, and the price announcement system. It is often described as the “cotton system”, 
which provided: 
• the procurement of inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, etc.),  
• the supply of agricultural services (extension, training and supervision, and support for 
 producer organisations),  
• the organisation of marketing, and the setting-up of basic economic and social 
infrastructure, such as roads, schools, health  centres, etc.   
Nowadays the sector is not as homogeneously organised and its design varies from the 
former vertically integrated system to a competitive system and all that can be in between. 
This will be analysed in chapter 2. 
 
3 Value chain f rom cot ton to  garment 
 
In this section I will first go through the cotton value chain in general, keeping an eye to its 
characteristics in SSA. I will then re-analyze the cotton value chain highlighting the 
criticalities peculiar to it in SSA. 
 
 In general  
 
A cotton value chain may be generically thought of as a simple linear string of 
transformations of a raw material into a final consumer product. A value chain typically has 
about five stages: production, processing, distribution, retail, and consumption. For cotton 
this goes from growing cotton, followed by harvesting, to ginning, spinning and then knitting 
or weaving yarn into fabric, and finally to garment manufacturing. In fact, cotton travels 
through a much more complex supply chain, involving a number of interconnected stages 
which include (origin of) farm inputs, farm technology, cultivation, harvesting, storage, 
processing which entails the extraction of fibres, primary processing of the fibre for 
marketing, to secondary processing of the fibre to yarn, then dyeing and other processing to 
convert the yarn into fabrics, making clothes and garments. Each step also needs to be 
supported by services such as credit and transport, institutional services such as 
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infrastructure, markets, grading, standard, research and extension.  
 At a c loser  look  
Cotton in SSA is produced by smallholder peasants whose farms range around two hectares. 
If we skip land preparation, a labour intensive activity rarely done with the aid of machinery 
in SSA, the first step in the cotton value chain will be planting and cultivation. In this stage 
inputs are: seeds, fertilizer, pesticide and labour. Of the total farming cost, pesticide takes the 
largest share. Actually, cotton is in general the most pesticide consuming crop (ICAC). 
Following cultivation is harvesting. Cotton can be harvested either by hand or machine. 
Although 40 countries harvest some cotton by machine, only three (the United States, 
Australia and Israel) harvest approaching one hundred percent by machine (ITC). About 
seventy percent of the over one hundred million bales of cotton produced globally are 
harvested by hand. This is a labour intensive activity and as such it is suitable for the SSA 
region which is abundant in low cost labour.  
The harvested raw cotton is then stored, usually in collection points. Adequate storage 
facilities for seed cotton are essential if we consider that weathering reduces its quality. Seed 
cotton may be stored in piles on the ground, or in sheds, storage houses, trailers or modules 
so long as it is protected from weather damage and from excessive ground moisture. 
Moisture content, length of storage, amount of high-moisture foreign matter, variation in 
moisture content throughout the stored mass, initial temperature of the seed cotton, 
temperature of the seed cotton during storage, weather factors during storage (temperature, 
relative humidity, rainfall), and protection of the seed cotton from rain and wet ground all 
affect seed and fibre quality during seed cotton storage. 
Successively cotton makes its way to the ginner/s which are usually located in the cotton 
growing area but not necessarily. In this stage the conditions of existing infrastructure, i.e. 
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roads, railways are important. 
At the gin the seed cotton is processed. The ginning process is classified into ginning and 
pressing, i.e., putting the ginned cotton into layers. First, large trash components such as 
burs, limbs, and branches must be extracted from the seed cotton before they are broken up 
and embedded in the cotton, this is the seed cotton cleaning stage. Subsequently, cotton is 
processed by the gin stand. Ginning is, in its strictest sense, the process of separating cotton 
fibers from the seeds. The technology used in ginning can be either saw gins or roller gins. In 
SSA saw gins are generally used. Fibre represents forty-two percent of the ginning output, 
the remaining fifty-eight percent is cotton oil seeds and planting seeds (ICAC, Cotton Facts). 
The next step is bailing and packing: staple fibres are compacted by mechanical means into 
bales (bailing)7. Bale packaging is the final step in processing cotton at the gin. Packaging 
materials have shown to be important related to the maintenance of quality of the cotton lint 
and the trend is to move towards packaging materials made of cotton themselves.  
The ultimate objectives of the ginner are to produce lint of satisfactory quality for the 
grower’s classing and market system; and to gin the cotton with minimum reduction in fibre 
spinning quality so that the cotton will meet the demands of its ultimate users, the spinners.  
 
The extracted cotton fibres and cottonseed are then marketed. Cottonseed is predominantly 
used and thus sold in the domestic market8. It goes to domestic edible oil mills which process 
(crush) the cotton seeds mechanically to obtain cotton seed oil used for human 
                                                
7 Bales are formed at the end of the ginning, drying and cleaning process by accumulating cotton fibres in a 
chamber called a press box. While in the press box, bulk cotton fibre is compressed by hydraulic rams straps or 
bands are added at the press box to contain cotton fibres to form the bale. (Cotton Exporter’s Guide) 
8 In many West ans Central African countries, cottonseed oil (used as oil or margarine) provides the main 
source of fat and oil supply and has several food applications. Actually, according to FAO statistics, it can be 
considered that only 3% to 5% of the African cottonseed oil production has effectively been exported over the 
2000-2005 period. Cottonseed oil may also be further refined for use in soaps and cosmetics. According to the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) statistics (December 2008), cottonseed oil ranked fifth in 
production among vegetable oils in the 2007/08 crop season with a bit less than 4% of world volumes. 
UNCTAD  
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consumption. The residue, i.e. oil cake residue or cotton seed meal, is high in proteins (about 
40%) and is usually marketed for livestock breeding although it can have other uses such as 
fertilizer. The fibres instead, are sold to domestic or international textile and garment 
factories directly, or through international merchants after being classed.  
Classing is the determination of the quality of the fibre. The quality of the cotton fibre is 
determined by three factors, namely, the colour, purity (the absence of foreign matter) and 
quality of the ginning process, and the length of fibres (USDA). Classification is not 
mandatory, but growers generally find it essential to marketing their crop. Prior to the 
development of official standards, cotton was marketed primarily on the basis of its variety 
and where it was grown, although some physical standards for cotton classification (sets of 
physical samples) were used privately. In 1914 the US Department of Agriculture established 
physical standards as a means of determining colour grade, staple length and strength, and 
other qualities and properties with the United States Cotton Futures Act. These standards 
have thereafter been agreed upon and accepted by the leading European cotton associations 
and exchanges (USDA). An invariably binding international standard has not been adopted 
as yet and there are cotton producing countries that have taken up their own standard related 
to their cotton. 
 
Once it is graded, the cotton lint is marketed. The lint cotton is marketed through an auction 
process like cotton oilseed. The auction is usually held for each grade or specific quality of 
the lint cotton. While the domestic buyers, mainly the textile factories, obtain information 
about the tender directly from the local media, buyers from other countries access the market 
either through international trading companies or, less often, through direct contact with the 
producer. The majority of internationally traded lint is handled by trading companies which 
play a key role as bridges between ginners and spinning mills which represent the next stage 
in the cotton value chain. Trading companies buy cotton from far reaches of the world and 
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sell it through global markets.  
The major end use of cotton fibre is wearing apparel, which accounts for about sixty percent 
of cotton consumption (ICAC). Other major end uses for cotton fibre include home 
furnishings (draperies eventually the third major end use, ICAC) and other industrial uses 
such as medical supplies or professional garments. 
The second part of the cotton value chain starts with the fibre - obtained from the ginning 
process- reaching a spinning mill. Spinning is the process of making yarn from unbundled 
fibres: this is where the fibre is spun into yarns and threads. Cotton fibre reaches the 
spinning mills in the form of bales which undergo a series of processess before spinning 
takes place. In order to ensure homogeneity, which is particularly important in the spinning 
process, cotton bales are sampled in terms of lint quality and origin. They are then opened 
through bale openers to make lint fluffy and ready for the cleaning stage during which air-jet 
cleaners remove extraneous matter from the lint. At this stage loose fibres are not aligned 
and parallel in a single continuous strand. The carding stage separates, straightens, aligns and 
condenses fibres into a single continuous strand, removing impurities. A sliver of 
approximately one-meter width is then obtained. Carded cotton may be combed, but this is 
an optional process and is only used to produce superior quality yarn and with long, or extra 
long-staple fibres.  
The yarn obtained from spinning can further undergo either weaving or knitting to obtain 
fabric. This can be then processed by a second group of business units specialized in 
finishing, i.e., bleaching, dyeing, printing and optionally other processes. The “finished” 
fabric can eventually undergo processing in the final group of business units in the chain, 
specialized in cutting garment and manufacturing (sewing) fabrics. Clothing is then produced 
and further distributed to retailers.  
The finishing part of the chain accounts for a substantial part of the value added. 
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4 A Cri t i ca l  overv i ew o f  the  co t ton value chain in SSA  
 
In this secion I will critically go through the cotton value chain that is specific to SSA, 
accounting for the plusses and minuses (breakdowns in the flows of the chain) that 
characterize it.  
Land preparat ion   
Cotton is considered a particularly demanding crop: it causes land exhaustion possibly 
leading to soil degradation and eventually desertification. This has been experienced 
throughout the WCA region for example, despite the increased use of fertilizers (UNIDO, 
2007). Thus, especially in cotton cultivation areas in SSA, soil fertility needs to be accounted 
for. At present, extension services are failing to educate producers on the correct use of 
fertilizers, successful crop rotation (with a culture of leguminous plant and one of cereal), 
fallow periods, replenishment of organic matter, tillage, water control and so forth as 
measures to avoid a decline in soil fertility, soil erosion and eventually desertification. In a 
UNIDO report (2007), laboratory analysis of soil by each farmer is recommended as a means 
to a more rational use of fertilizers and to increase productivity. 
Plant ing and cul t ivat ion   
Cotton is an input-intensive crop. Inputs necessary for cotton production are expensive for 
the small SSA farmer and cannot be done without if a profitable result is pursued. Due to 
lack of credit associations in the SSA area, farming inputs and equipments generally need to 
be taken on credit basis, offered based on an implicit agreement that the small farms will sell 
their final harvest to the ginners who give out the credit. Such kind of arrangement has 
remained to be the only alternative that the small farms have in the SSA area (Poulton et al. 
2008; Abudullahi and Ayele, 2008). Input provision is often pointed out as the weak link in 
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the chain that makes competitive cotton sectors fail as a consequence to side selling - not 
enabling ginners to recover from the cost of input credit provision. 
As far as seed inputs are concerned, particularly important is the quality of cotton seeds –
determined by variety, production and storing- all of which have consequnces on 
productivity and fibre quality. Research plays a role not only in the development of seed 
variety but also in seed reproduction which contrasts the distribution of “second hand” seeds 
(which entails poor quality and low germination). One example for all is the drop in lint 
quality recorded in 2006/2007 in Uganda, in grand part due to the break down in the seed 
wave which has caused the sector to be using 2002 (old) seeds (Ministry of Agriculture 
Uganda, 2009). Quality of cotton is also hampered when seeds are distributed late in relation 
to planting time. Research including seed multiplication, remains mainly a public expenditure 
matter in SSA. The private sector participation in the research stage in the cotton chain is still 
trivial as a consequence to inadequate intellectual property rights legislation (UNIDO, 2007; 
USAID). These issues will be considered in more detail in chapter three which I dedicate to 
research in cotton in SSA.  
Input provision, be it from producer organisations, cooperatives, ginners or private traders, 
also needs inputs to be selected, stored and distributed.  
Harves t ing   
Cotton may be either harvested by hand or with the aid of specific machines (machine-
picked). Hand picking sees farmers collect cotton flowers into a big bag each picker has. The 
material used for such bags has been on trial since in most cases polypropylene (PP) is used, 
which has shown to contaminate cotton in an undetectable way until it is dyed, thus having 
consequences on textile quality. Some ginners have therefore decided to distribute cotton-
made collecting bags to farmers to avoid this problem. Contamination still remains a major 
problem which has consequences on quality reputation and thus on price. Extension services 
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should educate and train farmers not to collect cotton in PP bags nor allow presence of 
foreign matter in the bags or collection points (UNIDO, 2007). Use of cotton bags needs to 
be incentivized so as to assure elimination of contamination and the consistency in quality 
that international merchants seek for. 
Machine picking is faster and gives a reliable result. Still it is less accurate –higher levels of 
vegetal matter leaf and twig fragments are left- and kind to the flower than hand picking and 
the quality of the resulting lint is lower. Machine picking of cotton also demands a 
defoliation stage before cotton flowers can be picked. In addition, the necessary machinery 
represents a non trivial cost which most SSA cotton producing countries are not yet able to 
face.  
In SSA cotton is still mainly hand-picked. This was once considered an advantage since it 
better protects the quality of cotton and is considered to deliver cleaner cotton, thus making 
it a potential candidate for the premium price on international markets. Nevertheless, 
international merchants have been in recent years showing a preference for machine picked 
cotton because of its reliable though less ambitious results while hand picked cotton is more 
aleatory and is also subject to contamination from PP. As a result, machine-picked cotton 
currently trades at a premium over hand-picked. Poulton et al. (WB 2008) consider that if the 
institutional arrangements were put in place to give smallholder farmers strong incentives to 
avoid contamination of their seed cotton, hand-picked African cotton could achieve useful 
premia over the benchmark A Index lint price. An example is the Zambian cotton which has 
seen an increase of eight to ten percent in the total lint value with a rise in its premium over 
the A Index price. Contamination is a particularly important issue: according to a World 
Bank report (2008) solving the contamination problem means a “significant increase, both in 
quantity and in the unit price of WCA exported cotton…” and as such should be a top 
priority. Tschirley and Kabwe (2007), consider that there is an increased demand for quality 
in the world cotton market as the premia and the discounts have increased. The authors also 
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claim that contamination of cotton in Africa has been shown to reduce premia by up to 
twenty percent.  
Harvesting is thus an important stage since it entails the cleanliness of the raw cotton. Cotton 
that will be processed by gins needs to be clean from trash – foreign matter such as vegetal 
parts and seed coat fragments- since dirt particles in the cotton flower can seriously damage 
ginning machines thus leading to additional costs. According to the International Textile 
Manufacturers Federation (ITMF) Cotton Contamination Survey 2011, “foreign matter, 
stickiness and seed-coat fragments in raw cotton pose serious challenges to the cotton 
spinning industry worldwide.". Notably, the survey also identifies where from and to what 
degree comes clean or contaminated raw cotton, which arguably has consequences on 
country reputation. In the 2011 Survey, very clean raw cottons were recorded to have  
originated among others in Benin and the United States, while the most contaminated cotton 
originated in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, India, China and Turkey.  
Stor ing  
Once collected, cotton is then sold either at the farm or in collection points where it is 
stored. There is a general lack of storage facilities close to producers. Contamination needs to 
be contrasted at this stage also for example by making better storage devices available instead 
of just leaving the harvested cotton in open air in collecting points. 
Transportat ion to  the g inner  for  process ing   
While it may be said that cotton is bulky to transport in general, additional considerations 
need to be accounted for when referring to transportation in the SSA region. Here SSA has 
in general, a competitive disadvantage which also needs to be considered in the stage after 
processing, when cotton lint is transported from the ginner to the port, to leave for 
international destinations. The competitive disadvantage is related to the region in general, 
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but landlocked countries are particularly concerned: transporting cotton from landlocked 
countries to ports is known to be costly, difficult and time consuming. The high transport 
costs are a consequence of a number of facts. First of all, the infrastructure of the transport 
network is not well developed as a consequence of neglected investment in basic 
infrastructure, namely roads and railways but also ports. However, there are more reasons 
and even when roads are reasonable, freight transport costs tend to be higher in Africa, for 
example in comparison to Asia: as of Poulton et al. (WB 2008) these are up to four-five 
times higher in Francophone Africa than in Pakistan or India on comparable roads. Among 
other causes are high costs for new vehicles due to high import duties, also on spare parts 
(higher in comparison to Asia), slow and corrupt border crossings, high fuel prices, and 
institutionalized rent-seeking in the form of trucking syndicates (USAID). Moreover, Asian 
drivers are also given a greater degree of responsibility for business performance than their 
counterparts in Africa which encourages them to use freight forwarding agents, and drive at 
much lower speeds with consequent lower fuel and accident costs (Poulton et al., WB 2008).  
Ginning 
Once the raw cotton has reached the gin, it is processed. The technology used to separate the 
cotton fibres from the seeds, i.e. ginning, can be either the saw-gin or the roller-gin. In SSA 
the saw-gin is used almost invariably (one exception is Zimbabwe). The reason is that the 
saw gin is much faster and as such less expensive to operate. The roller-gin instead, is slower, 
i.e. with a low ginning rate, but is on the other hand more gentle to the cotton flower and 
tends to break down less the fibres compared to the saw-gin. Notably, this makes the roller-
gin more suitable for processing valuable long-staple cottons such as SSA ones. In fact, it is 
used in the US for ginning Pima cotton so as to protect its extra long staple which is 
acknowledged to increase the quality and thus the value of the cotton fibre. For the same 
reason, Egypt, a major producer of Long Staple (LS) and Extra Long Staple (ELS) cotton, 
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also uses roller-gin equipment. The saw-gin is actually more suitable for ginning short staple 
upland cottons. Ginning has a role in maintaining cotton quality, and is a prerequisite for 
obtaining good ginning outcome thus, it is not surprising that it is recommended that SSA 
cotton producers (UNIDO, 2007) invest in roller-gin installations instead of keeping the 
existing “obsolete equipment” operating9. In addition, the roller-gin has a robust structure 
with no major breakdown or maintenance problems. Maintenance of old equipment has 
actually been highlighted as the highest cost in the ginning stage, followed by the cost of 
power which is also a major problem. Criticalities related to electricity are its high costs10 and 
the inadequacy of its supply which is hampered by repeated interruptions11. Electricity is 
actually a recurrent problem in SSA and the inadequacy in its supply affects also other stages 
of the cotton value chain.  
Ginning has been described as one of the weakest links in the existing SSA cotton chain 
(UNIDO), due to the need of renovation in terms of technology, management and 
integration to increase capacity utilization. Still more than ninety percent of total ginning 
costs have been calculated to be variable costs showing that the cotton ginning business can 
be profitable and its profitability can be enhanced by incresed capacity of operation to 
harness economies of scale. Profitability in the ginning stage is measured by the Ginning 
Outturn Ratio (GOT), i.e. the ratio of lint to seed cotton produced by the ginning process. 
Anglophone SSA cotton producing countries seem to have in general a lower current GOT 
in comparison to Francophone SSA, this is in grand part due to low capacity utilization as a 
consequence of low cotton production12 which also causes many ginneries to be in a state of 
disrepair or lie idle. The main problems ginners face in SSA include inadequate cotton 
                                                
9 It entails buying spare parts and costs for maintenance 
10 The Ministry of Agriculture (..) of Uganda reports that the costof electricity is more than twice that in 
competing markets of Bangladesh and China. 
11 Abudullahi  and Ayele report that electricity interruption results in almost twenty percent of the idle time of 
the ginning factory studied in Ethiopia. 
12 According to the Report (2009) by the Ministry of Agriculture of Uganda the current ginning outturn (GOT) 
is 34% in Uganda as compared to say 44% in countries like Zimbabwe. Cotton ginning in Uganda is 
characterized by excess capacity and a low ginning outturn. Only ten-twenty percent of the installed capacity is 
used.  
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volumes, high cost of power and its reliability, lack of crop finance and high transport costs. 
Bail ing 
Once the cotton is ginned and separated into lint cotton, cotton oil seeds and planting seeds, 
the lint is bailed and packed to make it ready for market. In this stage also, contamination 
must be fought against. Ginneries in SSA still mostly use PP to pack cotton which as 
mentioned, can create a problem to the final quality of the lint and is only detectable once 
the lint is dyed, thus late in the chain. Investment is needed if cotton packing is to be used 
(UNIDO, 2007), this also happens to be the most expensive among possible packing 
materials.  
Class ing  o f  the  co t ton l int  
International merchants have a preference for reliable and universally accepted methods of 
determination of cotton quality parameters. In the USA, Australia and Brazil and other 
cotton producing countries for example, instrument classification has been adopted (High 
Volume Instruments). High Volume Instruments (HVI) equipment enables a step towards 
standardized instrument testing for cotton. This equipment enables various physical 
parameters of cotton fibres, such as fibre length, short fibres, fibre length uniformity, fibre 
strength and elongation, micronaire, maturity, colour, and trash, to be measured and 
recorded instantly. Still even HVI need to ultimately make these measurements recognised 
invariably in the international trade of cotton13. In SSA, almost all cotton is still manually 
classed and graded. Manual grading is based on appearance and feel, and is accomplished 
mainly through the senses of sight and touch. Manual grading includes determinations for 
such factors as colour grade, leaf grade, staple length, identification of foreign or extraneous 
matter. These determinations are based upon visual comparisons with physical and 
                                                
13 HVI testing needs to overcome problems related to the uniformity of its testing 
  
38 
descriptive standards. This kind of grading causes the incorrect positioning of SSA cotton in 
the international markets to the detriment of prices obtained by exporters and growers 
(UNIDO). Exceptions are Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Togo and Senegal where HVI systems have 
been installed. Consequently HVI data can be provided when selling cotton from such 
countries.  
Another gap in the marketing infrastructure for cotton is a missing African standard for 
cotton and an African quality label. This would make SSA cotton quality recognisable in the 
world market and thus increase its market value. Virtuous examples do exist: official cotton 
standards have been put into practice– the Tanzania Cotton board for example has 
established quality standards for those attributes of cotton that affect quality in general in the 
cotton value chain, be it of the finished product or of the manufacturing efficiency; Benin 
has its own cotton labels for different quality grades. 
From the g inner  to  the  sp inner  
Once that the cotton lint is graded, it is auctioned off to domestic spinners or international 
trading companies - in place of international spinners. The reference price is the Index A 
Cottlook price, or Index B for short staple cotton. Each producing country will achieve a 
different export pricing due to a number of issues raging from differences in quality 
parameters (premia or discounts), to differences in geographic location. In particular, the 
amount of inland transport necessary to reach the nearest port, a warehouse or the designed 
spinner, will be to the detriment of the price eventually negotiated. Countries which enjoy 
coastal advantages have significantly lower transport costs. Additional pressures on exporting 
prices have been accused by Francophone African Countries owing to the liaison of their 
currencies to the Euro which has in recent years been strong against the US Dollar. 
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From f ibre  to  garment 
The cotton sectors in SSA are predominantly export oriented, as almost all the lint is 
exported in fibre (raw) form. It is estimated that about ninety percent of the fibres are 
exported, while only ten percent are processed into yarn and then textiles by local industries, 
partly considered to be due to the demand for foreign currencies by parastatal marketing 
organizations (ICAC, 2008). In fact, the textile and garment industrial capacity is considered 
to be the world’s weakest in comparison to other cotton producing regions of the world 
(UNECA, 2009). The only development in this direction has been the traditional textiles 
industry, which has existed in the region for more than fifty years. The textile industry 
capacity is in general also much less than local cotton production in almost all sub-regions of 
SSA. This is a lost opportunity since the substantial part of the value added in the cotton 
value chain -about eighty to ninety percent of the value (UNECA, 2009)- goes to foreign 
ginners and textile industries. Hence, Africa’s cotton production is considered to be generally 
under-exploited14.  
However, there are differences between Francophone and Anglophone SSA. Francophone 
Africa first recorded a boom in the textile industry from 1965 to 1985, which has then been 
eroded by a subsequent crisis. This has brought especially spinning, weaving and knitting 
plants to go out of business. Consequently, Francophone countries export more than ninety 
percent of the cotton they produce in the form of (unprocessed) fibres. In Anglophone SSA 
instead, up to ninety percent of the cotton produced is consumed domestically by the textile 
industry (e.g. Nigeria and Ghana). The Gambia, Ghana and Niger, actually have higher 
processing capacities than their actual cotton production, but their production of cotton is 
remarkably low compared to other SSA subregions. In fact, production of cotton in 
                                                
14 This is true as far as the production of cotton lint is considered, but not for the production of cotton seed oil 
or cottonseed cake. Infact, cotton grain is largely processed, particularly to extract the oil for human 
consumption and the cotton seed cake for cattle feed; cotton oil is ranked fifth in terms of global cooking oil 
consumption and oil cake ranks second in animal feed consumption, behind soya. (FAOSTAT) 
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Francophone countries is much more copious than that in Anglophone countries (Appendix 
1). 
In general, what is described as the “middle” of the value chain - specifically spinning plants, 
weaving mills, knitting units, and dyeing and finishing units - is largely missing in SSA 
(USAID, UNIDO, UNECA). Following is a review per step in the fibre to garment part of 
the cotton value chain. 
Spinning   
The existing equipment across SSA is old, obsolete or low-productivity. USAID (2006) 
reports that in Francophone Africa installed spinning capacity is just under four percent of 
the cotton crop and that in 2006 lint consumption by spinning mills was even less - only two 
percent. Spinning plants have been calculated to need a seventy-five percent rate capacity 
utilization in order to be profitable, in 2006 in Francophone Africa the rate was fifty-seven 
percent for spinning mills, much below the needed level (USAID). Anglophone Africa is not 
very different. Spinning capacity in Uganda consumes up to ten percent of domestic lint 
production (production is less copious than in Francophone Africa), but there are only two 
operational spinners that are also subsidized with much of its spinning capacity lying idle and 
about ninety percent of Uganda’s lint exported raw i.e. not spinned.  
In general spinning is hampered by various problems across SSA, including cost and 
reliability of power, human resource capacity and high cost of accessing seaport. The lack in 
trained personnel has spinning and weaving depend on expatriate staff, entailing higher 
hiring costs. The spinning stage is also affected by the shortcomings in cotton classification 
afore reported: spinners demand certain fibre characteristics (notably length, strength, 
uniformity of fibre and maturity) which are not comprehensively accounted for by manual 
classification, thus calling for investment in machine testing also related to spinning 
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imperatives. Recovering this part of the chain is not trivial since spinning requires large 
investments in new or good-quality used machinery, sufficient scale and reasonable energy 
costs (USAID).  
Weaving   
Weaving capacity is utilized to up to fifty-eight percent in Francophone Africa, thus more 
fully than are other segments of the value chain (USAID). Most of the looms are narrow 
width which can do little else but make base fabrics for African prints and, to some extent, 
fabrics for the cotton growing and ginning industry (cotton picking bags and bale cloth for 
example). Thus, a large part of this capacity is used for weaving African print and wax cloth. 
A concern is that the African print market is shrinking as a consequence to legal and illegal 
cheap African print imports from Asia and the growing demand for western type clothing so 
the survival of the operating weaving mills is endangered. Wide-width looms are few and 
where they have been installed, there is no wide-width dyeing and finishing equipment, 
relegating these companies to producing sheeting and fabrics for the cotton growing and 
ginning industries in greige state. The recurrent constraint of the lack of technical staff 
affects this industry also and using expatriate technicians is costly. A needed expansion of the 
weaving industry asks for companies to invest in new or good second-hand equipment which 
is costly.  
Knit t ing  
Knitting capacity is six percent of weaving capacity across Francophone Africa and is poised 
to expand, albeit modestly in the short run (USAID). Knitting investments are considered to 
be the most in place in SSA since they can be smaller scale and require less capital.  
Finishing (b leaching ,  pr int ing ,  dye ing . . )   
Over half (52%) of the dyeing and finishing capacity is in Ghana, where actual utilization is 
only thirty percent of capacity. Across Francophone countries, utilization is forty-one 
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percent of installed capacity. As other stages also dyeing and finishing require more up-to-
date machinery. Peculiar to this stage is the compulsoriness of a big quantity of water, which 
sees countries with very limited supplies of water -particularly dry Sahelian countries- as poor 
candidates for a finishing industry expansion.  
Cutt ing  
In SSA only a limited range of fabric is available due to the missing industries mentioned 
afore. This causes apparel producers (for the U.S. and EU markets) to source fabric primarily 
from Asia. An expansion of the cutting industry could be enhanced if fabric were traded 
across African regions for example from Southern African countries, especially South Africa, 
Mauritius and Lesotho, which are able to provide a wide range of fabric, including woven 
and knit cotton, polyester, mixes, viscose, acrylic, and wool. USAID considers that prices 
would be more competitive as well as delivery time (seven to ten days) than if sourced from 
Asia (four to six weeks). Timing is becoming increasingly important as time to market, from 
order to delivery, is currently twelve weeks or less for most garments. 
Sewing  
Limited availability of yarn, particularly waxed yarns and synthetic or mixed 
(polyester/cotton) yarns keeps the industry at a non-professional level in the whole area.  
 
5 Conc luding Remarks  
It is acknowledged that three types of “flows” can be distinguished within a supply chain: 
flows of materials, flows of services, and flows of information; each of which have equal 
importance.   
Among other failures, flows of information and services particularly seem to wreck the 
correct functioning of the chain. Information flows communicate characteristics related to 
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quality, safety, and consumer demand. Information flows are transmitted in both directions 
and breakdowns in information between actors can lead to inefficiencies. Existing capacity 
results highly under utilized.  
A recurrent problem affecting the chain in SSA is generally high-cost electricity and power, 
as hydroelectric power is limited and most countries are dependent on fossil fuels to generate 
electricity. Limited and difficult access to finance also affects the cotton value chain as a 
whole since it undermines almost every stage in the chain: from production of the crop to 
the textile industry. Investor incentive packages are highly variable, ranging from good in 
Ghana and Mali to incomplete or poor in Senegal and Benin; and some governments are 
considered not to really understand foreign investor needs and requirements (USAID). 
Bureaucracy intended as port operations and document clearing, customs clearance and 
freight forwarding are generally slow and inadequate considering rapid global 
communications and trade and increasing pressure to reduce time to market. The lack of 
availability of industry-experienced production and quality managers which results in 
dependence on expatriate technicians and managers in textile and apparel operations 
particularly affects the textile industry part of the chain as much as a more general absence of 
an industrial-production work culture, where workers specialize in performing a limited 
number of repetitive operations rapidly, within production-line teams, and with minimal 
errors in a larger production facility. The existing textile industry albeit uncompetitive 
internationally, is the second largest employer in West Africa after agriculture15 which makes 
the shrinking of the domestic market as a result of second-hand clothing imports and 
smuggling of Asian imitations of African prints, even more penalizing.  
The investments needed to enhance the textile industry in SSA require huge amounts of 
capital not to mention the scale the industry needs to achieve in order to be competitive with 
                                                
15 Between sixty-five and seventy percent of Malian artisans, fifty percent of Burkinabe artisans and thirty to 
fourty percent of Ghanaian artisans operate in the traditional textile sector. 
  
44 
plants in Asia (UNIDO). The rationale behind such investments could be according to 
UNIDO, that US and EU buyers do not want to be entirely dependent on Asian apparel and 
fabric suppliers and sourcing from SSA would give buyers an alternative, as the global 
apparel market becomes increasingly dominated by Chinese and South Asian suppliers. 
Another reason is “time to market” for which it is no longer viable for garment 
manufacturers in SSA to rely on the roughly five to six weeks fabric delivery time from 
China. Moreover, a vertically integrated mill (yarn to garment) is more competitive than 
individual operations situated in different countries, given communication difficulties and 
transport and coordination problems (USAID). Another option for garment producers is to 
look in the direction of sourcing closer to home, namely in South Africa or Mauritius, and 
Lesotho for denim. Fabric prices tend to be higher (10-25%) in these countries than in China 
or India, but shipping times and thus costs to West and East Africa are considerably shorter 
(seven to ten days from South Africa). Nevertheless, it is not considered economically 
sensible to make costly investments in weaving or knitting units invariably in all African 
apparel producing countries. Such costly investments are considered due where there is an 
emerging critical mass of garment manufacturers (USAID), like Ghana and Cameroon. 
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Chapter  II   
The Dynamics  o f  the  SSA Cotton Sec tor  
Introduct ion 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the dinamics of the SSA cotton sector and 
eventually indicate the features of the sector that have not allowed for a succesful reform 
outcome. One of the prime motivations driving cotton sector liberalization was a belief that 
costs in the sector could be reduced, thereby affording a higher margin to the farmers 
themselves who are always residual claimants. This suggests an examination of the relative 
movements of input and output prices over the pre- and post-liberalization periods. A 
number of authors (Goreaux, 2003; Poulton and Hanyani-Mlambo; Tschirley et al. 2009, just 
to mention some) have examined this issue without a clear consensus emerging, in part 
because of differences in the input and output prices available for analysis. This thesis takes a 
different route. 
The chapter is divided in two parts. In part I, I begin with analyzing the dynamics of the SSA 
cotton sector under an industrial organisational perspective. I then give a comprehensive 
bird’s eye view of per country reform experiences and status quo of the cotton sector. I 
conclude part I highlighting the features that have shown to be sensitive to sector design.  
In part II, I introduce the reform experiences of three other SSA success cash crops that 
share a number of features with cotton: coffee, cocoa and tea. I eventually consider the 
reasons underlying the greater success achieved by reforms in such sectors and those that 
have brought to a disappointing outcome in the cotton sector instead. 
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Part  I  
The SSA Cotton Sec tor  
1.How the se c tor  was des igned 
Cotton production was introduced in SSA by Anglophone and Francophone colonizers16 due 
to the need of resources for their textile industry. Although in Francophone SSA countries 
the State was much more participating, at independence (1960s) the sector was initially 
organised as a state monopoly17 throughout the SSA region. This resulted in a vertical 
integration of the sector with parastatal companies providing factors that are to date still 
considered critical to the sector.  
 
1.1Before pol i t i ca l  independence  
Although the cotton sector was organised as a monopoly throughout SSA, originally slight 
differences did exist between the ESA and WCA regions. The French government created a 
dedicated parastatal company – the Compagnie Francaise de Developpement des Fibres 
Textiles (CFDT)- to develop cotton cultivation from the provision of inputs to farmers to 
the marketing of lint18, thus organizing the whole supply chain and entrusting the cotton 
sector to become an “engine of development”. When WCA countries gained independence 
they retained the design of the sector with cotton companies passing from CFDT to national 
governments (with CFDT still holding shares in the companies), leaving the cotton sector a 
vertically integrated supply chain and the role of development instrument. In ESA instead, 
cotton cultivation had its origins in commercial or missionary activity and governments 
assumed a greater role later in time. Before independence the sector was partly private: 
ginning and seed cotton purchase were dominated by Asian businessmen while governments 
were responsible for seed multiplication, research and extension, quality control and lint 
                                                
16 In Mozambique it was the Portuguese  
17 Actually the organisation was a monopsony for seed cotton purchase and a monopoly for cotton input sale. 
18 Cotton exports was marketed by a CFDT's affiliate, the Compagnie Cotoniere, or COPACO. 
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export. However, at independence governments started playing an increasing role in the 
purchase and ginning stages, monopolizing the whole sector at the expense of the private 
sector. Thus, after independence the cotton sector was designed as a state monopoly 
throughout the SSA region. 
1.2 Character i s t i c s  o f  the SSA cot ton monopoly  
The cotton state monopoly was a vertically integrated sector organisation characterized by a 
marketing board controlling and regulating all aspects of the cotton value chain: from the 
sale of planting seed to the marketing of cotton and its by products. The marketing board 
provided the sector with factors that are considered critical to it: a price announcement 
mechanism, input credit, research, extension, and marketing. Following is a brief description 
of the factors the (centralized) provision of which characterize the vertically integrated 
parastatal system. 
Price announcement mechanism - In cotton sectors designed as monopolies competition for 
purchase of seed cotton is not allowed and decisions about pricing are made at a central 
level. One firm has exclusive right and implicit obligation to purchase all seed cotton from 
farmers.  In these systems, prices are fixed by governments or administrative bodies. They 
are announced before planting time in order for farmers to know what they will receive for 
the seed cotton once they harvest and thus decide whether to produce cotton, or turn to 
another crop. Once the parastatal monopolistic ginner announces the price at which it will 
purchase the seed cotton from the farmers, it bears the risk of possible differences with the 
world price it is in turn paid when selling the cotton lint in the world market. Differences 
between producer price and cotton world price can in general be due to the volatility of 
world commodity prices or to exchange rate fluctuations. In order to face such differences 
the price mechanism was generally linked to a stabilization fund (at least until 2004) 
(Tschirley et al., 2009). The general purpose of the fund was to avoid that losses in the 
cotton sector be covered by direct government subsidies, but also that of supporting 
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producer prices when the world price was low. The internal mechanism of the fund was 
simple: when the world market was high the fund would be replenished by paying in turn 
lower producer prices. 
Input credit - or contract farming, sees the parastatal ginner make the necessary investments 
and solve the input provision problem typical to intensive input crops production in SSA (I 
will analyze this in the next section), by providing the farmers with the necessary inputs for 
seed cotton production. The farmers pay back the inputs once they harvest their seed cotton 
and sell it back to the ginner.  
Research - in the cotton sector research is about seed variety and multiplication, soil fertility 
and pest management. Throughout the region research programs were implemented in the 
public sector (usually by the Ministry of Agriculture), thus guaranteeing the necessary 
sustained and constant investments and the distribution of good quality seeds all of which 
are conditional to the attainement of high quality lint and yields. Extension services were 
implemented by parastatal ginners. 
Marketing - the grand part of SSA cotton was and is exported and marketing of cotton was 
managed by one large parastatal company with consequent credibility19 in the world market 
since able to ensure year-round shipments and relatively consistent quality standards. 
 
1.3 General  advantages o f  ver t i ca l  Integrat ion 
The advantages and disadvantages of vertical integration vary from industry to industry but 
there are general issues defined in the literature. 
In his article, “the Nature of the Firm”, Coase (1937) describes vertical integration as the 
“coordination of the various factors of production” which is “carried out without the 
intervention of the price mechanism”. Mahoney (1992) argues that “the vertical integration 
strategy may be implemented by a continuum of governance structures which include spot 
                                                
19 Reliability of export quantities is important when dealing with international merchants. 
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markets, short-term contracts, long-term contracts, franchising, joint ventures, and vertical 
financial ownership (hierarchy)”. Thus, vertical integration does not always mean vertical 
financial ownership. Actually, quasi-integration means that different functions in the value 
chain are integrated through joint ventures, franchises, minority equity investments, loan 
guarantees etc. Coase states that the dynamics of a firm getting larger or smaller, and thus, 
the degree of vertical integration, is determined by transaction costs20 which he intended as 
the “costs of using the price mechanism” (Coase 1937). In line with Coase, in 1975 
Williamson specifies the transaction costs that firms try to minimize by vertical integration; 
these originate from the opportunism21 and bounded rationality of firms and their suppliers, 
the uncertainty and frequency of transactions, and asset specificity in supplier-firm or firm-
customer relationships. According to Williamson (1981), it is these factors which determine 
the efficient boundary of a firm, and thus, the degree of vertical integration. 
In general, accepted advantages of vertical integration are: decreased marketing expenses, 
stability of operations, certainty of supplies of materials and services, better control over 
product distribution, tighter quality control, prompt revision of production and distribution 
policies, better inventory control, and additional profit margins or the ability to charge lower 
prices on final products. Mahoney (1992, citing Porter) adds to the list of benefits, a reduced 
uncertainty of demand and supply in that vertical integration assures the firm that it will 
receive supplies in tight periods or have an outlet for its products in periods of low demand. 
Mahoney (1992) further classifies the advantages under the following categories; profit, 
coordination and control, audit and resource allocation, motivation, and communication. In 
                                                
20 According to Coase (1937, 390-391), these costs are related to finding out prices and searching for suppliers 
from the market, as well as negotiating and making contracts with them. 
21 Opportunism means that a firm can take advantage of information that other firm does not have to lie, conceal 
information, misrepresent facts, or mis- lead the other firm in pursuing its own ends (Williamson 1975). Bounded 
rationality, which enables opportunism, means that a firm cannot foresee all the possible contingencies in a 
transaction, making it extremely costly to write, monitor, and enforce complete contracts (Mahoney citing 
Grossman & Hart 1986). Similarly, And finally, the relationship is asset-specific if the assets of the firm cannot 
be profitably deployed for any other application. (Afuah 2001, 1212)  
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particular, vertical integration facilitates information flows and coordination, consequently 
improving the overall control by gaining the control over critical elements such as the 
schedule, costs and product quality (Mahoney citing Usdiken et al. 1988). According to 
Mahoney, companies may integrate vertically also to control supply and distribution 
channels. 
1.4 Translated into the cot ton sec tor 
The SSA cotton value chain was generally vertically integrated also through backward quasi-
integration i.e. integration of suppliers through contract farming. Acording to Goldsmith 
(1985), this can be due to peculiar physical charcteristics of the crop that make such an 
organisation22 design preferable. The technical factors the author mentions are: perishability, 
bulkiness, permanence, need for processing, and variations in quality.  
Among these, cotton particularly seems to fit in the factors “Need for processing” and 
“Variations in quality”. According to the former, crops requiring extensive processing are most 
appealing to agribusiness which can then use its processing facilities to discipline suppliers. 
Sufficient production and assured and regular inflows of supplies are actually necessary to 
guarantee efficient operating in ginning plants and avoid costly over-capacity. 
The latter refers to crops that can vary significantly in quality and for which quality is 
important in processing, as such they are also considered suited for core-satellite production. 
Quality standards are desirable (particularly in cotton) and are more easily achieved by central 
coordination and contract farming. Actually, vertical integration enables comunication 
benefits through facilitated information flows particularly salient in the domain of 
classification and grading stages which in turn keep an incentive for quality perdurance; also 
through the implementation of extension services -often directly by the ginners-, which 
enable the necessary link between producers and R&D outcomes. 
                                                
22 Goldsmith talks of core-satellite farming or contract farming. 
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Goldsmith himself mentions in his paper (1985) that as other agribusinesses, also cotton 
companies “find compelling reasons to remain integrated to the field level”.  
However, other characteristics even outside the SSA cotton sector make it sensitive to sector 
design. Among these, the failure in financial markets in SSA makes input credit schemes 
arguably necessary as shown by their collapse and consequent depletion of the sector in the 
attempts of a liberalization of the sector. In turn, coordination in input credit schemes has 
shown to be necessary for the ginner to be repaid and avoid side-selling.  
Following is an explanation why also extension and contract farming give scope for vertical 
integration. 
Extension 
Agricultural extension is a service with the objective of linking research-based knowledge to 
the rural sector in a broader perspective of enhancing rural development; it enhances and 
accelerates the spread of useful know-how and technologies to rural people. The expected 
outcome is increased and sustained productivity, increased income and well-being of farm 
people, and eventually the promotion of national food security and economic growth. The 
instruments used are non-formal education, training programmes, two-way technology 
transfer and feedback systems. From the farmers point of view, extension is a form of 
assistance with the objective to improve their know-how, efficiency, productivity and 
profitability. Politicians, planners, and policy makers consider extension service as a policy 
instrument to increase agricultural production, thus achieve national food security and 
alleviate rural poverty and be a contribution to agricultural and rural development (Davis, 
2009). 
Extension in SSA 
In Africa, the view of extension has passed from being focused on increasing production, 
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improving yields, training farmers, and transferring technology to encompass assisting farmer 
groups in dealing with marketing issues, and partnering with a broad range of service 
providers and other agencies (Oladele, 2009).  
Extension in SSA was generally public. Despite the yield increases, in the 1980s public 
extension systems came under attack as a consequence to their financial burdening along 
with criticisms of irrelevance, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and lack of equity (Davis 2009 
citing Rivera, 2001). Consequently, many extension systems were reformed through 
privatization, decentralization, outsourcing, and participatory or demand-driven model 
implementation. Most African countries today are still experimenting with reforms to 
existing extension systems. 
The evaluation of certain of these reforms have unveiled a number of problems. For 
example, decentralized extension has seen the use of extension agents for non-extension 
purposes, lack of financial sustainability, and paradoxically, difficulties in linking to research. 
In particular the fee-for service model23 has not been well taken up in the few countries 
where it has been attempted (Davis, 2009).  
The current status of extension in SSA sees two main forms of extension policy: provisional 
extension policies and legislated extension policies. The former is the most common form in 
developing countries in general; in the absence of more formalized extension policies a 
provisional or ad hoc policy is used with decrees and proclamations issued by the head of 
state which do not go through the process of consultation and debate involving various 
stakeholders and beneficiaries. The latter, legislated extension policies, are embodied by the 
country’s highest law-making authority (e.g., congress or parliament) and tend to produce 
well-organized and financially stable extension systems (this is the system used for the 
                                                
23 One example is extension in tea sector in Kenya 
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extension service in the U.S.24). Odalele (2009) considers extension policy in selected SSA 
countries and from a list of twenty-seven countries under review, only four25 have adopted 
the legislated form of extension policy considered to be the best option among different 
forms of extension policy.  
In general, little is known about the capacity, quality of service, and performance of 
extension systems in SSA; due to many infrastructural variables and other factors affecting 
agricultural performance in complex and contradictory ways. Moreover, benefits are 
generally difficult to quantify making extension impacts per se are difficult to compute, 
especially in terms of attribution and quantitative cause and effect linkage (Davis 2009, citing 
Anderson, 2007).  
However, it is generally acknowledged that a major problem is the absence of a legal and 
policy framework for providing the service. This is confirmed by most SSA countries being 
ranked among the most difficult countries where to enforce a contract26. In addition, 
consequent to the increasing number of players and stakeholders, coordination and 
regulation turn out to be crucial also in the extension stage and underlines the need for the 
government to remain involved in extension (Oladele, 2009). 
Contract  Farming 
Outgrower or contract farming encompass a variety of institutional arrangements of vertical 
integration. A general classification distinguishes ’market specification’, ‘resource providing’ 
and ‘production management’. In the first, the transaction between growers and buyers is 
agreed on in terms of what is to be produced (product and quality attributes) and what the 
commitments for future sale (timing, location and price) are. The second model, adds the 
                                                
24 the Smith-Lever Act of May 8, 1914 established the Cooperative Extension Service in the United States 
25 Uganda is an example of legislated extension policy in SSA: in 2001 a program was created with the goal of 
increasing market-oriented production through empowering farmers to demand and control extension services 
(Oladele 2009) 
26 World Bank Facility for Investment Climate Advisory Services 2011
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provision of farming inputs to the former contract type; key inputs are provided on credit, 
often with cost recovery upon farm product delivery. In the third model, growers 
additionally agree to follow precise technological guidance on how to produce. 
In the SSA cotton sector it is the resource providing or production management models of 
contract farming that are implemented. Contract farming in the SSA cotton sector 
particularly, has shown to be a succesful organisation of the production stage. To begin with, 
in cotton special care is required in the cultivation and harvesting of the plants (as seen in 
chapter 1) and qualified family-run farms have shown to produce a considerably higher 
quality than big plantations. Further, the inaccessibility to loans for SSA small-scale farmers, 
unless they can support their requests with sales contracts and guaranteed sales prices (see 
box 1); makes the guaranteed sales and access to high quality input envisaged in contract 
farming very desirable features of the scheme. On the ginner’s side, contract farming is 
interesting in that it enables to ensure inflow of supply and quality control. In addition, it can 
be an element of risk diversification for harvest risks, for example due to climatic conditions, 
that can be avoided or reduced thanks to the geographical spread of the contract farmers. 
However, contract farming in SSA has shown to be design-sensitive. There are risks to 
contract farming that have been unveiled with the liberalization of the sector. A core 
problem of contract farming in general can be the non-compliance with contracts (Brüntrup 
and Peltzer, 2006). This can come from both parties: considerably higher than planned yields 
can cause prices to decrease, consequently companies can be tempted to avoid buying from 
contract farmers or only buy from them as a last resort; on the contrary, poor harvests and 
consequent high prices will incentivate farmers to sell on the market rather than to the 
company at the agreed lower prices. Furthermore, farmers can always be tempted to sell their 
harvest to traders not involved in the input credit scheme and as such buy without discounts. 
As experienced in the cotton sector, repeated breaches of contract undermine the 
outgrowers scheme and consequently deplete the sector. 
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Brüntrup and Peltzer, 2006 claim that successful contract farming needs a careful design that 
is customised to the specifics of the region, the product and the parties’ interests. In relation 
to the SSA cotton sector, they add that there is a consensus developing that privatised cotton 
companies should continue to have regional monopolies. Actually, this would enable the 
necessary coordination to avoid the collapse of the input credit schemes. Experience has 
shown that wherever this is not the case, cotton companies find themselves eventually 
unable to provide input credit to the farmers as a consequence to their systematical 
breaching of the contract and failure to supply the harvest despite advanced finance and 
consultancy services. In such a context sanctions need to be applied and companies must be 
able to rely on rule of law. 
 
2. The WCA exper ience  
The above described organisation of the cotton sector has made it possible for Francophone 
Africa to account for a ten fold increase in its cotton production from the 1960s to the 1990s 
(WB). It is recognized that this is to be partly due to the fact that the vertically integrated 
system has shown to perform the highest degree of farmer coverage on input credit and 
extension provision. Actually, the system was backed by high and stable repayment rates 
from farmers due to the impossibility of side selling (Tschirley et al., 2009), a problem 
unleashed with a competitive organisation of the sector instead. Sustained investment in 
research and extension has been of primary importance and the cotton sector benefited from 
this resulting in chemical inputs and seed varieties adapted to local conditions to produce 
high yields 27  and consistently top-quality cotton thus raising the productivity of large 
numbers of farmers. National monopolies also showed to have a very good performance on 
                                                
27 Yields increased dramatically in most countries until the mid-1980s, thanks to intensified use of fertilizer 
(made possible through input credit), development of animal traction, and development of new varieties with 
higher yield potential, as well as higher ginning outturn ratios. 
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value added per capita in that there were strong returns to a very large number of farmers 
consequently keeping them interested in producing cotton. As a result of such positive 
feedback, during the 1980s the national cotton companies increased ginning capacity, further 
developed input credit schemes, invested in transport for seed and cotton lint, and created 
their own extension services to disseminate technical packages. Cotton production grew 
rapidly further with an increasing number of farmers dedicated to cotton, and further 
increased farm yields28 and ginning outturn ratios. Lint quality also improved. The vertically 
integrated system brought cotton to be among the few African success stories and to be 
called Africa’s “white gold” with Francophone SSA alone accounting for more than two 
thirds of African cotton production. The flourishing of the cotton sector had positive 
overspilling effects also on other sectors which benefited from the public goods and services 
delivered by cotton parastatals – i.e. in WCA much has been invested to improve 
transportation infrastructure and road maintenance. 
 
3 .  The downside o f  the  monopol i s t i c  des ign   
Towards the end of the nineteen eighties after the considerable expansion of cotton 
companies (especially in WCA), due to a number of factors among which were declining 
world cotton prices29 and overvalued local currencies (in the case of WCA), SSA cotton 
companies began facing financial difficulties. The cotton state companies had grown into 
inefficient organizations with poor governance and high operating costs and oppportunities 
for rent seeking and corruption (particularly in ESA, according to Poulton, 2009). Moreover, 
while on one side producer prices were not in line with world prices resulting at times in low 
producer prices30 - particularly apparent when world prices were high- since governments 
absorbed much of the difference between domestic and world prices through various taxes; 
                                                
28 Data in the appendix 
29 also consequential to developed countries’ support policies to domestic cotton (ICAC) 
30 At others, parastatals paid prices lower than world prices, to the detriment of farmers, showing 
a countercyclical nature which is thought to be common of support systems in agricultural policies. 
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the price announcement mechanism was a much critised state support intervention 
considered it caused parastatal ginners to pay, at times, unsustainably high prices instead 
(politically backed for social purposes), which eventually contributed to sector financial crisis 
and consequently to state budget problems. The price announcement mechanism was also 
accused of subsidizing producers far from processing centres to the detriment of those near 
to ginning plants due to its being pan-territorial (other than pan-seasonal).  
Linked to the price mechanism are stabilization funds which have also generally been 
considered disappointing: often used inappropriately, i.e. not for their declared objective, 
when the funds were eventually needed to face world low prices they were empty and 
national governments were forced to intervene to flesh out producer prices, with 
consequences on the national financial stability. However, there have been examples of a 
virtuous use of the stabilization funds as in Burkina and Faso Cameroon though they have 
nonetheless eventually fallen victim of a combination of world declining prices and an effort 
of independently keeping high producer prices (Akiyama, 2001; Serra, 2012). 
 
4. Sea change 
Although cotton parastatals brought the cotton sector to be considered „a rare success story 
in Sub-Saharan Africa“, in the nineteen-eighties when the mentioned difficulties started 
emerging important donors and international financial institutions (IFI) as the World Bank 
(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) started calling for reforms of the sector. 
Advocated reasons were initially that the price announcement system failed to reflect world 
prices in producer prices, which were considered to be generally low hence not helping the 
smallholder farmers to exit poverty. Later, reasons ranged from rent-seeking opportunities to 
poor incentives for cost efficiency in parastatal ginning, which had supposedly undermined 
the sector´s international competitiveness and its contribution to the wider economy. The 
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pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing schemes were also considered to jeopardize national 
financial stability and to clamp down on rural development.  
Furthermore, the sector was generally not considered competitive on the world market and 
this would presumably jeopardize its survival due to competition from other fibres, 
particularly synthethic ones with their continuous pressure on prices. This implied a need to 
cut costs, raise productivity and quality management and marketing, efficiency of research 
and extension in order to be able to enhance pro-poor growth by maintaining returns to 
farmers (Tschirley et al., 2009).  
In general, the claimed objectives of such reforms were: farmer welfare, industry innovation, 
technical and economic efficiency, and value addition. In the subsequent decade, reforms 
were taken up in almost all SSA cotton producing countries although reform choices differed 
strongly across the region.  
 
5. Post  l ibera l izat ion organisat ions 
The present organisation of the cotton sector in SSA varies considerably from West to East 
Africa ranging from the early national monopoly system to competitive systems and 
concentrated systems depending on whether reforms have been undertaken and to what 
extent. Tschirley et al. (2009) have identified three macro classes of the cotton sector 
organisation in SSA: regulated, market based and hybrid system. Monopolies (especially state 
monopolies) are more easily found in WCA where gins are still owned and operated by 
public or, at most, mixed companies. ESA instead, implemented reforms more thoroughly, 
also due to the fact that the sector suffered from corruption and had lost in performance in a 
more marked fashion (Tschirley et al., 2009).  
As mentioned, where the system is “regulated“ the competition for purchase of seed cotton 
is not allowed, these sectors include national and local monopolies: company/ies with 
exclusive right/obbligation to purchase all seed cotton from farmers either at a national or 
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local level (concession area). Market-based systems instead, can have many buyers of seed 
cotton – i.e. competitive systems- or just a few – i.e. concentrated systems. Concentrated 
systems are most similar to duopolies or oligopolies with two or three ginners competing for 
the right to transact with producers both on services to producers and seed cotton price. In 
such organisations, the input credit system is generally maintained along with extension 
advice service, and although the coverage of farmers is not as complete as with national 
monopolies, consequences on yields as well as on quality have shown to be positive 
(Tschirley et al., 2009).  
However, what international institutions have been calling for is in fact, a competitive 
organisation of the sector. Since it is generally accepted that market structure influences 
performance, competitive systems are expected to positively influence production also in the 
cotton sector in SSA, and hence outperform concentrated and regulated sectors (Tschirley at 
al., 2009). Competition is expected to improve the share of the world price in producers’ 
price consequently increasing the number of farmers wishing to turn to cotton cultivation, 
with positive consequences on total production in turn avoiding ginning undercapacity; on 
the ginners’ side it should incentivize to minimize costs, soft budget constraints, excessive 
employment or political interference (Baffes, 2007).  
 
5.1 Reforms and s tatus quo  
The cotton sector has been reformed in almost all of the SSA region but there are 
differences in the ESA and WCA regions: while WCA can be defined as still lingering in the 
process, the East African countries have largely completed their reforms. In this section I 
will briefly analyze the reforms the cotton sector has undergone in the various SSA cotton 
producing countries divided in WCA and ESA macro areas and lingering on what I consider 
noteworthy examples. 
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ESA31 
Uganda 
I begin with what I consider a meaningful example: the story of the cotton sector in Uganda. 
Cotton was introduced into Uganda in the 1900s by the contemporary British colonial 
government and until the 1950s cotton was Uganda's major export crop. Uganda has a high-
grade fiber of medium-staple (Serunjogi et al. 2001). After independence in 1962, it was 
decided for the ginning industry to be vertically integrated: the government assumed direct 
responosibility for research and extension, seed multiplication, quality control and lint 
export, keeping these activities under the Ministry of Agriculture and marketing was up to 
the newly created parastatal Lint Marketing Board. The ginning industry was thereafter taken 
over by cooperatives. Uganda soon became the third largest cotton producer in Africa 
reaching an all-time high output of more than 86,000 tons in 1969 after a constant growth 
from 1962 (USDA) though the increased production was due to an expansion of the 
cultivated area rather than increased productivity since farmers had been attracted by the 
high prices paid to growers (Baffes, 2009). The sector contributed roughly fourty percent of 
Uganda´s foreign exchange earnings (You, Chamberlin, 2004).  
Follwing the military coup in 1971, cotton output collapsed. It decreased at a growing rate 
during the following eight years which produced general economic decline and social 
disintegration. Animal population was depleted32, ginning operations were poorly mainatined, 
research was disrupted, and cooperatives started delaying payments to farmers. Production 
had collapsed from roughly 84000 tons in 1970 to 4000 tons in 1980. Thereafter the sector 
never really recovered completely though it stopped decreasing and started slowly growing 
with a few stops during other political turmoil years such as in 1985. However, it never 
reached the pre-1970 production highs. As a consequence, in the early 1990s a reform of the 
sector was decided for.   
                                                
31 I do not consider Somalia 
32 Importance relative to animal draught and plowing 
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The reform was introduced in 1993 and the combination with high world prices of the mid-
1990s led to a good response in cotton production which doubled from 1993 to 1994 
(USDA). Farm prices had improved and growers were receiving payments regularly. Many 
new actors entered the cotton value chain (Baffes, 2001), and up to thirty buyers33 were 
competing on price to farmer production post reform. Again, production growth was 
primarily due to an expansion of the area cultivated on cotton34 since productivity35 didn’t 
increase and declined instead (Baffes, 2009).  
However, the liberalization attempt unleashed a series of weaknesses of the sector which 
obliged to reverse the reform course. Thus, limits to the degree of competition were imposed 
by the state to stem the detrimental effect on the provision of inputs and extension. Regional 
monopsony rights were established between 2003 and 2008 to eliminate competition 
changing Uganda's cotton sector to what Tschirley et al. (2009) call a hybrid organisation. 
Direct competition among ginners was eliminated so as to facilitate coordination among 
ginners and enable them to invest in extension provision and input supply securely36. 
Production increased by about ninety percent in the following two years.  
Despite production expansion, current production in Uganda is still about a third of its 
historical peak in the 1960s (USDA). Considering Uganda has a comparative advantage in 
producing cotton, both in terms of favorable agroecological conditions and the stable (even 
growing) world market for its cotton with high-grade fibre of medium staple length (You, 
Chamberlin, 2004), the question on the reasons for the sector’s declining yields and 
stagnating production, remains. General faults have been attributed to the collapse of the 
input credit system since declining cotton yields are commonly explained by lack in input 
                                                
33 This is partly due to the fact that Uganda ginning has historically been dominated by roller gins which are 
cheaper and with fewer economies of scale, thus need fewer initial investments which makes entering the 
market  easier for new ginners (Tschirley et al.). 
34 sixteen percent annually from 1994 to 2000- (Baffes, 2009) 
35 According to You and Chamberlin, most data sources estimate the average yield of seed cotton in Uganda to 
be below 500 kg/ha which is quite low even when comparing to neighboring countries in East Africa, where 
average yield is 900~1100 kg/ha in 1990s (Gibbon 1998).  
 
36 Efforts by individual companies to provide input credit had had to be quickly abandoned during competition, 
because the credit could not be recovered. 
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supply and extension provision (Baffes, 2009; Tschirley et al., 2009), which collapsed 
following liberalization. Other factors include inadequate information support, inadequate 
government support, underutilization and technologically aging ginneries, insufficient 
research and training. To date, there are thirty-three operational ginneries of which two 
operate saw gins and the rest use roller gins of which only one is a cooperative union the rest 
being private. 
In ESA Uganda is by no way an outlier: the rest of ESA cotton sectors have had similar 
experiences.  
Tanzania 
Tanzania liberalized its cotton sector in 1995 even though it had no apparent reasons to do 
so since it was having excellent production performance. After an initial increase in 
production following liberalization, again combined with high world prices, seed cotton 
production plummeted until 2000. Individual companies experienced they could not face the 
input supply challenge on their own and a sector-wide solution was instead necessary. 
Negative impacts were seen also on lint quality since seed varieties were mixed as a 
consequence to the lack of input credit. Thus, it was decided that the Tanzania Cotton Board 
(TCB) would thereafter provide seed, pesticide and quality control. However as Tschirley et 
al. claim, moving in the reverse direction is not as smooth as moving from a monopolistic to 
a competititve system. Currently (as of Cotton 24/7 june 2012) the cotton sector in Tanzania 
is described as threatened by collapse unless the government intervenes with subsidies for 
input provision and a guaranteed minimum price to keep farmers interested in cotton. 
Consequently, some of Tanzania’s top textile mills have temporarily shut down in view of 
the scarcity of cotton to spin. The cotton industry in Tanzania employs about forty percent 
of its overall population and ranks sixth among SSA cotton producers (Appendix 1). 
Zimbabwe 
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Similarly to Tanzania, Zimbabwe lived a short boom induced by high world prices during 
liberalization, but production fell sharply straight after (1993). Until liberalization was 
realized in the privatization of the national ginner Cottco and the entry of only two other 
competitors -who only had twenty percent of the market-, Cottco was able to retain its input 
credit scheme with high coverage and repayment record. The country was able to retain the 
reputation for high quality lint it had gained in international markets during the state 
monopoly and producer prices were also high (Poulton et al., 2009).  
However, things changed dramatically in 2001 when a more thorough implementation of 
liberalization took place and many more competitors entered the sector making the 
previously successful private input scheme collapse. Achievements in quality control and 
producer prices were also undermined. State intervention turned out to be unavoidable for 
the survival of the sector and limits were imposed to the degree of competition. In 2006 
regional monopsony rights were established to eliminate competition. In 2009 the 
government of Zimbabwe further introduced new legislation on cotton regulating the entire 
chain from production to marketing and compelling contractors to provide all necessary 
inputs to farmers at the beginning of the planting season. Cotton contractors now also have 
their own experienced extension officers who offer technical assistance to farmers.  
According to the Gain Report 2012, contract farming has “contributed to the stability and 
growth of the cotton industry by providing inputs and extension services to cotton growers, 
thereby ensuring consistent production”. In June 2012 the government has made a further 
step by making cotton a controlled product giving the Minister of Agriculture the power to 
fix cotton prices. 
Zambia 
From 1977 the cotton sector of Zambia was organized around the state-owned cotton 
company “Lint Company of Zambia” (Lintco). The company provided certified seed, 
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pesticides, sprayers, and bags and provided extension advice to farmers and purchased seed 
cotton from farmers at a fixed price. In 1994, it was decided that the sector be reformed and 
Lintco was sold to two private companies (Lonrho Cotton and Clark Cotton). The two 
companies were given separate regional influences on cotton with the intention to limit 
competition between them – i.e. concession area system. Reform had organised the sector 
into a duopoly and each company was successful in implementing outgrower programs 
having little problems with credit repayment. Rapid growth in cotton production followed 
also spurred by the high cotton prices on the world market, with a growing number of 
farmers involved in cotton and improving quality of lint.  
However, the expansion in the cotton production attracted new entrants also in the 
processing business. The inflow resulted in ginning overcapacity (also caused by a decline in 
production) in turn causing a competitive scramble for cotton among ginners making 
outgrower schemes fail. The entry of several new small ginners and traders more commited 
to trade in it self caused a first crisis in the sector in 2000. Lonhro was crushed by the crisis 
and its repayment scheme dramatically failed, consequently the company sold its liabilities to 
Dunavant - a US private cotton company. In general ginners cut back on their outgrower 
support schemes resulting in a fall in production. The sector later recovered thanks to 
innovation in the outgrowers schemes proposed by Dunavant and Clark providing a greater 
coverage of farmers –they expanded their production- and thus boosting production.  
In 2005, a second crisis hit the sector. Among reasons were: the appreciation of the local 
currency severely affecting the profitability of cotton to ginners, and the entry of more 
established ginners (most of the small ones had left after the first crisis) resulting in a 
decreased concentration of the sector and bringing the number of ginners to at least eleven 
(Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010). The crisis resulted in Dunavant not honouring its preplanting 
minimum price for the first time. In general, companies reacted by reducing the content of 
their input credit package for the following year and by trimming the covered number of 
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farmers. The result was a serious credit default followed by plummeting production which 
fell by more than half from 2006 to 2007, before recovering somewhat in 2008 and 2009. 
Currently, the two original companies remain the dominant players with still eighty percent 
market share (2009), but the new companies seem to be large enough to change the dynamic 
of the sector towards more competition. The cotton sector is considered to be at risk since 
farmers bear both the production and marketing risks and the global drop in the price of 
cotton adversely affects them since cotton is both capital and labour intensive. 
Kenya 
Poor performance of the cotton sector after the implementation of liberalization has been 
experienced also in Kenya where cotton is mainly grown in arid and semi arid areas where 
there are limited other economic activities.  
Cotton was first introduced to Kenya in the 1900s, but it was adopted across the country 
only in the 1960s when cotton became a commercial crop. In 1984/1985 the sector reached 
its to date all time peak: it employed over 200,000 small holder farmers producing over 
39,000 million tonnes of seed cotton (ICAC). In 1991, the vertically integrated system for 
input supply, extension and seed cotton purchasing collapsed under structural adjustment 
policies with the withdrawal of government from the provision of credit and inputs. The 
combination of the latter with falling world prices resulted in thousands of cotton growers 
abandoning the crop and production hit its lowest (14,000 MT) in 1994 (USDA). 
Considering that before liberalization, cotton was one of Kenya’s main foreign exchange 
earners and the potential of Kenya as a cotton producer37, cotton has been identified as a key 
sub-sector in the government’s policy for adressing poverty “Kenya Vision 2030”. Further, 
in 2006 the government was provided with the legal framework to re-organize the cotton 
                                                
37 The cotton sector is considered to have the potential to benefit eight million people in the drier areas of the 
country. The Cotton Development Authority estimates currently that there are 350,000 ha in the country 
suitable for cotton production, with a potential production of 50,000 tonnes annually (ICAC)  
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sector with the Cotton amendment Bill which resulted in increased production (9,800 tonnes 
in 2006 from 5,090 tonnes in 2005 – ICAC). The positive trend has continued with a 
calculated twelve percent increase in production from 2002 which has been driven primarily 
by the government’s efforts to revive the sector through the Cotton Development Authority 
which had been set up to coordinate rehabilitation of the sector (Cotton 24/7). At present, 
the commodity chain is made up of licensed and unlicensed private traders and ginning 
companies buying cotton on an ad-hoc basis. There is no zoning or concession system but 
some ginning companies distribute inputs on credit to farmers in order to ensure adequate 
cotton for their ginneries. However, this is not a homogeneous practice thus it provides 
opportunity for ‘side-selling’.  
Overall the cotton industry in Kenya is still considered much under its potential with low 
productivity, low utilization rates at ginneries, limited access to quality seeds, weak service 
markets, missing link between research and field implementation, and distrustful 
relationships within the market. 
Malawi 
Malawi now ranks thirty-third in world cotton seed production (appendix chapter I, USDA, 
2012) but it has been a cotton growing country since the colonial era and cotton has 
traditionally been an important cash crop in the country ranking third among its export cash 
crops (Faostat).  
The Malawi cotton sector has seen better times before the nineteen nineties. From the mid 
1960’s until 1994 the Agriculture Development and Marketing Corporation (Admarc) was 
the sole buyer of seed cotton. In 1994 the market was liberalized and Admarc scaled down 
its involvement selling its ginneries to two big cotton companies (Great Lakes Cotton 
Company and Clark Cotton Malawi Limited now Cargill). In the early 2000, another two 
(small) companies entered the sector but instead of increasing competition, the companies 
started colluding to purchase cotton resulting in low producer prices. The consequent 
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reduced farmers’ profitability pushed farmers out of cotton production resulting in 
plummeted country cotton production.  
Recently, the Malawi Government has incorporated the cotton sector as a key element in its 
poverty reduction and growth strategy, the objective being to “increase cotton production 
and improve quality in order to meet local demand and export any surplus.” (Ministry of 
Agriculture Report, 2006). The President of Malawi declared cotton as one of the strategic 
crops for growth for the country and has identified one way of improving minimum farm 
gate price through contract farming. A government fertilizer subsidy programme has also 
been implemented and it is under discussion that other inputs –cotton seed, pesticides and 
spraying equipment - are included. In its objective to promote cotton production, the 
government has initiated a project focusing on cotton seed multiplication, extension services, 
organizing farmers in groups, technology development, and support to research activities.  
The crop is grown on about 70,000 ha and supports about 200,000 small holder farmers, 
three ginning companies and input providers. Over the years the average yield of cotton has 
improved.  
 
Mozambique 
Cotton has an important role in the economy of Mozambique where it was introduced by 
portuguese colonizers. It ranks third among agricultural export commodities and has an 
important socio economic stabilization role in rural areas as confirmed by that ninety-seven 
point seven percent of cotton production comes from family smallholders (ICAC), also 
whitnessing the potential contribution of cotton in the fight against rural poverty.  
The production of cotton in Mozambique has yet to experience liberalization. The legal 
framework of the sector sees the sector organised into a concessions system with the 
government signing a promotion and rural extension contract for cotton in a given territory 
with a given company which defines the terms of rendering mandatory services to cotton 
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farmers – input provision, extension training – and guaranteeing exclusive right for 
purchasing (observing the minimum price), ginning and trading the seed cotton. Although 
the government is not involved in any commercial transaction, it establishes the minimum 
price for cotton on a one year basis as a result of a negotiated proposal between the farmers -
united under the National Forum of Cotton Farmers (Fonpa)- and the ginners -assembled 
under the Cotton Association of Mozambique.  
The government has set a priority for the cotton sector to be gradually reformed in a ten year 
horizon heading towards liberalization.  
Niger ia 
Cotton is a major cash crop in Nigeria. Production is dominated by small scale farmers, with 
farm sizes ranging from three to five hectares all under rainfed ecologies, hence it is of 
considerable social and economic importance. Cotton production in Nigeria dates back to 
1903 with the British Cotton Growers Association taking the lead until 1974, when it was 
replaced by the Cotton Marketing Board to develop, gin and market the produce. Cotton 
then grew to play a vital role in the Nigerian economy and in the seventies and eighties, the 
cotton industry was the highest employer of labor after the government (ICAC).  
In 1986 the Nigerian economy was deregulated and the Board was abolished as well as the 
economic activities it provided. Under the reform policy the government also gave up all 
control over prices. Following liberalization the number of functional ginneries reduced from 
fifty-three to seventeen with capacity utilization estimated at thirty-seven percent, the 
number of mills has decreased from one hundred seventy-five in the seventies and eighties to 
less than fourty in 2009. At present about seventy percent of cotton used by local mills is 
imported ; and textile imports in 2007 alone was valued about six times higher compared to 
2003. The opening of the cotton sector has also brought about a set of undesirable flaws 
such as unfair tactics, fraud against sellers and buyers, preemption and undesirable 
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collaboration both among farmers and ginners (Onu and Okunmadewa, 2008). The wrecking 
of the sector moreover resulted in the social dislocation of over two million Nigerians 
including 0.25 million cotton farmers and about 30,000 fabric processors and 
garment/apparel workers (ICAC).  
The Nigerian Government is from 2009 in its effort to revive the industry authorizing the 
establishment of a cotton/textile/garment (CTG) fund through the Bank of Industry (BOI) 
for onward lending to businesses along the CTG value- chain (ICAC). 
Ghana 
Although it is the smallest among ESA cotton sectors, the experience of Ghana is worth 
mentioning. It can be considered symbolic because of the extremes it reached. It was the first 
to liberalize the cotton sector, in 1985. After experiencing the impossibility of maintaining 
whatsoever kind of input credit scheme when multiple companies compete on the same 
territory, the main players of the cotton sector were obliged to plead for State intervention 
and persuade the Ministry of Agriculture to institute back a local monopoly system (2000-
2001).  
There are now four private cotton companies operating in the sector and a number of 
problems to be solved among which are poor quality seed, inadequate extension services, 
lagging research, lacking labour and poor producer price. 
Ethiopia  
In Ethiopia there is an enormous potential for the production of cotton following its suitable 
agro-ecological zones and the availability of water. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
the suitable cotton production area is estimated to be equivalent with the fourth largest 
producer, Pakistan (2,575,810 ha). Despite this huge potential, however, Ethiopia currently 
produces only from a total area of 42,371 (Agridev, 2003). Cotton is produced for 70% by 
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private commercial farms and the remaining 30% by smallholders. The processing stage is 
dominated by private ownership. 
 
WCA 
WCA has a different story compared to ESA and the reform process has been tackled more 
cautiously and definitely at a slower pace. Though cotton had formerly been introduced to 
supply the French textile industry, the integrated supply chain system created by the French 
government turned out to be very successful in involving a sheer number of farmers and 
assuring a great number of poor rural households with revenue from the crop production 
since gins were obliged to purchase all seed cotton produced, furthermore at a fixed price set 
by the government. The sector flourished even after independence of WCA states, when 
parastatals passed on to national governements (1960s). The partnership with the French 
Development and Textile Company (CFDT), the French statal company with which the 
cotton sector was initiated, and the Cotton and the Exotic Textiles Research Institute (IRCT) 
survived independence and concretised in an uninterrupted strong support in research, 
extension, and assistance to farmers’ organizations. This allowed substantial improvements in 
cotton cultivation with the introduction of new production techniques like the ox-plow, 
mineral fertilization, and pesticides, along with high-yielding seeds. The result was a two-fold 
increase in cotton yields over the 1980s.  The public companies grew in ginning capacity to 
face the growing production of seed cotton: WCA increased its share in world cotton trade 
from one percent in 1960 to eleven percent in 2006. The cotton sector flourished and the 
ample cotton profits were invested in rural infrastructures (roads, education, and health), 
further improving farmers’ living standards with general positive spill overs. Ginners also 
expanded side activities investing in transport for seed and lint, created own extension 
services and in some countries companies were given direct responsibility of rural 
development in cotton areas (Mali and Cameroon). In brief, the organisation of the sector 
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had been successful in increasing production and yields, in developing new ad hoc seed 
varieties and in achieving high lint quality. Thus a liberalization of the sector was made 
difficult from a social and political point of view: introducing far-reaching reforms in 
Francophone WCA would supposedly have a detrimental effect on the revenues of farmers, 
particularly least productive ones and, consequently on poverty rates. There has therefore 
been a longlasting debate on whether the highly integrated WCA system should be reformed.  
 
Benin 
In WCA Benin stands out for being among the countries most dependant on cotton and for 
being the first to have embarked in a liberalization of the sector. Since the 1980s cotton is 
considered the basis of the whole rural and agro-industrial sector contributing to more than 
ten percent of GDP, accounting for seventy to eighty percent of agriculrural exports and 
benefiting more than 300,000 small farmers (Gergerly, 2009).  
Cotton production existed in the country before colonization but it was only after the end of 
the marxist regime (1972-1978) that the sector developed more markedly. The cotton sector 
was then managed by a government owned cotton company (Sonapra, 1984), which had a 
monopoly on the purchase of seed cotton, the sale of lint cotton and the delivery, on credit, 
of cotton inputs to farmers. At the time, the sector compared favorably even to other West 
African cotton sectors, with higher yields and higher prices paid to producers (Gergerly, 
2009). However, the heavy losses in which the company incurred by the end of the decade 
had the government decide to withdraw from cotton production and liberalize the sector.  
Benin was the first country in WCA to deeply reform its cotton sector in the 1990s, 
suppressing the characteristic single channel  relationship between ginners and farmers. The 
vertically integrated monopoly was broken into distinct horizontal functions, allowing entry 
by different private operators. Liberalization was implemented in stages involving the input 
distribution function first and then the sale of quotas for buying and processing seed cotton 
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production to new ginning companies. The privatization of the cotton parastatal only took 
place many years later.  
The outcome of those reforms has been “far below expectations” (Gergerly, 2009; Serra, 
2012), and resulted in a sharp decline of the performance of the sector. There was a marked 
deterioration in the key services along the value chain, particularly in input distribution and 
quality; a fall in credit recovery rates, and an overall uncertainty due to the continuously 
changing rules for awarding quotas (Serra, 2012). Even though reforms didn’t put in place a 
pure competition model but a concession area scheme - resulting in a quasi-monopoly with 
each company in the market being assigned a given cotton zone over which it would hold 
exclusive monopoly and monopsony rights (concession areas) rather than competing with 
each other - there have been coordination failures along the chain38. The consequent serious 
liquidity problems of the major cotton company resulted in a reversal of the privatization 
process with the state intervening with its own funds and once again becoming a majority 
share holder (sixty percent of shares). To date a price determination mechanism is still in use, 
and there is the intention to establish a smoothing fund.  
The difficulties experienced with the reform process in Benin contributed to a large extent to 
a reluctance to reform among cotton sector stakeholders in other WCA countries. 
Mali 
Among WCA countries Mali is the country that has least moved towards reforming its 
cotton sector. Cotton is the country’s success story and an element of national pride, source 
of livelihood for millions of rural people, main generator of political rents, and the second 
major source of foreign exchange earnings. Cotton production covers about one third of the 
cultivated land and about fourty percent of rural households, or two and a half million 
                                                
38 Furthermore, only two companies were allowed to enter (Faso Coton and Socoma), covering, together, about 
15% of the seed cotton market, allowing SOFITEX (SOFITEX became 35% to the state, 30% to the UNPCB, 
27% to the former CFDT, then renamed DAGRIS, and 1% to local banks and the rest to some national private 
actors)to retain the lion share).(Serra) 
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people, rely on cotton production and related activities for their income (Unctad).  
The government refused to consider a cotton sector reform throughout the 1990s, but then, 
pushed by donors and a precipitating cotton sector crisis (Serra, 2012), it created a task-force 
for the restructuring of the cotton sector in 2001, formally committing to both privatizing 
the state company CMDT and liberalizing the market. The only step taken towards reform 
has to date been the division of the CMDT into four subsidiaries each operating in a 
different cotton zone (East, South, Central and West), thus committing to a local monopoly 
scheme, and the offering of their shares for sale through a tender process. However, no bid 
seems to have measured up to expectations and the privatization process of the four CMDT 
subsidiaries has not progressed (USDA). In general, the process has not been completed and 
has stalled due to several reasons, including favorable conditions in the international cotton 
market and the impending 2012 general elections (Serra, 2012). Mali has been more keen on 
institutional reform, especially at the level of producer associations. 
Central  Afri can Republ i c  
Cotton is the second largest source of export receipts in the Central African Republic. 
Cotton cultivation employs more than 100,000 people and another 800,000 are involved in 
cotton-related activities (Unctad). The "Société Centrafricaine de Developpement des 
textiles" (Socadetex) is the main corporate actor in the cotton sector. Socadetex was 
established in 2002 following the liquidation of the state enterprise Sococa ("Société 
Cotonnière Centrafricaine"). It is controlled by foreign investors (fourty nine percent share). 
The state holds a fifteen percent share and the local private sector accounts for the remaining 
thirty six percent. 
Côte d‘Ivoire  
Although cotton is not the prime cash crop in Cote d’Ivoire it accounted for about three 
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percent of agricultural exports from 2001 to 2003 (Baffes, 2007). Until 1973 the sector was 
managed by CFDT and in 1973 it passed to the "Compagnie Ivoirienne de Développement 
des Textiles" (CIDT), a state enterprise which was responsible for organising all services 
needed for cotton production and marketing. Under the CIDT the sector was vertically 
integrated and thrived reaching an all time high production of one hundred and fifty tons in 
the mid ninety nineties, also thanks to the CFAF devaluation and world high prices for 
cotton (Baffes, 2007).  
In the late nineteen nineties the government decided to undertake a reform of the sector and 
privatize most of the cotton industry: CIDT was broken down into five smaller companies 
with a concession area scheme (Baffes, 2007), only one of which has remained in the hands 
of the government. The conflicts that have hit the country especially in the northern region 
where cotton is grown, make it difficult to asses the outcomes of the undergone reforms. In 
any case the reform did not lead to competition as the price of seed cotton remained equal 
among zones and each company retained exclusive purchasing rights within its zone. 
Further, the government continues to support the cotton sector with the highest farm gate 
price in the sub-region (USDA) and subsidizing inputs. If the government meets its 
expectation, production will have seen a thirty-three percent gain over 2011/12 (USDA).  
Niger  
Producers are provided with seeds imported by the state enterprise "Société Cotonnière du 
Niger" from Benin. Two companies dominate cotton production and processing in Niger:  
- The "Société Cotonnière du Niger" (SCN), jointly owned by Aiglon (70%), DAGRIS (25%) 
and the Niger Government. SCN handles about 90% of domestic cotton production. 
- The Niger United Cotton Industries (CNUCI), controlled by Chinese interests. Established 
in 1998, it primarily markets cotton from the South-Western Gay and Dosso regions.  
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Senegal  
Although Senegal only ranks fourty-ninth among world cotton producers (USDA), cotton is 
the second largest agricultural export for the country accounting for around sixteen percent 
of total agricultural exports (USDA). It is grown in nearly every region and covers almost 
one third of cultivated acreage. Cotton was introduced in Senegal in the early 1960s after 
independence and was developed by the CFDT -later (1974) replaced by the Society for the 
Development of Textile Fibres (Sodefitex)- which distributed free inputs to cotton growers 
and ensured the collection of seed cotton. In the early eighties, the company also 
implemented a policy of technical training of villagers with the objective to increase 
production.  
In 1989 cotton producers started a process of organisation completed in 1998 with the 
creation of the National Federation of Cotton Producers (FNPC) bringing together Cotton 
Producer Groups (GPC) as a reaction to Sodefitex unilateral decision to halve subsidies on 
insecticides with a consequent significant drop in production. In January 2007, the 
partnership between Sodefitex and the FNPC went even further with the creation of the 
Senegalese Interprofessional Cotton Association (ASIC) which acts as an arbiter between the 
different actors in the sector.  
In 1998 it was decided that the sector be liberalized in order to face the need of substantial 
financial resources of Sodefitex to refurbish its facilities and vehicles. However, it was not 
until 2003 that Sodefitex was privatised: the State sold fifty percent of its shares to a private 
operator – Dagris, who became the majority shareholder. Producers acquired thirty percent 
of the company's shares (USDA) while the government retained ten percent and local 
spinners received the remaining shares (Baffes, 2007). The disengagement of the State was 
done with a view to protecting the national interests of the industry. Since the privatization in 
2003, the cotton growers and Sodefitex have developed their relationships as partners, 
sharing responsibilities – e.g. for the procurement and management of inputs, which were 
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controlled by Sodefitex and are now managed by the FNPC. The company is said to be still 
striving to fully use its ginning capacity (USDA). 
Chad 
Chad was the first WCA country to cultivate cotton. Cotton was introduced in Chad during 
the colonial period and has since dominated the economy. The sector is crucially important 
to the national economy both in terms of income generation for farmers and for export 
revenue: almost fourty percent of the country's total population is occupied in the sector 
(Unctad) and its parastatal is the third largest employer in the country39 (Baffes, 2007). As 
such it plays an important role in poverty reduction (WB). During the colonial period, cotton 
was produced and marketed through the French CFDT and Cotonfran which was replaced 
in 1971 by the parastatal Chad Cotton Company (CotonChad) after independence.  
Cotontchad had and has the monopoly of all cotton activities in the country. It provides 
farm inputs to farmers on credit and manages the distribution of such inputs; purchases, 
collects and transports seed-cotton from the villages to its cotton ginneries; gins the seed-
cotton, and commercialises the lint. The producer price for seed-cotton is set each year by a 
committee consisting of representatives of farmers and CotonChad.  
During 1970-75, Chad was the most successful cotton producer in WCA, its cotton output 
was almost twice as much as Mali’s average and three times as much as Benin’s and Burkina 
Faso’s average (Baffes, 2007). However, Cotonchad faced serious difficulties following the 
price decline and a drought both in 1985, which resulted in almost halved production. The 
sector was also burdened by a civil war, a war with Libya, and heavy taxation. Consequently, 
it was decided to evaluate reform startegies which was made through an ad hoc Cotton 
Sector Reform Committee. However, the only step actually taken in that direction has been 
the privatization of the lucrative oil-soap factory in 2002 under the auspices of the IMF. The 
                                                
39 after public administration and the army 
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divestiture of the latter and the disengagement of the state are by some (Enda editions, 2007) 
considered among the reasons of the following deepening crisis of the chadaian cotton 
sector and the momentum for reforms has further weakened following the country’s windfall 
revenue from crude oil. Nevertheless the state embarked upon a radical restructuring of the 
cotton company in an attempt to revitalize the sector. The Chad Cotton Company was 
dissolved by the government in September 2011 and a new company was created in its place: 
the Société Cotonnière du Tchad Société Nouvelle (CotonTchad SN) to which all operating assets 
and liabilities were transferred with the State acquiring the remaining assets and assuming the 
remaining liabilities. The state also assumed responsibility for financing the strategic liabilities 
of CotonTchad which have been transferred to CotonTchad SN (WTO). Since the creation 
of the new state-owned cotton company, CotonTchad SN, farmers have planted more 
cotton with the increase of the farm gate price (2009/10) which had been fixed for many 
years and the area planted for 2012/13 increased fifty seven percent from 2011/12 (170,000 
ha to 267,000 ha) (USDA). The long ago planned privatisation of Cotontchad has so far not 
yet been achieved: the government is still the majority shareholder (seventy five percent), 
followed by Dagris (nineteen percent), and the local private banking sector (six percent) 
(Baffes, 2007). 
Togo  
Although the crop was introduced only relatively recently, cotton cultivation plays an 
important role in the economy of Togo. Cotton is the largest source of export receipts 
providing important monetary resources to the State, and contributes to food security of the 
rural populations, accounting for up to seventy percent of income of farmers (Unctad).  
Until 1995 the sector was operated through a state-owned company, the Société Togolaise de 
Coton (Sotoco) created in 1974, in charge of providing input supply and marketing activities 
as well as research, extension and maintenance of the road network (Baffes citing World 
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Bank 1988). With the vertically integrated system, cotton growing experienced a boom and 
production increased significantly in the 1980s, as well as following the 1994 devaluation. 
The boom is to be credited to infrastructural interventions in agriculture promoted by the 
state. As a result, in fifteen years cotton became the third most important cash-crop of Togo, 
behind cocoa and coffee.  
However, declining world cotton prices combined with an appreciating exchange rate and 
inefficient local marketing and processing, heavily affected the performance of the sector 
with cotton production dropping to less than half of the decade’s average and Sotoco going 
bankrupt. In 1995 Sotoco lost its monopoly on processing and the external marketing of 
cotton as a result of the liberalisation of the ginning and spinning sectors that has allowed the 
entry of three new companies: Sicot-sa ("Société industrielle de coton"), whose main 
commercial partner is the controlling swiss company "Aiglon"; Sopic ("Société de production 
industrielle de coton"); and Socosa ("Société Cotonnière des Savanes") established (as for 
Sopic) by the Continental Eagle corporation (sixty-five percent) and the trading company 
Louis Dreyfus (twenty percent). Nonetheless, Sotoco which has meanwhile (2009) become 
“La Nouvelle société cotonnière du Togo” (NSCT) a mixed partnership company with sixty 
percent shares held by the state and fourty percent by cotton producers, still has a dominant 
purchasing position and is the sole provider of fertilizers and pesticides. Actually, cotton 
produced by farmers is first purchased by Sotoco, then half of the crop is sold to the three 
private ginneries in a fixed share per ginnery set as a proportion to its respective ginning 
capacity, at a price equal to the price paid to the producers plus marketing and transportation 
costs (Baffes, 2007).  
The performance of the sector has shown to improve since the 2011-2012 campaign has 
been successful and cotton production has increased to reach objectives. The Ministry of 
Agriculture maintains that the New Cotton Company of Togo will be privatized (US state 
department, 2012).  
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Cameroon 
Similarily to Mali Cameroon has implemented the least reform introducing the least changes 
to its cotton system which is still dominated by the state controlled company Sodecoton. 
Cotton was introduced in Cameroon in the early 1950s through CFDT. Initially, it was 
cultivated with only limited use of inputs but following two decades of stagnation, the 
government promoted the use of inputs, resulting in boosting yields during the mid-1980s. 
Since then, cotton production increased consistently and reached 100,000 tons of lint by 
2000 only lately decreasing.  
Since 1974 the cotton parastatal has been in charge of most aspects of marketing and trade 
of cotton. A privatization plan has been adopted by the government under IFI pressure in 
1994 during structural adjustment and then reproposed in 2003 but has to date resulted in 
minority shares of thirty and eleven percent held, respectively, by Dagris and Smic, a private 
local company. The privatisation project is thought to have failed due to the lack of internal 
political agreement40 but also due to the fact that the cotton sector performance has been 
satisfactory throughout41, and that the state parastatal is generally considered solvent thanks 
to effective institutional arrangements between the company and producer groups (Serra, 
2012). However, according to Serra, privatization is not to be completely excluded and the 
national producer association is trying to find resources to get hold of a twenty percent share 
in the cotton company once the opportunity is on the table. 
Burkina Faso 
Burkina Faso's cotton sector is one of the strongest agro-industries in Africa. Cotton was 
introduced in Burkina Faso towards the end of the colonial period and is the most important 
cash crop in the country. It is the main exported commodity in terms of value and accounts 
                                                
40 Baffes, 2007: ”It appears, however, that there is not much political interference in the sector.” 
41 “Cameroon: A well-managed sector—so far, so good” Baffes, 2007 
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for almost two thirds of total merchandise exports (Baffes, 2007). Cotton generates income 
for approximately two million people in the country.  
The sector was developed by the CFDT which was solely responsible until 1975 when it was 
first replaced by a joint venture between the government and CFDT, and in 1979 by the new 
cotton company “La Société Burkinabè des Fibres et Textiles” (Sofitex). In 1991 it was 
decided that the sector be reformed and that management responsibilities be transferred to 
growers and to a cotton company. Following came the transfer of thirty percent of shares 
from the state to growers grouped in the “Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton du 
Burkina Faso” (Unpcb), and another thirty-four percent to Dagris (Développement des 
Agro-Industries du Sud). In 1999 a committee was formed to coordinate Sofitex and 
UNPCB in the determination of the farmgate and input prices and management of the 
research program. In 2004 two other private companies (Socoma, Société Cotonnière du 
Gourma, and Fase Coton) were allowed to enter the sector covering together about fifteen 
percent of production. However this was under a temporary concession system with 
exclusivity zones conceded for eight years. In 2006 an umbrella organization was created to 
coordinate the actions of all three cotton companies.  
Compared to other WCA cotton-producing countries the reform process in Burkina Faso 
was considered a success story. Indeed, between 1995 and 2005, cotton output in Burkina 
Faso increased five-fold, from 64,000 to almost 300,000 tons (Baffes). However, it appears 
that despite the entrance of private ginneries as well as the restructuring of the ownership of 
Sofitex, the government is still the key decision maker in the sector. Actually, despite the 
state's divestiture, it still retains a thirty-five percent share and the enterprise is still integrated 
along the value chain (Unctad) and is still responsible for most of the commercial and 
industrial activities of the sector. The involvement of producers moved forward in 1999, 
when the national cotton producers' association ("Union nationale des producteurs de coton 
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du Burkina Faso" - Unpcb) purchased a thirty percent share in Sofitex. Dagris 
("Developpement des Agro-Industries du Sud"), a French public holding company dedicated 
to cotton cultivation in the franc zone, holds a thirty-four percent share, whereas the 
government has retained a share of thirty-five percent. Private sector banks hold the residual 
one percent share. Transport has been liberalized. 
Sudan 
Cotton is the leading cash crop in the country since the early twentieth century. In 1970 
cotton trade was nationalised under the Cotton Public Corp. (CPC) later (1986) renamed 
Sudan Cotton Company Ltd. (SCCL). The company was privatized in 1993 and several 
stakeholders own the SCCL: cotton farmers in Gezira, Rahad and New Halfa along with the 
Farmers’ Commercial Bank and the National Pension Fund. The management of cultivation, 
ginning, marketing and exporting involves both government, tenant farmers and the private 
sector. The cotton sector of Sudan, however is not as relevant to this research since it is not 
based on smallholder production. Actually after the completion of the Sennar dam in 1925, 
ninety percent of sudanese cotton has been grown in large irrigated farms. 
Guinea  
Cotton was introduced in Guinea post independence by the French Development and 
Textile Company (CFDT) which provided all management of the secor from the distribution 
of inputs and granting of credit to the production and marketing of cotton fibre. The State 
has encouraged cotton production in all regions with ecological potential as the crop had 
shown to be growth enhancing and to be a means to get to substantial cash income and build 
public infrastructure.  
In 2000 the sector was liberalized and the Guinean Cotton Company (CGC) was established. 
The major shareholder was the state, the second largest shareholder was meant to be CFDT 
but the shares were sold to the country’s private sector instead. This resulted in the 
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withdrawal of the sector’s main technical and strategic partner with consequent plummeting 
of cotton production due to disaffection to the crop by producers. Although the state tried 
to give cotton back its role through continuous support, the cotton sector continued to face 
enormous difficulties. In 2004, there were no ginning plants in the country and the crisis 
became worse with the difficulties to supply producers with inputs who had to travel to Mali 
to find some during the 2005/2006 campaign. In addition to difficulties encountered by 
cotton producers, the assistance of the state has been growingly scarce (Privatisation and 
Liberalisation of African Cotton Sectors, Enda editions). To date production has not recovered. 
 
6 Design sens i t ive  fac tors  
Reform experiences have highlighted that two of the critical factors in the cotton value chain 
have shown to be particularly sensitive to changes in the design of the sector. One is input 
credit. Cotton is an input intensive crop -as confirmed by cotton being in general the most 
pesticide-using42 crop (ICAC)- and external inputs –seeds, fertilizer, pesticides- are critical. 
Moreover, the inputs used must be the right inputs43 in order for farmers to be able to earn 
reasonable returns from the crop and for production to be enough for gins to avoid costly 
undercapacity.  
The SSA cotton sector is characterized by smallholder, undercapitalized farmers which 
makes saving from one season to the other to purchase the costly necessary inputs unlikely; 
as is formal lending due to a general financial scarcity and lack of collateral on the farmers’ 
side (box 1). While in the vertically integrated organisation of the sector the problem was 
solved by implementing contract-farming schemes, allowing to copiously increase production 
also by involving a growing number of farmers; the input credit system has shown to be 
                                                
42 In the 1990s, the use of crop protection chemicals on cotton peaked, accounting for some 20% of all global 
insecticides applied annually for agricultural purposes. ICAC 
 
43 the quantity of fertilizer and pesticide is important as is the quality of seeds. 
  
83 
difficult to apply in a competitive organisation of the sector in SSA. Competitive systems in 
the cotton sector are characterised by having a large number of ginners operating with open 
market competition for seed cotton purchase at harvest time and due to the difficulty in 
horizontal coordination among firms to prevent side-selling from farmers, there is no 
incentive to provide any preharvest service in such systems. Thus, among other services, also 
input credit is not provided.  
The combination of the characteristic market failures in SSA seasonal rural credit (Baffes, 
2007; Ikpi, 1999; Tscirley et al., 2009) and the absence of an input credit system from the 
ginners, have direct consequences on yields and participation in cotton cultivation on a large 
scale: farmers move in and out of the crop production, making the quantity of production 
irregular and generally decreasing, thus making long term programmes for productivity 
growth difficult 44 . Furthermore, volatility in production has a negative impact on key 
relationships with international merchants, who are sensitive to consistency of production.  
Input provision is also strictly related to the quality of seed cotton since the latter in grand 
part depends on the seed variety that is planted and thus distributed to producers.  
 
                                                
44 This is confirmed by the fact that although an increasing number of markets have become competitive, fifty 
percent of production in SSA still originates from non-competitive systems where input services are provided 
and prices are fixed. 
Box 1 
SSA rural credit markets are known to be plagued with inefficiencies and this is especially true for seasonal agriculture 
in general and grain crop production in particular (Dorward et al.). They are generally characterized by inflexible 
formal bureaucracy on one side and a weak informal component on the other (Ikpi), resulting in credit rationing, 
politicisation, poor management, lack of emphasis on savings mobilisation, and unsustainably low interest rates 
(Dorward et al.). SSA does have MFIs, but they tend to be in urban areas or when in rural areas these are less poor 
areas with better access and less dependence on seasonal agriculture, thus leaving out of the picture those who are most 
in need i.e. smallholder subsistence farmers. In other regions of the world, direct lending for seasonal agriculture exists 
and is considered in the litterature (there are examples in Latin America), as mentioned by Doward et al.. Unluckily 
the method seen is considered to be hardly feasible among SSA smallholders since the experienced lending technologies 
require use of collateral and of household budgets which are unlikely to be appropriate for subsistence crop producion, 
and in any case loan size is large. Doward et al. also mention that there do exist a few African MFIs trying to fill this 
gap in rural financial credit markets, but they tend to exist in more favourable areas where seasonality and climate 
risks are not majour features. In any case, they conclude that there is „as yet, no successful working model for such 
provision“. Some kind of financing for inputs in the cotton sector has shown to be a sine qua non to keep the sector 
living, since in the absence of input provision farmers have shown to turn to other crops.  
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The other design-sensitive point in the value chain, is the quality of seed cotton and lint. 
Before the cotton boll opens, cotton fiber quality is affected by research (seed variety, 
fertilizers, pesticides and production operations), extension and input provision; after that, 
nothing can be done to improve the quality of cotton but all subsequent operations can alter 
it for the worse. Following operations that affect quality include harvesting, storage (place 
and time), transportation, classing and grading functions, and operations at the gin.  
While monopolistic systems are burdened by the obligation to buy all seed cotton produced 
and thus have less possible impact on quality enchancing/perfomance, they also often have a 
rigorous and centralised cotton grading and lint classification system, sustained investments 
in research and extension which concertedly enable delivery of consistent high quality cotton. 
On the other side, although one of the expected results of a competitive cotton sector was an 
accrued quality performance encouraged by a higher connection to final market 
requirements, what actually occurred was a decline in support and quality control services 
which eventually turned out into a deterioration of quality.  
Among causes is that the primary worry of ginners is to avoid over capacity which results in 
a scramble to secure the purchase of a sufficient volume45 of seed cotton, regardless of its 
quality. This has turned out in a depletion of grading at the primary marketing stage due to 
the possibility of farmers to take their seed cotton to an alternative buyer who will purchase 
it irrespective of quality, since quantity comes before quality for ginners. Consequently, 
producers do not have the incentive to implement quality-enhancing practices. 
The achievement of high quality cotton also requires that ginners are able to control their 
supply chain46, impling some form of contract farming that is difficult to maintain in a 
competitive organisation of the sector.  
                                                
45 to cover their fixed costs 
46 As mentioned the quality of cotton seed and lint is partly consequent to the quality of inputs farmers use, 
thus dependent on the provision of services as input credit, research and extension. 
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Two consequences stem from low quality. A short term, direct impact on the price received 
on the world market: differences in quality affect the value that manufacturers can get from 
the cotton lint and consequently the price that they are prepared to pay, resulting in a lower 
price received by producers and processors - price differentials are quite wide, with a ratio of 
about 1:4 between the lowest and the highest quality (Estur, 2008). The second is a non 
trivial, long term impact on country reputation from which premiums and discounts partly 
derive, and that is much considered by international merchants when deciding where to 
purchase cotton lint and at what price. Moreover, it is aknowledged that it is easier to destroy 
this kind of good reputation than to establish it, let alone re-gain it. Quality maintenance and 
improvement requires a concerted effort involving all actors in the chain from researchers, 
producers, ginners, to transporters. Chapter four analizes quality in the SSA cotton sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2 
Benin, seed cotton grading and lint classing remained regulated and carried out by the government following the 
liberalization of ginning. However, lint quality has remained irregular since liberalization, with the proportion of 
production classed in Standard 047 (the highest quality) dropping from 82 percent in 1996/97 to less than 40 percent 
during the following three seasons, and fluctuating between 43 percent and 62 percent over the past five years. 
Uganda cotton was considered the best upland cotton in Africa. The country still occupies a special niche-market position 
by supplying roller ginned lint, and fiber quality is still considered relatively high. Yet, the quality control system at the 
primary collection level has largely broken down. Ginning overcapacity has led to a scramble for cotton and a large 
number of buyers purchase seed cotton regardless of quality, forcing others to do the same. Indiscrimate buying is 
correlated with high levels of contamination and because Ugandan cotton is reputed to be very contaminated, the premium 
its lint attracts has shrunk during the last decade. 
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PART 2   
Comparison with other  Cash Crops ’  Value Chains and Impl i cat ions on 
Market  Organisat ion  
In this section I consider three other SSA success cash crops sectors which have undergone 
liberalization. I have chosen among those crops that similarily to cotton are highly labour 
intensive and where smallholder production dominates. I describe each crop -coffee, cocoa 
and tea- separately, beginning with its main features and then describe pre and post 
liberalization organisations of the sectors including advantages and disadvantages reported in 
literature. I eventually consider the reasons that have brought to a different outcome in the 
cotton sector. 
7 Cof f ee  
In developing countries, towards the end of the nineteen-nineties, coffee was the second 
most important commodity after petroleum in terms of export earnings. Many countries, 
especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America, still depend heavily on coffee as 
a source of foreign exchange and of employment in rural areas. SSA is the third largest world 
producer and exporter of coffee following Brazil and Vietnam with Ethiopia alone ranking 
eighth among world coffee producers (USDA, 2012). In SSA coffee production is 
characterized by smallholder production. 
 
7.1 Crop Features  
Coffee is usually cultivated between latitudes twenty-five degrees North and twenty-five 
degrees South. 
Coffee cherries grow on bushes which take three to five years to develop from seedling to 
full-producing shrub. The shrub is productive for around fourty years although production is 
prime between its fifth and fifteenth year (Agro-Industry Profile, Coffee; WB 1986). The first 
stage in the coffee value chain is input provision. Inputs are tipically fertilizers and pesticides 
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which play a decisive role in the quality of coffee; coffee seedlings are necessary only at the 
beginning of the productive stage. Farmers carry out pruning, fertilizer application, pesticide 
spraying and then harvesting which all have consequences on the quality of the crop. 
Harvesting is particularly labour intensive since it is done by hand, even more so when “wet 
processing”- which demands for “selective picking”47- is to follow. The harvested coffee 
beans are then sold to local collectors and further to coffee processors for export. Coffee 
processors dry, grade and even size beans to be sold to exporters. There are two varieties 
cultivated commercially: Arabica and Robusta, of which Arabica is more refined. 
7.2 Sec tor  Design Prior  to  Liberal izat ion  
For many SSA countries coffee is a source of foreign exchange and government revenue48.  
Before the nineteen-nineties the sector was designed as a vertically integrated single-channel 
marketing system with state monopolies, stabilization funds and marketing boards. A pricing 
system was part of the organisation and producers received a fixed advance payment price 
and a second payment, usually linked to quality. Prices were fixed pan-seasonally so as to 
protect growers from price fluctuations assuring them a minimum price providing a degree 
of security and keeping incentives to production. Marketing boards were responsible for 
promotion, quality control and export processing. The centralized system was typically 
successful in keeping the information flow in the whole value chain and as such was 
considered to provide quality incentives to cooperative societies part of the chain and (less 
directly) to farmers (Fold and Ponte, 2008). Parastatals provided technical assistance in 
production, processing, and marketing and helped farmers establish interest groups.  
Smallholders delivered coffee to cooperatives or private domestic traders. The cooperatives 
passed the coffee on to cooperative unions for hulling, and private traders hulled and sold 
                                                
47 Wet processing requires soft fruit that is pulpable,so only ripe cherries are harvested (selective picking). Strip 
picking instead, removes all fruit from the tree aftiier most of the fruit has matured.The result is an uneven end-
product since a large proportion of the fruit may then be over-ripe, immature or even green. In this case 
cherries are thn dry-processed. 
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the coffee to the Marketing Board. The difference between the producer price and the 
border price was an important source of revenue for the government with coffee providing 
up to ninety percent of foreign exchange and fifty percent of government revenue e.g. in 
Uganda. The private sector was either completely left out of the sector or had very limited 
action – mostly confined to hulling and internal trading (Fold and Ponte, 2008). 
7.3 Downturn to  the  pre-Liberal izat ion Organisat ion 
The vertically integrated systems were considered inefficient and losing money at various 
points in the chain. The price stabilization mechanism was associated with high costs 
resulting in lower proportions of the export price given to the farmers (Ponte, 2002). 
Payments to farmers were often late (Ponte, 2002). Stabilization funds which were to be 
replenished when world prices were high were misused and consequently malfunctioned and 
the possibility of moral hazard opened the door to corruption (Akiyama, 2001). Furthermore, 
the sector was generally burdened by high taxes (Akiyama, 2001). 
7.4 Sea change and Liberal izat ion 
A state control of marketing and the described price mechanism have long been considered 
necessary by SSA governments because of coffee's importance as a source of foreign 
exchange and government revenue (Akiyama, 2001). Moreover the functioning of the system 
was backed by the existence of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) created in 1962, 
which established and monitored an international export quota system suporting coffee 
prices above market levels (Gilbert, 2007). The ICO export quotas stabylizing system actually 
made fixed-price policies sustainanble for governments (Akiyama, 2001). This set of factors 
has made it possible for the African share of Robusta producers to grow and reach a peak of 
twenty-four percent of world production in the beginning of the nineteen-sevnties (Gilbert, 
2007). This is in line with the view that African producers have been “sheltered” by the ICO 
to the detriment of other larger producers such as Brazil. In July 1989 the ICO export quota 
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system collapsed and export quotas were eliminated. Coffee-producing countries reacted 
exporting large portions of their accumulated stocks, causing a sharp decline in coffee prices 
– a fourty percent drop (Gilbert, 2007). The quotas being lifted, fixed–price policies became 
hardly sustainable having to face the combination of a sharp decline49 and fluctuation in 
world prices. The revenues of all coffee producing countries were affected and parastatal 
marketing boards started suffering financial difficulties. As a result many governments were 
forced to look to international organizations and donor countries for financial assistance 
which came on the condition that they would undergo market reform. Liberalization was 
implemented in the nineteen nineties in almost all SSA coffee producing countries.  
7.5 Fol lowing l ibera l izat ion 
Reforms resulted in significant changes to the coffee subsector with a substantial reduction 
of government intervention in the marketing and pricing of coffee. Among changes were 
new marketing systems, growing private sector participation and increased producer prices 
(Akiyama, 2001). Where reforms were implemented, private exporting firms were gradually 
allowed to export and soon began handling almost all coffee exports. The most significant 
change since liberalization was in producer prices which were now linked to world prices and 
rose significantly in terms of the share of the border price; farmers were also exented from 
the long waits for payments that characterized the previous system (Ponte, 2002). Input 
provision was passed on to the private sector, be it commercial banks which provide 
financing-for example in Uganda, or private exporters - like in Togo where they have taken 
up crop financing with prefinancing and cash advance to farmers.  
However, a number of critical services previously provided by parastatal agencies have come 
to miss. To begin with, research and extension services have been weakened by reforms and 
obtaining credit at reasonable interest rates has shown to be very difficult for small local 
                                                
49 Not only because of the de-stocking of coffee producing countries but also because of coffee’s “catching 
up” its negative price trend resulting from productivity advance, common across all agricultural commodities. 
(Gilbert) 
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exporters and producers, one of the primary reasons for this being the mentioned weakness 
of financial institutions (box 1).  
Producers’ groups and cooperatives have been adversely affected by reforms (Akiyama, 2001; 
Ponte, 2002) having difficulties in competing with private traders on price 50 , with a 
consequent dramatic decrease in their share in produce handling to the advantage of large 
scale producers. The weakening of cooperatives and the high levels of buyer competition 
also increased the speed at which all negotiations take place: traders need to move coffee 
quickly  in order to minimize costs51. The coffee is bought all at one price with pre-functory 
checks only: good and bad coffee is all mixed together and exporters can only perform a 
partial selection process to re-separate high quality for speciality exports, thus leaving out of 
possible premiums the small-holder producer and sharing no information with farmers52. 
This results in a disincentive to produce high quality coffee among small-holder producers to 
the advantage of estates53 and threatens the supply of speciality coffee and the economic 
viability of high quality producers (Ponte, 2002).  
Another consequence to the disruption of the information flow in the value chain is that 
producers are left to acquire price information and handle negotiations with traders 
independently, thus having to decide whether prices traders offer are adequate. Farmers also 
face volatility of prices which is passed through much more directly to them as a 
consequence to the dismantling of domestic marketing boards (Gilbert, 2007).  
                                                
50 “If they pay a lower price than traders, they fail to get coffee from farmers. If they pay a high price, they risk 
losing money if the market price goes down, plus fail to make a second or third payment in relation to quality. 
As a result, they have either gone bankrupt, or have competed on the same basis as commercial traders – but 
without their speed and flexibility.” Ponte 
51 consequently they cannot afford to spend time to evaluate small batches of coffee or preserve the identity of 
the batches for a future payment related to quality. 
52 Both country-based actors and farmers have lost power in the marketing chain to the advantage of 
consuming-country operators who take advantage of the asymmetry in quality information with a substantial 
part of total income being transferred from farmers and producer-country operators in general to consuming-
country operators. However, other authors along with Gilbert (2007) dissent arguing that in more than one 
study, USDA among others- resulted in a one-to-one adjustment of roast coffee price to the price of green 
coffee. 
53Gilbert (2007) observes that there is some evidence that small holder production is superior in quality in 
comparison to estates. 
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Two general consequences to reforms have been the fall in production, as registered by the 
loss of market share by African Robusta producers –from a twenty-four percent share to 
nine percent- after the collapse of the ICO quota system and liberalization of the coffee 
sector with an increase in concentration of world coffee production in Brazil and Vietnam 
(Gilbert, 2005); and a general deterioration in the quality of the export crop resulting in price 
discounting in international markets and a consequent loss of reputation for those origins 
(Ponte, 2002). However, looking at export data per country, some countries like Ethiopia 
and Togo have actually slowly increased their production and exports while other like 
Uganda and Tanzania are either recovering or have not changed much (Appendix 1). 
Comparing the whole SSA region to Brazil there is a fall in exports after year 2000 (an all 
time peak) and until 2005 but a slow recovery thereafter. 
8 Cocoa 
The world’s production of cocoa is dominated by four West African countries: namely Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon and Nigeria. Together they account for about two thirds of total 
production with Côte d’Ivoire alone contributing over fourty percent being the world’s 
major cocoa producer.  
8.1 Crop f eatures  
Cocoa is a tree crop (derived from the tree Theobroma cacao) grown only in tropical areas 
and is suited both to small farmer and estate systems. Traditional varieties cultivated 
commercially are Criollo, Forastero (commonly Amelonado), and Trinitario which is an 
accidental hybridization between the former two. Traditional varieties start yielding beans 
about five years after planting and hybrid varieties after about three years. Production is 
prime after eleven years for traditional varieties and after seven years for hybrids. Given the 
right conditions, high yields are maintained for twenty to twenty-five years, and trees will 
continue yielding for between thirty and seventy years. Pods that are ripe for harvest are 
available all year round but there are peaks, mainly as the result of climatic factors - especially 
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temperature and rainfall. Time of harvest is not as critical as with other crops; pods which 
are not fully ripe can be fermented as easily as fully ripe pods, and ripe pods can be left on 
the tree for two to three weeks. However, frequency of harvesting influences bean quality 
which is best maintained when harvesting takes place every one or two weeks. The obtained 
raw cocoa is then cleaned, roasted, winnowed and ground to produce “nibs” which are 
further processed into liquor, cocoa butter and powder. The latter three are traded 
internationally and used in making chocolate. 
Cocoa processing can be divided into two parts. Primary processing is carried out in 
producing countries by producers themselves - stages are pod opening, fermentation (box 3) 
and drying. Secondary processing has been concentrated in consuming countries. 
 
8.2 Sec tor  Design pr ior  to  Liberal izat ion  
Until the 1980s Africa’s cocoa was produced and marketed under state-controlled systems, 
through marketing board systems and stabilization funds. The marketing board system was 
characterized by a parastatal with a monopoly over internal and external crop marketing: the 
crop was handled by the marketing board from the moment the crop was purchased from 
the grower to the moment it was exported (Akiyama, 2001), also accounting for quality 
requirements. Producer prices were determined administratively by the marketing board and 
government authorities and were fixed pan-seasonally, or even for several years, and pan-
territorially so farmers would receive a uniform price irrespective of their location. The 
Box 3 
Fermentation 
Correct fermentation and drying are critical operations and no subsequent processing can compensate for poor practice at this 
stage. The objective of fermentation is the production of cocoa beans possessing the desired stability, flavour, and aroma from 
which good chocolate can be manufactured. Desirable effects of fermentation on the beans include reduction in bitter taste, 
destruction of the seed, facilitation of shelling, and most importantly, development of flavour and aroma precursors. Without 
these precursors chocolate flavour will not develop during roasting. 
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objective of the price mechanism was to provide some degree of insulation against 
fluctuations in world market prices. Stabilization fund systems were designed to accumulate 
reserves when prices are high and support producer prices when prices decline, thus 
providing a degree of price stability in the face of international price volatility. The fund, or 
caisse, was a government-controlled marketing agency regulating the internal market and 
exports but did not handle the physical crop directly - it licensed agents to do so determining 
how much they would be paid according to a mandatory schedule of prices, costs, and profit 
margins for each stage of internal commercialization and exporting.  
8.3 Downturn to  pre-Liberal izat ion Organisat ion 
In the general scenario of falling world cocoa prices, marketing boards and stabilization 
funds grew to become cumbersome and often politicized organizations characterized by high 
operating costs absorbing a significant share of export earnings and high marketing costs 
ascribed to the administered price mechanism (Akiyama, 2001). Price mechanisms tend to be 
unsustainable when word prices are low since governments soon face fiscal constraints as 
they are obliged to finance the difference between the guaranteed producer price and the 
actual export price. The combination of factors exerted significant pressures on farm 
incomes (Akiyama, 2001). Experience in West Africa has shown that cocoa farmers in 
countries with stabilization funds and marketing boards have been poorly remunerated as 
parastatal marketing agencies and governments have appropriated a substantial part of the 
export price (Akiyama, 2001). Moreover, funds have rarely been used for their presumed 
purpose and have not fulfilled self-financing. 
8.4 Sea Change and Liberal izat ion 
Although there were no distortions in the world cocoa market to be phased out/eliminated54, 
                                                
54 “The International Cocoa Agreement (ICA) of the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) operated a 
buffer stock program aimed at defending world cocoa prices (represented by the ICCO's daily price) within a 
certain price range, or band. During the late 1980s the decline in world cocoa prices forced the buffer stock to 
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during the last 20 years, world cocoa prices have exhibited a pronounced downtrend as a 
result of producers’ response to attractive prices in the late seventies and early eighties which 
induced them to increase cocoa plantings (Akiyama, 2001). Hence, supplies and stocks of 
cocoa increased and prices fell due to the inverse relation between global cocoa stocks to 
grindings and real world cocoa prices. Cocoa prices were at historically low levels in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Not surprisingly, stabilization agencies and marketing boards that 
attempted to maintain high producer prices found themselves facing serious financial 
difficulties (Gilbert, 2008) and consequently longing for financial assistance. Major donors 
conditioned financial help to the implementation of a liberalization of the cocoa sector. 
Reforming the sector was seen as a way to reduce the high marketing costs, raise incomes of 
farmers by increasing farmgate prices, and open up the cocoa sector to private operators 
(Gilbert, 2008). All four of West Africa's largest cocoa-producing countries- Cameroon, 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d'Ivoire-plus Togo (a smaller cocoa producer) undertook such 
reforms with the objective of improving efficiency thus reducing costs and increasing 
producer prices. The reforms undertaken in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Togo 
have been profound, Ghana's reforms have been more gradual.  
8.5 Fol lowing Liberal izat ion 
Where reforms have been fully implemented the marketing chain comprises many private 
agents with market forces determining prices and without a direct involvement of the 
government in marketing the crop. Producers sell at the farm gate or at village markets to 
local traders or cooperatives which then transport the cocoa to secondary markets or to a 
port and sell it to private exporters directly or through intermediaries. International dealers or 
traders subsequently sell to final users - generally chocolate companies - or processes the 
cocoa for sale. One general result of liberalization is that in free market sytems, producers 
                                                                                                                                            
its limit (it reached 250,000 tons in 1988), and efforts at price stabilization were effectively abandoned. Recent 
renewals of the ICA do not contain economic clauses (that is, there is no price support or price stabilization) 
and in 1997 the buffer stock held by the ICCO was liquidated.” (Akiyama) 
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receive a much higher percentage of the f.o.b. export price than in other marketing systems 
(Akiyama, 2001). In Cameroon and Nigeria producer prices increased from around fourty-
five percent and twenty percent, respectively, before the reforms to over seventy percent and 
eighty percent afterward (Akiyama, 2001). Producer prices in Togo increased from sixty 
percent of the f.o.b. price prior to reforms to about eighty percent thereafter (Akiyama, 
2001). Increased producer prices are the result of growing competition among local traders, 
lower marketing costs and margins, and the abolition of state marketing agencies and thus 
implicit taxes - comparison studies show that marketing costs and taxes are lower (Akiyama, 
2001 citing a study in 1989 and 1995) than in monopolistic statal systems. In fact, marketing 
costs and taxes declined dramatically in Cameroon and Nigeria following market 
liberalization. However, although the market system is free the government may retain 
involvement in quality control, taxation, and general monitoring and supervision. In general 
market liberalization has had a positive impact on producer prices and on production which 
have both increased (Akiyama, 2001). 
8.6 Downside to  l ibera l izat ion 
Reforms also unleashed a number of problems.  
Collapse in forward sales - Forward sales in the cocoa market allow to hedge from the 
uncertainty of future prices, they reduce the risk of seasonal price stabilization, and they 
allow producing countries to capture the “forward premium” - the difference between the 
forward price and the spot price at the time of the forward sale. Thanks to an established 
reputation in the market as a reliable counterpart, marketing boards were able to sell forward 
even well ahead of harvest time –up to eighteen months ahead. This was also made possible 
thanks to the confidence agencies had in the availability of cocoa beans for sale in the 
coming crop thanks to the control of exports through direct sales and granting export rights. 
The presence of a monopoly marketing agency such as a marketing board generally greatly 
reduces performance risk in forward sales (Akiyama, 2001). While prior to liberalization 
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cocoa exports were in grand part sold forward before the new crop year thanks to the 
governement agencies acting as counterparty risk in international transactions; since 
liberalization, private exporters have become the counterparties in forward transactions, thus 
raising the performance risk. Consequently, there has been a collapse in forward sales 
(Akiyama, 2001). 
Concentration of exporters – after rising in number immediately following reforms, the 
number of exporters dropped dramatically in the post liberalization period with a consequent 
concentration of exports in foreign-linked companies. This happened in Cameroon for 
example, where two foreign-linked exporters control around eighty percent of all exports 
(Akiyama, 2001), leaving out of the business local exporters (Fold, 2008) who have been 
reduced to traders, selling to either foreign-linked exporters or the local processing factory, 
also thanks to the difficulties local traders have in accessing credit. 
Declining quality – A number of reasons lie behind the declining quality of cocoa following 
reforms experienced by most cocoa producing African countries. After liberalization, the 
rush for market share by both experienced and new domestic traders resulted in higher prices 
offered to producers and less attention oriented to quality requirements. In the attempt of 
reducing time between borrowing and repayment and to increase the speed of capital 
turnaround due to the costs of capital as a consequence of its scarcity and with the objective 
of maximizing their profits, new domestic buyers and exporters showed little regard for 
quality paying the same price for all beans. Consequently, low and high grade55 beans would 
be increasingly mixed together to the point that cocoa would be purchased even if it was not 
properly dried or fermented for the fear of losing potential shipments. On their side, farmers 
would take advantage of the oppportunity of selling quickly to local buyers, consequently 
paying less attention in the processing -  drying and fermentation- resulting in the erosion of 
                                                
55 “Low quality is caused primarily by high bean humidity at the arrival points in the port of shipment and the 
resulting mould that easily develops. High humidity content is a consequence of inappropriate and reduced 
drying times at village level (…)” (Marianne, Fold) 
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the general quality level (box 3). The trend was exacerbated by the abolishing of government 
quality controls and of grading at the village level (Fold, 2008 citing Atse). The general result 
has been a loss of consistency and consequent reduction in price premiums. This has been 
experienced by Cameroonian cocoa which used to command a premium over Ivorian cocoa 
but saw it extinguish after exporters have taken full responsibility for quality control, and 
where average quality sunk to such low levels that during one season, a considerable part of 
the beans was declared unacceptable to Northern exporters and grinders (Fold, 2008 citing 
Marchés Tropicaux). Nigeria also lost its premium due to a number of reasons among which 
the abolition of quality control and standards following a too rapid liberalization. For the 
same reasons Ivorian cocoa quality started declining with the implementation of the first 
reforms in nineteen-ninety. Although it might be too simplistic to attribute a deterioration in 
quality entirely to market liberalization or to the advent of a free market system as Akiyama 
claims, other authors argue that the situation has remained substantially the same ever since 
the first ‘post-liberalization rush’ (Fold, 2008).  
Increased price volatility exposure – given out the protection performed by marketing 
boards, market liberalization has brought farmers to be directly exposed to price volatility 
from fluctuations in the world market56.  
 
9 Tea 
 
In Africa, tea is produced mainly in East Africa with Kenya, Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania 
being the largest African producers and exporters of tea. In the world market, Kenya is the 
third largest producer of black tea after India and Sri Lanka. In this section I will consider 
solely the case of Kenya for a number of resons I hereafter briefly explain.   
Tea is Kenya’s top export (Faostat), whereas it is less important in the other African 
                                                
56 This is shown by Gilbert and Varangis for example, in the comparison table between price variability before 
and after globalization. 
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producing countries’ economies. Kenya has been the world’s top exporter of tea in 2007 and 
2008 and has been second only to Sri Lanka since (Faostat). The Kenyan tea sector is 
peculiar in that its smallholder production is one of the greatest success stories in the 
country’s agricultural sector. Kenya’s tea is the most important agricultural sub-sector in the 
country and the second leading foreign exchange earner, contributing about twenty six 
percent of the total foreign exchange earnings (Kagira citing the Tea Board of Kenya). The 
sub-sector employs approximately ten percent of the Kenyan population (Kagira citing 
Gesimba et al., 2005) and further has to do with poverty reduction since it enables farmers to 
accumulate assets57.  
9.1 Crop f eatures  
Tea (black, green and white) comes from an evergreen bush (Camelia sinensis) which thrives 
at fairly high altitude in the humid regions of the tropics and sub tropics (1400-2500 m). 
Although usually grown in large estates, it is also cultivated on small farms. The tea plant 
starts to yield usable leaf two to three years after planting, reaching full production after 
seven to ten years. Yields of made tea vary depending on climate, variety and cultivation 
practices. The quality of tea produced is closely linked to growing conditions and cultivation 
practices. Quality depends on the characteristics of the leaf which vary according to the 
plant’s growth patterns and growing conditions as well as cultivation and harvesting 
practices. Tea is harvested or “plucked” year-round and is particularly labour intensive (needs 
to be plucked every seven to twenty days). Plucking helps determine the quality of the final 
product and has a significant effect on the growth of the plant. Plucking is usually hand 
made, higher quality tea is produced from “fine” plucking of “two leaves and a bud”. 
Mechanical harvesting is also possible but results in “coarse plucking”. Tea bushes are 
                                                
57 Kagira et al. assert that involvement in tea production improves the quality of life of rural families enhancing 
the wellbeing of communities living in rural areas. 
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typically plucked once every one to two weeks depending on the season; great skill and care 
is required to ensure that the plant remains productive. Other significant factors are shade 
and pest control. Once the leaf is plucked it is taken to the factory for processing in the least 
possible time - less than twelve hours - so that bacterial attack and leaf deterioration do not 
occur. Poor handling results in bruising and consequently in uncontrolled fermentation and 
overheating. The processing stage in itself does not involve complicated machinery or 
sophisticated technology. However, it is time, space and usually also labour intensive. The 
main purpose of tea processing is to allow chemical changes to take place within the leaf. 
The fundamental process in black tea manufacture is enzymatic fermentation of polyphenols 
within the leaf. Different processes prepare the leaf, establish optimum conditions for 
fermentation, and end the process when it has gone far enough. The two most important 
factors affecting the final product are the temperature and the duration of the process. 
Fermentation is the simplest but most important stage in tea processing. 
 
9.2 The Case o f  Kenya 
The cultivation of tea for commercial purposes was introduced in Kenya in 1924. At that 
time tea growing was restricted by the government and colonial settlers, to large scale 
farmers and multinational companies. Natives were not allowed to grow the crop until after 
independence (1963) when the government created the Special Crops Development 
Authority (SCDA) to promote growing of tea by Africans with the support of the ministry of 
Agriculture, thus opening tea-growing to local indigenous farmers. In 1964 the liabilities and 
functions of the SCDA were taken over by the then established Kenya Tea Development 
Authority (KTDA) with the mandate to promote and develop the growing of tea in local 
smallscale farms. Since then tea growing is wide-spread in Kenya and although large scale 
farms still operate, smallholders contribute the biggest percentage of the output - 
approximately sixty-two percent of the total tea crop in Kenya is produced by more than 
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562,000 small-scale farmers – and have more acreage, covering sixty-six percent of the total 
area under the crop (Kiarie, 2012 citing Mwaura & Muku, 2007).  
KTDA is to date the management agency of the smallholder tea farmers. Until 1997 KTDA 
operated as a parastatal and had exclusive management control over the smallholder tea value 
chain including provision of planting material and extension services, provision of inputs and 
services, collection and processing of the green leaf, management of the factories and 
marketing of the processed leaf. The sale of the processed tea was organised by KTDA 
through its contracted agents at Mombasa and London auctions, once it received the sale 
proceeds it arranged the payments to farmers on a monthly basis. KTDA also insisted on the 
“two leaves and a bud” plucking style, which kept quality high and KTDA tea generally sold 
for higher prices than estate teas (Tyler, 2006). Average yields were on a par with Kenyan 
estate levels, which in turn were on average the highest in the world.  
The exclusive KTDA control over the smallholder tea value chain worked well when 
membership was small (CPDA) and until the nineteen eighties the industry was well 
organised and farmers promptly received good prices for their tea (CPDA). According to 
Tyler, KTDA’s early success was also due to its high level of integrity, which gave confidence 
to smallholders that they could deliver their leaf to KTDA and then would be paid a fair 
price without excessive deductions or KTDA overheads. Consequently, a growing number 
of farmers went into tea growing or expanded their tea acreage also encouraged by the 
government.  
However, as the number of tea farmers grew throughout the country, the centralised system 
started to show weak spots (Keraro et al., 2012). The administrative and financial control of 
all tea factories was in the hands of KTDA, which started being accused of high overhead 
costs that reduced payments to farmers. As KTDA grew into one of the biggest enterprises 
in Kenya its reputation of integrity slipped: politicians recognised that there was money and 
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patronage to be squeezed out of KTDA and by the nineteen nineties KTDA had become a 
politicised institution. Farmers felt they had limitated power in decision making on the 
processing and marketing of their tea, thus they started calling for a decentralization of the 
authority and privatization of the tea sub-sector (Keraro et al., 2012).  
In 1999 the liberalization process of the tea sub-sector began and KTDA lost its monopoly 
rights being privatised as the Kenya Tea Development Agency Limited in 2000, through the 
issue of shares to its smallholder growers. To date, smallholder farmers produce and sell their 
tea through the Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA), which has become the largest 
single tea agency in the world with sixty two tea factories in the small scale tea sector serving 
over five hundred thousand growers. KTDA functions include factory unit management and 
support services, sales and marketing, financial services and tea management consultancy 
services (KTDA, 2011). It also provides extension services, production inputs, green leaf 
collection, processing and marketing of processed tea on behalf of small scale tea farmers 
(KTDA, 2011). 
9.3 Outcomes o f  Liberal izat ion 
One outcome of privatisation was  that the directors in the KTDA board are directly elected 
by the farmers to represent their interests in the tea factories (Keraro et al., 2012). 
Privatization was called to bring about more efficiency and transparency in the operations of 
the company and according to Keraro et al. it was actually successful in improving 
management expediency in decision making, eliminating redundant bureaucracy and accruing 
transparency in factory operations. However, Keraro et al. (2012) also mention the poor 
quality of the new board directors – read inexperienced- and other problems unleashed with 
liberalization.  
In general the outcome of the undertaken reform is not clear. In fact, if on the one hand 
there are authors like Keraro et al. (2012) who bolster the privatization of the Kenyan tea 
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through studies that reveal that liberalization has resulted in ”significant positive impacts” 
which have led to the growth of the sub sector and benefited the farmers; there are other 
studies that claim that results of privatization have fallen short of expectations. The CPDA 
study for example reveals that instead of accrueing transparency, KTDA has become 
increasingly corrupt58 and inefficient after privatisation as a result of being shielded from 
direct public scrutiny. While Keraro et al. claim that privatisation has particularly benefited 
smallholder farmers59, CPDA asserts that farmers have reamined isolated at one end of the 
value chain and have little if no weight in decision making and influencing the sector. 
Further, even though the prices smallholder attain on the world market are similar to those 
for plantation tea, the crowded smallholder tea value chain, the high management fees 
charged by KTDA and its management inefficiencies reduce the payments received by the 
small scale farmers which thus remain lower than those for plantations.  
CPDA also claims that following liberalization, quality has taken a declining trend which in 
turn negatively affects prices obtained by the small scale farmers. This is confirmed by Kagira 
et al. (2012) who claim that farmers in Kenya have specialized in production of bulk 
undifferentiated low quality tea with a focus on volume rather than quality. Kagira et al. 
(2012) also consider that smallholders have been negatively affected by liberalization as far as 
the information flow in the value chain goes: when the sector was run by the parastatal, 
farmers used to get extension services (including information on better tea farming practices) 
from the Ministry of Agriculture; following liberalization, such services are available only on 
fee and most farmers are unable to pay or ignore the usefulness of the service. One example 
for all is that the Tea Research Foundation of Kenya has developed forty-five varieties of tea 
which have not been adopted yet because many farmers ignore their availability (Kagira et al., 
                                                
58 as a result of being in the hands of a “small club of powerful elite businessmen who enjoy political 
patronage” 
59 “The study revealed that farmers have a much bigger say in the management of factory companies now than 
before liberalization.” 
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2012). The adoption of improved varieties of tea is one way to tackle the declining quality 
problem following liberalization and is among KTDA duties to ensure that farmers adopt 
these technologies but it has shown to be unable to do so.  
Following liberalization, farmers also need to deal with fluctuation of world tea prices which 
is a major problem especially when the small scale farmer family does not have other sources 
of income (Kagira et al., 2012). This is directly linked to tea hawking: high poverty levels 
among smallscale farmers often takes them not to be in the position of waiting the payment 
terms of KTDA and obliges them to sell their tea to non-KTDA outlets or sell to 
middlemen for immediate though much lower payment (Kagira et al., 2012). According to 
Kagira et al. (2012, citing Kegonde 2005) tea hawking is wide spread in Kenya tea growing 
areas. This has showed to lead to poor tea husbandry, low returns to the farmer and non-
repayment of farm input-loans advanced to the farmers by the factory companies to which 
these farmers belonged (Keraro, 2012).  
So although as Chepengeno et al. claim, liberalization has brought smallholder tea farmers to 
have more channels for their produce instead of having only KTDA as an outlet, and that 
the structure of the sector has actually changed and become competitive at the farm level 
with increased participation by private firms and individuals with the private sector 
participating in the marketing of smallholder tea; the structure and performance as well as 
the benefits of this new organisation of the sector remain unclear (Chepengeno et al., 2012 
citing Nyangito, 2001).  
 
10. Conc lus ions :  Dif f erent  Sens i t iv i t i e s ,  Dif f erent  Impacts   
I have chosen to compare the afore described crops to cotton for a number of reasons. As 
for cotton, the absence of scale economies at the growing stage of these chains and their 
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agronomic characteristics make these crops particularly important to the rural poor in SSA. 
Furthermore, they all are SSA smallholder production success stories; they share with cotton 
a number of stages in the value chain and all four crop sectors were originally organised as 
state monopolies and have subsequently been reformed.  
The reforms in the considered SSA sectors have given outcomes that are hardly interpretable 
univocally: in all four sectors reform outcomes are usually described as mixed, and much 
depends on the viewer’s perspective. However, following liberalization two facts have 
generally taken place: a wellcome raise in producer prices as a share of f.o.b. export prices, 
and a dismemberment of the value chain with a consequent fall in quality. The four sectors 
have been affected unequally by such changes: while Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire retain their 
position as the world’s major exporters in tea and cocoa respectively, and the SSA region as a 
whole shows recovery in coffee production with Ethiopia even increasing its share in coffee 
exports (Appendix 1); declining quality and the consequent loss of country reputation has 
turned out to be more serious an issue when related to the cotton sector.  
The reasons are to be searched for in the dynamics of world market requirements per crop. 
In the coffee sector, the development of new processing techniques, i.e. steam cleaning, have 
resulted in the possibility of substituting low-cost robusta coffee to high-cost arabicas 
providing the potential to reduce bean costs by mixing different quality of beans (Kaplinsky, 
2004). Thus, high quality beans and traceability have lost criticality in exports but for 
speciality coffees. In cocoa, at the basis of a homogenized demand for lower quality are the 
changes in transportation technology: beans are now transported in bulk making segregation 
of quality beans costly (exporters can distinguish different quality lots but only losing the cost 
advantage from bulking) and resulting in a downward shift in exporter’s demands for 
premium quality cocoa (Gilbert et al., 2002). In tea, blending makes different tea qualities 
become interchangeable. 
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None of this seems to work for cotton. The difference in cotton lies in the lasting criticality 
of its design-sensitive features: inputs and quality. The timely need of inputs is a consequence 
of the intrinsic charcateristics of the crop: it is input-intense and it is a year crop. Instead 
inputs are not as critical in coffee, cocoa and tea which are tree crops with a consequent 
difference in investment/planting decisions and related credit problems. In cotton, inputs are 
needed seasonally and some kind of coordination has shown to be necessary for input credit 
provision to be viable. Where there is no input provision quality plummets and farmers have 
shown to turn to other crops with a consequent fall in cotton production which undermines 
consistency of exports and eventually country reputation.  
In cotton, quality is still the main source of differenciation in end-markets. As confirmed by 
increasing price differentials between the A Index and the B Index60, quality parameters 
determine the price obtained in international markets. The demand of quality originates from 
the imperatives imposed by consumers of cotton lint, i.e. spinners. The spinning industry has 
progressed into high technology and increased competition, making management of lint 
quality increasingly influential and resulting in a new demand for quality.  
Competition in the textile industry originates from market saturation consequent to plentiful 
supply of cotton (mostly from the US and China) and results in an inclination toward 
differentiation rather than standardization in products. This can be partly achieved through a 
greater accuracy in the assesment of fibre properties and the measurement of an increased 
number of properties of cotton, providing a greater scope for differentiation. This demand is 
partly satisfied by HVI testing and there actually is a trend toward a mechanical calibration of 
fibre properties but, those properties which are crucial for spinners remain tested on an 
experience basis. Two reasons lie behind this: first, calibration is based on samples from each 
bale and some properties need to be tested for more generically instead; and second, 
                                                
60 equivalent to the A Index but for coarse low grade cotton 
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uncertainties about reliability of test results 61  resist. Consequently, spinners and thus 
international traders still rely on country reputation on which also cotton blending depends 
since most spinners, contrarily to grinder and roasters, have a preference for specific blends 
of specific different national origins in order to obtain the desired yarn properties. Once 
reputation has suffered and customer spinners have changed their blend, it is difficult to 
regain the specific market segment. This results in a rigidity in substitution, which make 
quality and the related country reputation entry barriers to the different spinning end-
markets.  
Importance of reputation is exacerbated by the way seed cotton is traditionally transported, 
i.e. in bulk. This kind of transportation doesn’t allow for segregation of quality and makes 
free-riding possible among producers, particularly concerning contamination. Classing and 
grading stages at the primary market have shown to be critical in maintaining an incentive for 
producers to keep levels of quality high – through cautious harvesting for example.  
Progress in the spinning technology demands for better characteristics of cotton lint. The 
achievement of this involves almost every stage in the cotton value chain: quality is the 
resultant of a concerted action among research, input provision, extension, harvesting, 
storage, classing and grading. Actually, high-speed spinning and the technologically advanced 
equipment require fibre quality that is of premium cotton (National Cotton Council of 
America) the limited62production of which in fact make quality a determinant of the world 
trade of cotton (box 4).  
                                                
61 test results have shown to be sensitive to different laboratories, humidity grades, colour gradings etc. 
62 There is a high demand for Egyptian cotton with a limited supply; this drives up the price also. 
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Box 4 
 
China is the biggest producer and at one time importer of cotton which makes any decision on its cotton 
policy the main swing factor in world cotton trade with prompt repercussions on world cotton prices.  
China could be self sufficient but big parts of the cotton it produces are stocked. One reason behind  this 
policy is that much of the Chinese cotton crop does not meet the quality required by mills, particularly 
those with export markets for their yarn and textiles. Consequently, China needs to buy cotton abroad 
and Chinese spinners have used an increasingly large amount of imported cotton to supply its growing 
mill capacity in the past decade. This is confirmed by trade flows which have shifted destinations from 
Europe and the US to countries in Asia. 
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Chapter  III   
 
Research and Deve lopment   
 
 
Introduct ion  
In this chapter I adress cotton research and development (R&D) in sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) selected cotton-producing countries. I begin with briefly describing R&D in 
agriculture in general and then in SSA; I then pass to R&D in cotton specifically. Following 
is a per country analysis of agricultural R&D within which I frame cotton R&D. I consider 
financing of agricultural R&D and of cotton R&D specifically indicating the trend of 
expenditures in the two cases.  
The issue of a contingent sensitivity of R&D in cotton to a liberalization of the sector is 
problematic because data on specific R&D expenditure is limited. However, I consider 
(unpublished) ASTI data on full time equivalent cotton researchers63 per country as of 2001 
and 2008 (to the best of my knowledge this was the only data available). 
 
1. In genera l  
Research and development (R&D) in agriculture are in general fundamental. Driven by 
innovation and tecnological change agricultural production methods have changed 
dramatically over the past century. As of the USDA, agricultural production in the United 
States from 1920 to 1995 has seen crop land, agricultural labour force and the number of 
people employed in agriculture dramatically decline, while agricultural production has more 
than tripled. Agricultural productivity has increased and agricultural production methods 
                                                
63 ASTI calculates its human resource and financial data in full-time equivalents taking into account the 
proportion of time that researchers spend on R&D versus other activities. University employees, for example, 
spend the bulk of their time on activities other than research, such as teaching, administration, and student 
supervision. These hours are excluded from ASTI calculations of human resources invested in agricultural 
R&D. Thus, four faculty members estimated to spend 25 percent of their time on research would individually 
represent 0.25 FTE and collectively be counted as 1.0 FTE. 
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have changed significantly; agricultural research, be it public or private, is a key driver of this 
growth.  
Agricultural R&D investments are reconned to be a crucial determinant of agricultural 
productivity through the introduction of improved crops and cropping practices, labor-
saving technologies, improved quality of storage, processing, and marketing. In terms of the 
production frontier, R&D is what provides the necessary technology to move the production 
frontier out by enabling the representative farmer with a fixed amount of inputs to get more 
output without using more resources.  
The relationship between R&D in agriculture and the consequent economic and social 
impacts are the rationale to why both the public and private sector invest heavily in it. 
Nevertheless, there are downturns to R&D that make such investments not an obvious 
practice. To begin with, R&D demands high and continuative investments. Moreover 
research is known to be plagued with uncertainty: results are not necessarily achieved and 
even when they are, there is a considreable lag between the necessary continuous expenditure 
and the expected returns. Alston et al. (1995), have approximated the lag to be about eight 
years from the initial investment. Others, like Thirtle et al. (2010), consider a lag of twenty-
five to up to forty years comprehensive of the diffusion time of the innovation to the 
productivity gains at the farm level. Furthermore, regardless of the time it can take to achieve 
possible results, outcomes of research are not necessarily marketable. Sunding and 
Zilbermann (2000), distinguish between innovations that are embodied in capital goods and 
hence can be marketed, from those which are „disembodied“ and are thus not so easily 
commercializable and more prone to be defined pubblic goods. They consider such 
classification useful for directing pubblic investment decisions in R&D and state that the 
adoption of innovations is affected by economic forces. Investments in R&D can come from 
the private sector or the public sector and distinction is considered useful to direct public 
investment in innovation generation: private investment is less likely in disembodied 
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innovations because the final product is difficult to sell. Even in the case of embodied 
innovations private investment requires a series of appropriate institutions for legal 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. As a consequence, public expenditure on R&D in 
agriculture is particularly important.  
Economic analysis has shown that the payoffs to investment in agricultural research are 
large. There is a vast litterature advocating a strong link between public investments in 
research and innovation in agricultural productivity growth. However, although there is 
considerable empirical evidence that indicates high rates of return to public agricultural R&D 
investments64, towards the end of the 20th century most countries have shown a decline in 
public funding of agricultural R&D (Beintema et al., Thirtle, Masters, Pardey et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, expenditure has been retargeted from productivity enhancing to other public 
interest areas such as the environment and food safety (Alston et al. 1999) so the decline in 
(agricultural) productivity enhancing R&D is substantial. This direction change in public 
R&D investment has consequences on countries beyond the high income group considering 
that in the past, both developing and developed countries have been dependent on 
technology spillovers from a few of the world’s affluent countries.  
Beintema et al. state that innovations in agriculture fostered by public investment in 
agricultural R&D have helped alleviate poverty throughout the twentieth century. Thus the 
slow down in industrialised countries public agricultural R&D and its retargeting towards 
environmental objectives, food quality and safety, and other objectives raise questions about 
the future of agriculture in the more disavantaged countries. According to the authors, 
developing and least developed countries will have to become increasingly self-reliant in the 
creation of innovation in agriculture, although complete self-reliance will be beyond many 
countries.  
                                                
64 Alston et al.´s „Meta Analysis of  Rates of Return to Agricultural RD“; Fan and Saurkar 
  
111 
Unluckily SSA is no exeption to the declining pattern of public investment in agricultural 
innovation and total public agricultural R&D spending has been decreasing since the early 
1990s (ASTI). 
 
 
2. SSA R&D in Agri cu l ture  – a History  
The origins of agricultural research and development in SSA can be found in the colonial 
botanical gardens that were introduced in the region by European colonisers in the late 
nineteenth century. In 1900 around twenty-four botanical gardens and model farms had been 
established in the region. Their aim was mainly to study and propagate tropical export crops 
but, as they slowly turned into experiment stations they also laid the foundation for an 
agricultural research infrastructure in Africa. By 1920 at least one station had been 
established in every country in the region. In the following years they further evolved, 
expanding research and specializing with the upcoming of commodity specific research 
stations. 
Until WWII these research stations were administered by local colonial admistrations. This 
was true but for the French colonies where two types of stations were established: local 
and federal agencies. Federal agencies were administered by the relative federal government 
and they coordinated the work of the local agencies. Funding generally came from local in-
country sources (Pardey, Roseboom, and Beintema, 1998) while metropolitan governments 
invested directly in higher education to form specialized staff destined to work in the 
colonies. The French were precursors and established the “Ecole Supérieure de l’Agriculture 
Tropicale” in 1902, while the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad was 
established in 1921. 
After WWII attention from metropolitan governments on colonial research agencies grew 
and an expansion and reorganization of agricultural research followed, particularly in the 
British and French colonies. Soon after, the political independence achieved by African 
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countries changed the picture again and the existing agricultural research structures passed to 
the newly formed African governments. However, the transition followed different patterns 
in Anglophone and Francophone colonies. The British left the occupied countries more 
promptly but they just as promptly contracted the flow of financial and technical support for 
research from the UK, thus leaving the responsibility of funding and managing the research 
institutes to the incoming governments.  
In Francophone Africa instead, the French retained administrative responsibility continuing 
to fund, manage and execute agricultural research for many years following political 
independence. Cooperative bilateral agreements were signed by all the French African 
territories except Guinea and Mali, from which French research staff and equipment were 
withdrawn immediately. In the rest of the ex-colonies, France continued to provide scientists 
and cover the related costs, and local research structures were affiliated with the French 
commodity institutes, while the host country provided support staff (Pardey et al., 2006; and 
Roseboom et al., 2009). This organisation lasted until the 1980s when African states took 
over complete control over the research agencies on their territory. Nevertheless, support 
with regard to agricultural research remained important and expatriate scientists continued to 
play an important role in former French Africa countries.  
 
 
 
3. SSA R&D in Agri cu l ture  – Today 
 
Contrarily to what mentioned for the developped world, in developing countries agricultural 
research is still mainly public (Ecvheverria and Beintema, 2009) and SSA is no exception. 
Public agricultural research is conveyed by government agencies, higher education agencies, 
and nonprofit institutions. Government agencies are directly administered by the national 
government and are typically departments or institutes within a certain ministry. 
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The majority of SSA countries have a single national agricultural research agency that 
accounts for the bulk of agricultural R&D capacity and investments. The agencies that rose 
during colonization and were then taken over by local governments, developped into 
National Agricultural Research Systems which perform public agricultural R&D. In most of 
Africa these have then undergone further re-organisation to enable cost minimization and 
better resource allocation and an organisation of research by commodity. This new 
organisation is defined as the „single agency“ model: the National Agricultural Research 
Organization (NARO). Nowadays this is the dominant65 structure for public agricultural 
R&D in Africa (Pardey, Roseboom, Beintema, 1995). Other two organizational models exist: 
the „two-agency model“ and the „multi-agency model“. In the former, two separate agencies 
perform public agricultural research typically separating for crop and livestock research 
together accounting for the bulk of research in agriculture. The multi-agency model instead, 
has a moltitude of agencies none of which represents the dominant share of the country's 
total agricultural research. 
Along the mentioned agencies an important part of agricultural research is performed in the 
higher education sector: Pardey, Beintema and Roseboom (1995) identified 105 among 
faculties, university colleges, or schools of agriculture, forestry, and veterinary sciences 
throughout Africa. It is notable though that they generally represent only a small share of the 
overall research effort and that they only combine university level education with research. 
Echeverria has found that most universities allocate less than twenty percent of their time to 
research and that it is more often discipline-based research than applied research. Moreover 
initial efforts were devoted to educating graduates for the emerging national bureaucracies, 
thus research was adressed only gradually. Nevertheless, university-based agricultural 
research has expanded more rapidly comparing to government and semipublic R&D 
agencies over the past three decades.  
                                                
65 There also exist agencies that are non NAROs, but these employ (6.5 times) less researchers, have less 
research stations and typically concentrate on one commodity or at most a group of commodities. 
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Non profit institutions complete the picture of public research. These institutions have no 
explicit profit objective and are characterised by having more freedom than their publicly 
funded counterparts not being directly controlled by the national government. They are 
often linked to producer organisations or commodity boards and funding comes in grand 
part from levies on production or exports (Echeverria and Beintema, 2009). Agricultural 
Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) show that researchers employed in the sector 
have increased in absolute terms, but the overall growth has been low compared with the 
other two public research sectors (Echeverria and Beintema, 2009). 
Research is implemented also across country borders and from 2000 a number of 
institutions66 have helped create networks aiming at the collaboration of national agricultural 
R&D in the SSA region. According to Beintema and Stads (2011), as a result of such 
collaboration information is shared more easily and the specialization in particular fields of 
national agricultural research systems is made possible. These networks have proved to be 
particularly beneficial for small countries which do not have a critical mass of agricultural 
R&D.  
Agricultural R&D in Africa is conducted also by international organisations and among these 
important to mention are the centres under the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR). These centres are identified by Beintema and Stads as 
a source of innovation since they can for example provide new crop varieties which are then 
tested at the national level by local R&D agencies under local conditions. 
Private sector agencies exist but still play a very small role in the sector. These agencies 
generally have the production of goods and services for profit as their primary activity so that 
R&D is not their main activity (Beintema and Stads, 2011). In some cases private for-profit 
companies have a unit dedicated to R&D, but in general companies tend to depend on 
                                                
66 The Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA); the Association for Strengthening Agricultural 
Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA); the West and Central African for Agricultural Research 
and Development (CORAF/WECARD); and the Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Directorate of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Beintema, Stads 2011) 
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government agencies or universities for research. In any case information on expenditure 
trends in private agricultural R&D in SSA is little (Beintema and Stads, 2011). 
To sum up, agricultural R&D in SSA is still dominated by the government which represents 
the main source of funding and the main executor of research activities. According to 
Echeverria the government sector in 2000 accounted for more than three-quarters of total 
agricultural R&D staff. However, since then new ways of financing are being experimented 
and new partnerships are rising so that the balance between public agencies is changing, 
ASTI show that the relative share of staff employed by the governmnet has declined over 
time. Nonetheless, government agencies still employed seventy-three percent of full-time 
equivalent public agricultural R&D staff in 2008 (Beintema and Stads, 2011) and the 
government is still the main source of funding for agricultural R&D in SSA. 
 
 
 
4. R&D in Cotton 
 
In Africa cotton is closely related to general agricultural R&D all the way from its origins. It 
has been introduced in the continent through the botanical gardens that represented the 
embrios of the present agricultural R&D infrastructure and its success is in grand part due to 
the work of such early research establishments. The relationship has shown to be two-way, 
since the success of the commercialization of this cash crop in turn enhanced the demand of 
additional research outputs to answer the growing demand to improve production and 
innovate the necessary technologies. The success of cotton in SSA advocates the importance 
of the allocation of resources to specific research areas which is considered one of the most 
critical policy and management aspects directly influencing the ultimate effectiveness of 
a research system (Pardey, Roseboom and Beintema 1998). 
Agricultural R&D in cotton is not different from agricultural R&D in general: also in the 
case of cotton it is a long term endeavour. Pardey, Roseboom and Beintema (1996), find that 
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it generally takes from seven to ten years to breed a new crop variety for example, and more 
for it to get to the fields.  
In general, R&D in the cotton sector can be divided into three domaines: entomology, 
agronomy and varietal selection. Following is a brief description of each section. 
Entomology has to do with the phytosanitary protection of the cotton plant. This division of 
R&D develops and then executes correct action protocoles in the domain of phytosanitary 
protection of the cotton plant. The primary objective of the studies in this domain is the 
reduction of the impact of deseases (especially of destructive insects and acarids), in order to 
promote the potential of the varieties selected and of the agronomic techniques advised, also 
keeping in mind environment protection. This division developes a treatment programme for 
every sowing campaign; indicating a list of certified products to be used and concretely 
suggesting the amounts of treatments to be used per hectare.  
More in detail, research activities in this division concern the dinamics of destructive insects. 
The evolution of the population of different families of insects is studied on a yearly basis, in 
order to measure their impact on the production of cotton and hence to evaluate the 
consequences on an economical basis and judge the efficacy of the used treatment. It also 
concerns the chemical war, the insecticide composition efficacy, protection programmes, 
techniques and treatment devices. The action against bugs is also dealt with by studying the 
combination of various methods against such destructive bugs with the aim of minimalizing 
the use of insecticides. Laboratory work is aimed to study the sensitivity of bugs to the active 
molecules that are spread in the fields, to the massive breeding of insects, to the biological 
evaluation of the insectisides used, but also to maintenance of an assortment of insects. 
Agronomy is about soil fertilization and the technical itinerary to be followed. The objective 
of this division is to give the producer/farmer new technical methods that are compatible 
with his initial resources and that enable the management of a lasting agriculture contextually 
improving productivity. The activities of this section of R&D regard the following points: 
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research regarding soil fertility, mineral fertilization, technical production procedures, 
experimentation of herbicides and of regulators of cotton growth.  
This division studies the persistence of mineral elements like phosphore, potassium, nitrogen 
and sulphur in the soil, since such mineral elements are deprived by continuous cultivation. 
The deficiency of such minerals has clear negative consequences on the cotton plant and the 
difference with regularly fertilized plants is stark. Experiments on the types of fertilizer, and 
on combinations of fertilizers are implemented. A particular problem faced rdcently is 
substitution of urea fertilizer since its price is growing.  
Technical itineraries of production has to do with setting a specific date for sowing for each 
agro-ecological area, deciding the density of sowing, the timetable for fertilizer spreading 
considering changing climatic constraints of each agro-ecological area (zone agro-écologique) 
and the practical application of manure. Different types of herbicides are experimented as 
well as growth regulators (régulateurs de croissance) of the cotton plant. Herbicides pre and 
post self propagating plants and of cotton plant, total herbicides for chemical weeding and 
regulators of cotton growth are supplied by agro-paharmaceutical firms in order to be tested 
to achieve a certification. Efficiency and selectivity tests enable to estimate in two to three 
years the herbicides pre plant of cotton plants and self propagating plants. The best products 
are selected and made available to producers after certification. 
The objective of the genetic section of R&D in the cotton sector is to improve the quality 
and quantity of production through the creation of new varieties which are more performing 
and better adapted to the needs of all of the actors of the “filière”, to the different 
constraints of the areas and to the different production systems.  
The genetic improving of varieties is generally done in the research station. The two starting 
steps of the creation process are: the evaluation of the new genetic material followed by the 
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creation of the variability through cross-breeding and then selection. Experiment results are 
then tested on the field in stations. Another type of genetic improving practice is done 
directly by the producer/farmer and then passed on to the lab so that it can see the 
technological aspects of it, such as the ginner out-turn ratio, the characteristics of the seed 
and the quality of fibre it produces. After testing, a number of plants are chosen and 
replanted. This division also usually takes care of seed multiplication and testing shelling with 
different gins. 
As mentioned, agricultural R&D in SSA is in grand part fed by public expenditure. This is 
also true for research in cotton and is particularly true in Francophone Africa where part of 
the revenues from the sector were invested in R&D before the vertically integrated system 
was dismantled (Depleuch and Leblois, 2011). In ESA instead, research on export crops was 
more often financed by processors through commodity levies. This is still true in Tanzania, 
Kenya and to a lesser extent, Uganda (Beintema and Stads 2006). Following is a per-country 
analysis of agricultural and cotton R&D for selected SSA cotton producing countries67. 
 
5. R&D in Agri cu l ture  and Cotton -   
Organisat ion and Expendi ture  Patterns in Se le c t ed SSA Countr i es   
 
 
Benin  
 
In Benin research in agriculture is in grand part implemented by the Institut National des 
Recherches Agricoles du Bénin (INRAB) which is the main agricultural R&D agency in the 
country accounting for close to sixty percent of the country’s agricultural R&D expenditure 
and capacity (ASTI). INRAB was founded in 1992 as a scientific and technical institution, 
endowed with a legal personality and financial autonomy and is supervised by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MAEP). The mandate of the institute is to generate 
technologies for the farming community and foster scientific progress. The institute is 
                                                
67 Countries have been chosen depending on whether ASTI data for relative cotton researchers was available; 
thus excluding those countries for which there was no data. 
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decentralized and composed of a scientific direction in Cotonou; six agricultural research 
centers (CRAs) of which three centers with a regional focus (CRA Sud in Niaouli, CRA 
Centre in Savè, CRA Nord in Ina); two commodity-based centres (Centre de Recherche 
Agricole Coton et Autres Fibres Textiles, and Centre de Recherche Agricole Plantes 
Pérennes); and the CRA Agonkanmey, which has national scope. INRAB cooperates with a 
number of African regional organisations and with CIRAD and other ONGs. 
Two non-profit agencies perform agricultural research in the country: the Benin Centre for 
the Environment and for Economic and Social Development (CEBEDES) and the Network 
for Sustainable Agricultural Development (REDAD). However, research carried out in these 
two institutions is rather of a socioeconomic nature although it concerns topics that are 
connected with agriculture.  
Higher education agencies also play an important role in research in agriculture in the 
country. Since the 1990s, the share of the higher education sector in agricultural R&D has 
grown - from twenty-three percent in 1990 to forty percent in 2008. This has come at the 
expense of INRAB and is explained by university salaries being up to thirty percent higher 
than those paid at INRAB and by the government freeze on recruitment and permanent 
employment contracts at INRAB. The country’s principal higher education agency in the 
field of agriculture is the University d’Abomey-Calavi (UAC) which also witnessed the main 
increase in agricultural R&D capacity - in 2008, UAC employed forty-four fte researchers, 
compared with twenty fte researchers in 1990. The only other higher education agency 
involved in agricultural R&D and not placed under the supervision of UAC, is the Faculty of 
Agronomy of the University of Parakou. In 2008, it employed just two fte agricultural 
researchers.  
 
Research focus is on crops: in 2008, forty-two percent of Benin’s agricultural researchers 
conducted crop research. Cassava is the most researched crop and absorbed ten percent of 
INRAB’s fte researchers and thirty-eight percent of UAC’s Genetics and Biotechnology 
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Laboratory (LGB) researchers in 2008. Other important crops included cotton with 13.9 fte 
researchers (all at INRAB). 
Financing research across institutions comes from the government and international donors. 
As of 2007 there has been greater willingness to provide funding for agricultural research 
from the national government and INRAB’s level of expenditure has increased. However, 
during 2001–08, the national government only contributed by one third of INRAB’s funding, 
with foreign donors and regional and subregional networks providing around fifty percent of 
funds, the rest (seventeen percent) generated internally (mainly through production sales - oil 
palm, maize, and cowpea seeds). Particularly, Denmark and Germany have been involved in 
funding Benin’s agricultural sector since 1997. Other external funding sources include the 
West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development 
(CORAF/WECARD), AfricaRice, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), 
the West and Central Africa Collaborative Maize Research Network (WECA- MAN), the 
African Development Bank (AfDB), and the Government of the Netherlands and a World 
Bank loan expected to take place in 2011. UAC’s research is also donor funded and is in 
close competition with INRAB for the available funds.  
Total public expenditure for agricultural R&D has grown. In 1995 the public expenditure for 
agricultural R&D was 13,1 million 2005 PPP$ with the Government providing a 48,1 share 
and donors a 38,6 share, and 21,6 million PPP$ in 2008- Government providing a 40,6 share 
and donors a 38,1 share (ASTI data). In terms of percentage of agricultural GDP, public 
expenditure in agricultural R&D was 0,37 in 2001 and 0,69 in 2008. The recipient of such 
funds is the Institut National Recherches Agricoles du Benin (INRAB). The share solely 
dedicated to cotton research is calculated to be, in terms of full equivalent researcher, 6,49 fte 
in 2008, no data is available before that (Figure 2). 
Research in cotton is conveyed by the Centre de Recherhe Agricole Coton et Fibres (CRA-
CF) a national cotton program inside the INRAB. CRA is responsible for designing, 
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developing and implementing programs on cotton and other fiber crops. The centre includes 
three departments: agronomy, phyto-sanitary protection, and variety improvement which are 
involved in genetic improvements, sustainability of cotton related production systems, plant 
protection, and lint quality improvement. The activity programme of CRA-CF is established 
each year jointly by CRA-CF and AIC (Association Interprofessionelle Coton), which 
contributed to its financing each year until 2008 (partly financed under a project from the 
World Bank).  
The budget for AIC’s contracting is financed by setting an annually negotiated fee on 
producer prices although the fee for critical functions has never in fact reached the required 
amount since the agreed on fee -calculated to be around a high fifteen percent of price 
received by producers- has progressively decreased in years (except 2005/06). Thus, 
necessary funds were eventually remitted by the Government and partly by a World Bank 
project in support of the sector reform process which terminated in June 2008. In general, 
the budget for the season comes from core funding, funds from projects, contracts executed, 
and equities from the sale of agricultural products and services (ICAC).  
The AIC also provides funding for the production of seed. There is a national commission 
on seed, which provides guidelines and monitors cotton seed multiplication from field 
through ginning and packing. Once researchers develop a variety ready for release, the 
variety is presented to the Commission with its technological features. The Commission 
reviews, discusses and decides whether or not to approve the variety for commercial 
production.  
As far as extension and advisory services to cotton farmers go, after reforms the AIC has 
been increasingly responsible for these critical functions although, in 2007 extension 
activities were transferred back to the Direction du Conseil Agricole et de la Formation 
opérationnelle (DICAF) and the Centre d'action regional de développement rural 
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(CARDER) by the Government in line with a de-liberalization policy. The Ministry also 
recruited more than 1000 new extension agents. 
In the past the cotton R&D programme was successful and has been responsible for the 
progress in yields and lint ratio (Gergely, 2009), two varieties have been introduced 
successfully - STAM 18A in 1997, STAM H 279 in 2003. One consequence to the reform 
was that before researchers had to satisfy only the parastatal ginner but, according to 
Goureaux’s WB report, after reforms they had to satisfy both growers and cotton companies 
who had different requests: ginners being interested in ginning rates and fibre length and 
producers in yield per acre, resistance to insects and ease of harvesting. A recent study on the 
assessment of the reform program notes also a lack of linkage between research and 
extension, resulting in poor dissemination of research findings. 
 
Côte d ’Ivo ire  
In Cote d’Ivoire research was initiated as early as in the 1890s with the establishment of 
experiment gardens most of which later evolved into experiment stations that focused on a 
very small number of crops. At the time of independence (1960), most of the existent 
agricultural research facilities were managed by the French and instead of nationalizing the 
research infrastructure, Côte d’Ivoire chose to continue close collaboration with the French 
institutes - such as with the Study and Research Group for Tropical Agricultural 
Development (GERDAT, CIRAD’s predecessor). Nevertheless, in the 1980s and 1990s the 
French local research activities were gradually taken over by national institutes which merged 
to become the National Agricultural Research Center (CNRA).  
CNRA is the principal agricultural research agency, accounting for two-thirds of total fte 
researchers and three-quarters of total research spending. CNRA was established as a semi-
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autonomous private institute in 1998. According to the WB project which began in 1998, 
CNRA should be forty percent government owned and sixty percent privately owned. The 
centre is regionally based with a network of five regional offices, thirteen research stations, 
three central laboratories, and five experiment and production stations. Research at the 
CNRA is conducted across five primary research streams: perennial crops, annual crops, 
animal production, production systems, and technology with particular focus on crop 
research - in 2001, close to two thirds of researchers employed at CNRA conducted crop 
research. CNRA’s primary research crops are fruits, cotton (fifteen percent) and oil palm. 
Other government agencies conduct agricultural research, together accounting for seventeen 
percent of the total 2001 agricultural R&D capacity.  
Higher-education is involved in agricultural research with six agencies, five of which 
accounted for sixteen percent of the country’s total agricultural research capacity. The 
Advanced School of Agronomics (ESA) is responsible for most of these activities. Teaching 
is the most important activity at ESA, but the school carries out some forestry, water, and 
crops research. 
Only two private companies undertake agricultural research activities in Côte d’Ivoire. Many 
of the larger private companies do not employ research staff, contracting research out to 
CNRA and other agencies. CNRA has active research agreements with the two sugar 
companies in the country68; the cotton companies Ivorian Textile Development Company, 
Ivorian Cotton Company, and Ivory Cotton; and with the Ivorian Company of Oil Seeds 
Trituration and Vegetable Oil Refinery.  
Côte d’Ivoire is one of the few countries in the subregion that does not depend heavily on 
large-scale donor funding to pursue its agricultural research resulting in greater freedom in 
setting its research priorities and in being less subject to external pressures than are 
                                                
68  Sucrivoire and the African Sugar Company 
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numerous other countries in West Africa (ASTI). Agricultural research in Côte d’Ivoire has 
largely been funded by government revenues and commodity sales, but also World Bank 
loans, and other donor funding. World Bank contributions took the form of two consecutive 
projects the first of which was implemented during 1994-97 to streamline and decentralize 
agricultural services, the second from 1998-2010 which focuses on strengthening adaptive 
research and extension, supporting farmer organizations, and creating a decentralized 
national agricultural research institution that would be sixty percent privately owned. 
However, as a consequence to the break out of civil war in september 2002 and to the 
government failure in supplying its share of funding, the second WB project was interrupted 
and the World Bank froze its aid to Côte d’Ivoire. Nevertheless, the centre still received ten 
percent of its funding from other donors including the African Development Bank (ADB), 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), France and Belgium. As a result of 
the low level of disbursement by the government and the World Bank, revenues generated 
by production activities have been one of CNRA’s main sources of funding (sixty-four 
percent of CNRA’s total funding in 1999). However, due to the decline in world market 
prices these funds have decreased considerably since then and the government had to raise 
its contributions to CNRA in order to keep the centre operational - in 2001 government 
contributions accounted for about two thirds of CNRA’s total funding. However, in 2008 
government funding covered only fifteen percent of CNRA’s total expenditures and the 
remainder of CNRA’s funding was accounted for by the private sector, through FIRCA69, 
and internally generated resources.  
In line with funding trends, fte researchers have decreased from 2001 to 2008 although only 
slightly especially in comparison to fte researchers conducting research in cotton who have 
halved (Figure 2).  
                                                
69 Fonds Interprofessionnel de la Recherche et du Conseil Agricole (FIRCA) is a funding system, which is 
unique and exemplary in Africa. Through FIRCA, research has become more demand driven and the system’s 
solidarity mechanism ensures the availability of research funds to assist those agricultural production sectors in 
which the volume of raised subscription fees is low. (ASTI) 
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Research in cotton is implemented through the Cotton Program at CNRA (Centre National 
de Recherche Agronomique-CNRA) and undertakes research on all aspects of production 
research. Program planning is done under the coordination of the Fonds Interprofessionnel 
de la Recherche et du Conseil Agricole (FIRCA) where also funding mainly comes from. 
However, the CNRA station in Bouaké cotton was totally destroyed during the war and the 
government is still seeking funding for reconstruction of the station. Seed multiplication is 
ensured by cotton companies under the control of INTERCOTON70. 
Despite the civil war and relative problems and CNRA being most severely affected; funding 
levels for the last few years reveal a relatively stable trend and investment levels in 
agricultural R&D are comparable to or higher than those in other African countries (ASTI). 
Furthermore, Côte d’Ivoire’s agricultural research, and in particular that of CNRA, ranks 
among the best performing and most innovative in Africa (ASTI). 
 
Ghana 
Agricultural research in Ghana began in 1890 with the establishment of the Government 
Botanical Gardens at Aburi which created the basis for the Department of Agriculture 
Research and the experiment stations created between 1900 and 1910. Initially, research 
focused primarily on oil palm, cocoa, and rubber. In addition to the Department of 
Agriculture, several regional research organizations were established throughout British West 
Africa in the late 1940s and early 1950s. With independence (1957), the regional institutes 
created under British rule were nationalized. In 1968, the Ghana Academy of Sciences, 
established a few years earlier, was restructured as the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). 
                                                
70 L'Association Interprofessionnelle de la filière Coton (INTERCOTON) was established in 2000. Its purpose 
is to group professional cotton producer organisations and ginners.  
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CSIR is still the primary agency for agricultural research implementation in Ghana. It 
coordinates all of scientific research in the country, accounting for roughly two-thirds of 
both total research spending and agricultural researchers. CSIR oversees thirteen research 
agencies, nine of which conduct agricultural research. The central administrative body for 
CSIR’s agencies, falls within the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology (MEST). 
In 2001, the Government of Ghana legislated changes to CSIR’s mandate with a shift 
towards commertialization, introducing a private-sector funding target of thirty percent for 
each agency’s budget. The process was supported by a WB loan that had previously been 
approved (2000). CSIR collaborates with various United Nations agencies among which the 
FAO and the United  Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and international  science 
entities like the Commonwealth Science Council, the Pan-African Union for Science and 
Technology, and the African Academy of Sciences. 
Four other government agencies are involved in agricultural research among which the 
Biotechnology and Nuclear Agricultural Research Institute (BNARI), under MEST, which 
focuses on the use of biotechnology and nuclear technologies to address sustainable 
agriculture, health, and industrial needs. Among agencies not associated with CSIR, the 
Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) is the most significant. 
Higher education agencies are also involved in agricultural research and in 2001 accounted 
for seventeen percent of human resources. Most of this research was conducted at the five 
main universities of the country: the University of Ghana (UG), the Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology (KNUST), the University of Cape Coast (UCC), the 
University of Development Studies (UDS), and the University College of Education of 
Winneba (UCEW). With thirty-two fte researchers in 2001, UG’s Faculty of Agriculture is 
the largest agricultural research entity in higher-education in Ghana. 
No private for-profit organizations conducting agricultural research were identified in 
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Ghana. 
In 2001, more than sixty percent of fte researchers conducted crop research. 
Currently all agricultural research, with the exception of activities related to cocoa71, is funded 
by the Government of Ghana, donors, and self-funding by the respective agencies. The 
World Bank has provided loans to agricultural research in Ghana under two consecutive 
projects, which are co-funded by the government and other international donors. Under the 
second project, producers and exporters of crops such as oil palm and palm oil, fruits and 
vegetables, cotton, coffee, yams, and sheanut butter, along with agribusiness, will fund a 
growing share of the research costs for these commodities. However, only one CSIR agency 
has met this target to date, and consequently the government has not reduced its funding to 
CSIR agencies as was scheduled to occur in 2001. The project includes the establishment of a 
competitive agricultural research grant scheme (CARGS) that provides research funding 
based on the quality of research proposals. Agricultural research at higher education agencies 
is financed primarily by the government, although other donors including FAO, 
nongovernmental organizations, and foreign universities contribute. 
Agricultural research expenditures and funding increased marginally in Ghana throughout 
the 1990s and remained highly dependent on government and donor funding, with the 
World Bank’s two projects contributing greatly to the rehabilitation of Ghana’s weakened 
agricultural research infrastructure. However, in 2009, Ghana invested 0.9 of its agricultural 
GDP increasing from a 0.57 in 2000 (Figure1). 
Research in cotton is conducted by the Savanna Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) at 
Tamale which was an experimental station known as the Nyankpala Experimental station 
(NAES) and operated as an outpost of Crop Research Institute (CRI) of Kumasi until it was 
upgraded to autonomy in 1994. Other institutions involved in cotton research are the 
                                                
71 For cocoa, producers apply a levy on the Freight on Board (FOB) price. 
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University for Development Studies (UDS) at Tamale, which conducts socio-economics 
research, the University of Ghana (Soil Science Department and Department of Geography 
and Development studies) at Legon, the Environmental Protection Agency at Accra, the Soil 
Research Institute (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) at Kumasi and the 
University of Science and Technology (Department of Crop Science), also at Kumasi, which 
contribute through studies to an improved understanding of the cotton region’s environment 
or conduct experiments for soil conservation or into innovative cropping systems (direct 
sowing). 
SARI instead, conducts research into all aspects of cotton production - along with different 
plant programmes - with the overall goal of finding answers to the needs of farmers and to 
increase their production and incomes. Testing stations are distributed over all the agro-
ecological zones of the three northern regions: Manga, Damogo, Yendi, Salaga and Wa. It 
also coordinates the activities of the Research-Extension Linkage Committees in the 
northern regions. The cotton programme has scientists working in the fields of genetics, 
agriculture, entomology and socio-economics. According to the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MoFA)  the only programme which has shown continuity and has come to 
tangible results is the varietal programme. The Ghanaian cotton sector is particularly 
sensitive to the varietal problem which makes the programme relevant. Actually, a matter of 
concern is that Ghana does not have its own system of seed multiplication. Consequently 
third or fourth generation seeds are purchaised from neighbouring Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Togo. Such seeds are not guaranteed and thus unreliable, not to mention the 
transport conditions they undergo with consequences on their quality. All of this contributes 
to low yield due to very low viability and vigour in the cotton seed. Poor seed leads to a poor 
germination rate. Consequently cotton companies have requested the Savanna Agricultural 
Research Institute (SARI) to develop appropriate genetic materials for growing cotton in 
Ghana. SARI has released 3 varieties: SARCOT 1, 3 and 5, but a national multiplication 
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scheme that can guarantee the distribution of the adapted high yield variety is still missing. A 
research project in this direction was interrupted in 2008 (MoFA, 2010). 
While the Cotton development Board was responsible for the financing of research in the 
Ghanaian cotton sector and thus a public expenditure, with privatisation and later 
liberalization, the Savanna Agricultural Research Institute was intended to be financed by the 
newly formed private cotton companies through contributions for their use of research 
findings. However, SARI never received any contribution from cotton companies and these 
often prefer importing seeds from neighbouring countries with the afore mentioned 
consequences on seed quality. In fact, the institute is to date only financed through the 
government budget.  
ASTI figures show that public expenditure in Ghana for research in the cotton sector is low 
in 2001 and has even more decreased in 2008 with only 4.57 full time equivalent researchers. 
Another major problem which is common in SSA research stations is the low wage level 
which results in a human resources problem that undermines the continuity of research 
programmes, not to mention the motivation of scientists. Also SARI has been affected by 
low salaries (MoFA report 2012).  
The three “Northern regions” of Ghana are the poorest in the country and food crop 
farmers have the lowest income. Cotton is by far a more suited cash crop for the climatic 
conditions of the northern region as it is drought resistant. Thus, the MoFA advocates that 
developing cotton as a major cash crop in northern Ghana has a better potential of reducing 
poverty in the region in comparison to other crops; and asserts this should be done adressing 
cotton R&D first. 
Guinea 
The area where the cotton project was first introduced (Kankan) is also the area where the 
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first food and crop research station was created in 1930, under the French colonisation. 
Following independence (1958) and the cessation of relations with France, the research 
centre was nationalised, and a national agricultural research institute was created. In 1969 the 
Government introduced a network of 300 regional crops and livestock farms along with 
thirty crop and animal science faculties. However, during the first Guinean republic, the 
country was governed by a totalitarian socialist regime (1958–84), which had a negative 
economic impact on the agricultural sector as a whole (Stads, Béavogoui, 2009): research 
resources were limited and the country was cut out from possible foreign investment until 
the 1980s. At that time economic liberalization resulted also in a renewed interest in 
agriculture, and numerous old agricultural research stations were rehabilitated and reopened.  
In 1989, what is presently considered the country’s most important agricultural agency -the 
Agricultural Research Institute of Guinea (IRAG)-, was established by incorporating 
numerous agricultural R&D centers and stations from across the country’s various 
agroecological zones. In 2008 it accounted for approximately two thirds of all agricultural 
researchers and public expenditures (ASTI). IRAG carries out all kinds of agricultural R&D, 
including livestock, forestry, and socioeconomic research, but crop research is particularly 
important. In 2001 and 2008, close to half  of  agricultural fte researchers for whom data 
were available conducted crop research (ASTI).  
There seem to be no private-sector companies, profit or non-profit, that conducted their 
own agricultural R&D in Guinea. IRAG, however, works in close cooperation with a 
number of producer organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private-
for-profit enterprises. 
Financing from the government has from the foundation of IRAG only been part of the 
necessary funding for its operating, the rest coming from donor contributions. Main donors 
were the World Bank and the French Government, especially during the 1990s and 2000s. 
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This has made research programmes particularly sensitive to the completion of the donor 
funding projects. Between 1991 and 2002, for example, World Bank loans accounted for 
fiftty-six percent of IRAG’s total funding, the government provided the remaining forty-four 
percent together with other donors (France and the European Union). Following the 
completion of the donor projects there was a sharp fall in research expenditure and when the 
World Bank funding ceased in December 2000, more than half of IRAG’s research programs 
were affected. From then on, the French Government became IRAG’s primary donor after 
the Guinean government; but in 2008 the French funding project was also terminated.  
The decline in the country’s overall agricultural R&D, however, is not only due to reduced 
donor support, but also to a decreasing trend in government funding. In 2008, only 0.16 
percent of Guinea’s AgGDP was invested in agricultural R&D compared to 1.17 in 1991 
(figure 1), becoming among the lowest levels recorded in Africa and leaving IRAG in a bleak 
financial situation. 
Cotton is among crops considered important but it only comes after rice, the principle staple 
crop, and after coffee, the second main crop. Research on cotton accounted for four to eight 
percent of total crops research (ASTI).  In 2001 fte researchers on cotton were 5,70 and 4,56 
in 2008, showing a decreasing trend in line with total public expenditures in agricultural 
R&D. The cotton programme is run in the regional centre of Bordo in Upper Guinea along 
with other crop programmes. In general crop research focus is mainly on crop genetic 
improvement on which forty-seven percent of IRAG’s researchers focused on, followed by 
postharvest research and crop pest and disease control. 
 
Mali 
Research in agriculture prior to Mali’s independence (1960) was conducted by the Bambey 
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(Senegal) Federal Center for Agronomic Research and the Niger Office. Immediately upon 
independence Mali was one of the few French African colonies to create a national 
agricultural research structure with the objective to control and coordinate agricultural 
research activities in the country. In 1960, the Rural Economy Institute (IER) was 
established as an agency within the Ministry of Agriculture with the mandate to coordinate 
the different research organizations as well as all the agencies implementing development 
projects. Although independent, an agreement was made with the former colony so as to 
enable collaboration among IER and the existing French research institutions most of which 
continued to conduct research in the country. 
Mali has an extremely centralized agricultural research system which distinguishes it from 
other African countries. The Rural Economy Institute (IER), Mali’s principal agricultural 
research agency, is responsible for eighty-five percent of the country’s total agricultural 
researchers and expenditures. The institute oversees six additional regional centres -each in a 
different agroclimatological zone (Kayes, Sotuba, Sikasso, Niono, Mopti, and Gao)-, three 
central laboratories, and one genetic resources unit. Each centre operates within a network of 
research stations. IER’s runs research programs over five themes: crops, livestock, forestry 
and fisheries, production systems and natural resource management, and economics of 
agricultural networks. National partners are the Center of International Agricultural Research 
Cooperation for Development (CIRAD), and the Institute of Research for Development 
(IRD), the latter two from France. IER is also a member of various regional networks.  
Two higher-education agencies employ another ten percent of the country’s total agricultural 
research staff: the Rural Polytechnic Institute for Training and Applied Research 
(IPR/IFRA) and the Higher Institute of Training and Applied Research (ISFRA); both are 
under the University of Bamako. The former is the country’s main agricultural training 
institute and has trained the grand part of researchers employed in the IER. However, the 
institute also works on agricultural R&D, including crops biotechnology, crop pest and 
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disease control, and soil fertility improvement (Stads 2009 citing Samaké 2002). The 
occupation in ISFRA is solely training. 
There are no private for profit companies known to conduct agricultural research in Mali. 
However, the IER works closely with various producer organizations and private companies, 
in particular with the Malian Cotton Company (CMDT). IER conducts applied cotton 
research on a contractual basis on behalf of the CMDT and the two agencies work together 
on technology transfer to cotton producers.  
Cotton is particularly imortant in Mali and research in cotton was adressed separately as early 
as in 1948. At that time the N’Tarla experiment station and farm school were created by the 
Institut de Recherche Cotonnière et des Fibres Textiles exotiques (IRCT) created by the 
French governement in 1946. The purpose was to carry out applied research, breed new 
varieties and train extension agents. Initially, varietal research focused especially on yield 
objectives with quality features being trivial at that time. From independence cotton research 
activities have been managed by the IER in collaboration with French agricultural research 
institutes (CIRAD, IRCT) and regional WCA institutions and cotton companies 
(CFDT/Dagris, CMDT)72. All research activities form part of a national strategic plan 
submitted by the IER to the National Committee for Agricultural Research (NARC) that 
coordinates the entire portfolio and allocates national science funding after a Scientific 
Committee has judged the relevance of projects. When a new variety is created, experiments 
are made, including extensive testing in rural areas with extension staff, resulting in a 
performance report on a particular variety which is used by CMDT to decide whether or not 
                                                
72 When the Compagnie Malienne pour le Developpement des Textiles (CMDT) was created in 1974, the CFDT retained 
a forty percent stake in the new company, allowing the sector to benefit financially and technically from the 
cooperation with the French company and government and to access external capital for rural development 
programs in the CMDT zone (Tefft citing Bingen et al. 1995 and Dione 1989). Between 1976 and 1988, the 
CMDT carried out two successive projects (Mali-Sud I and II) co-financed by the World Bank, IFAD and 
French development agency funds (FAC and AFDviii). Under these projects, the CMDT began to provide key 
public services that were viewed as a complement to their cotton-specific actions. These public development 
interventions included both new and accelerated initiatives in the area of animal traction support, training and 
equipping blacksmiths, animal health, cotton research 
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to adopt the new variety. If approved, CMDT multiplies the variety in its seed-farms and 
supplies seed to cotton growers. The cooperation among the mentioned institutes, resulted 
in the production, multiplication and successful adoption of six new seed varieties with 
progressively higher agronomic and ginning yields73 and improved fiber quality characteristics 
(length, fineness, color, strength, maturity and impurity content). 
As of ASTI data, in 2008 twelve percent of researchers were involved in reserach in cotton.	  
In terms of fte researchers, cotton in 2008 had 19.0 researchers at IER and 4.2 researchers at 
IPR-IFRA, totally 23.3, i.e. a 11.5 percent on the total of fte researchers. 
Agricultural research in Mali is primarily financed by the national government and in varying 
proportion by the World Bank74 (ASTI). Among other foreign donors are the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), USAID, IAEA, the Swiss 
government, and the European Union (during 1991–2001, ASTI). Conequently also the IER 
heavily relies on foreign donor funding with two thirds of its budget coming from donors 
between 1994 and 2001 (ASTI), of which one third from the WB and the rest from other 
foreign donors as USAID, CMDT and Novartis Foundation. However, the national 
government covers one third of the budget and has delivered ninety-nine pecent of its share 
of counterpart funding (ASTI). CMDT provides funding for research in cotton while the 
government finances the salaries of researchers, and operating budgets of infrastructures. 
The budget allocated to cotton by the CMDT for over five years is now 170 million CFA 
Francs (US$315,000). The budget allocated for inputs, operation of vehicles, etc., is managed 
by the CMDT itself. Since 2009, the cotton program has received, as part of a project Draft 
Sector Support Cotton Textile-PAFICOT (Projet d’Appui à la Filière Coton Textile) between 
                                                
73 Improved yields objective has been reached also through the widespread adoption of ultra low volume 
pesticide equipment (ULV)73 and the introduction and use of pyrethroid pesticides in the nineteen seventies. By 
the late 1980s, average seed cotton yields averaged over 1,300 kg/ha, (546 Kg/ha of cotton lint), a cumulative 
increase of over 600% since independence. 
74 The World Bank has assisted the Malian government in the development of the country’s agricultural sector 
since 1971. During the period 1991–2003, two consecutive World Bank projects have targeted Mali’s 
agricultural research sector. Both largely cofinanced by the Government of Mali. 
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the C475 countries and the ADB (African Development Bank) of an extra budget of 110 
million CFA (US$203,000) per year which should run to 2013/14. 
Mali’s total number of agricultural researchers increased by 2.3 percent per year on average 
during 1976–2001 (ASTI). There has been a slow decline in fte during the last decade 
although agricultural spending has remained stable, actually since the beginning of the 1990s, 
agricultural researcher numbers have first gradually fallen from the peak reached in 198976 
with 345 researchers. However, from 2001 to 2008 the trend in ASTI data shows to be 
positive, passing from 247,25 in 2001 to 312,65 fte in 2008. Researchers dedicated to cotton 
have followed this fashion and the proportion on total fte researchers has slightly grown: 
from 7.6 on the total in 2001 to 7.8 in 2008. 
Average expenditures per researcher in Mali are higher than in most West African countries. 
In general Mali has shown serious commitment to research in agriculture investing a share 
well above that of Africa and the developing world in general (ASTI). Nevertheless, 
expenditure as a share of agricultural Gdp has fallen from 1.04 in 2001 to 0.64 in 2008 
(ASTI).  
 
Niger ia 
Agricultural research in Nigeria was initiated with the establishment of a botanical garden in 
Lagos during the late 19th century as part of a network of gardens established under British 
rule, focusing on the introduction of new crops. In 1914, a new Department of Agriculture 
was formed from the merger of the former Agricultural Department for southern Nigeria 
and of the Agricultural Department for northern Nigeria. Research focus was on export 
                                                
75 Four major SSA cotton producing countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali 
76 Between 1976 and 1989, researcher totals increased steadily by 7 percent annually, reaching a peak of 345 fte 
researchers in 1989. (ASTI) 
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crops like cotton and cocoa. After Nigeria achieved independence in 1960, research activities 
were regionalized, eliminating federal government involvement, but regional efforts did not 
yield the expected results and the federal government intervened in the 1960s resulting in the 
current structure. 
Agricultural research in Nigeria is mostly public. ASTI identified eighty-one government and 
higher-education agencies engaged in agricultural research in Nigeria in 2000. Of these, 
twenty-two were government agencies the grand part of which under the responsibility of 
the Agricultural Sciences Department (ASD) within the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (FMARD), which is responsible for the coordination, planning, and 
evaluation of the activities of these, the rest falling under the responsibility of the Federal 
Ministry of Science and Technology (FMST).  
The rest are higher-education agencies conducting agricultural or agriculture-related research. 
The primary higher-education agencies involved in agricultural research are the four older 
universities—Ahmadu Bello University, the University of Ibadan, the University of Nigeria, 
and Obafemi Awolowo University. Important role in Nigeria’s agricultural research is also 
played by the three universities of agriculture in Makurdi, Umudike, and Abeokuta. As of 
ASTI data, in 2008, thirty-eight percent of fte researchers in agriculture focused on crop 
research. 
Private-sector involvement in Nigerian agricultural research is considered negligible (ASTI). 
The low private-sector involvement results from a number of disincentivating 
circcumstances: lack of incentives in terms of returns on investments because public research 
agencies share their research results at no charge (Stads citing Voh 1999), political instability, 
and lengthy bureaucracy for approval of new varieties. However, some seed companies with 
small research activities focusing on varietal testing have been spotted as well as a few agro-
industrial companies which fund adaptive research activities in public-sector agencies in areas 
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of their interest (Stads citing Okunmadewa and Olayemi 2002).  
Research on cotton  is conveyed by the Institute for Agricultural Research of the Ahmadu 
Bello University in Zaria. A Technical Sub-committee critically reviews data from on-station, 
multi-location and on-farm trials before recommending suitable varieties for registration and 
release. New varieties recommended by the Technical Sub-committee need to be approved 
by the National Committee of Crop Varieties, Livestock and Fisheries Registration and 
Release before they are released. The Institute for Agricultural Research then provide seeds 
to ginneries for further multiplication by supervised out growers. The Research Institute also 
develops production technologies, which are first tested on farmers’ fields under supervision 
of researchers. New technologies are promoted by the Institute’s Extension Department, 
National Agricultural Extension Research Liaison Services and the State Agricultural 
Development Programmes-ADPs through monthly review meetings, Small Plot Adaptive 
Techniques, etc.  
Agricultural research in Nigeria is largely funded by the government, although during the 
1990s, funding from the World Bank was considerable. For the first two decades after 
independence in 1960, Nigeria’s agricultural research performance was strong, but since the 
early 1980s—in part due to falling oil prices—it has weakened significantly. Funding dropped 
sharply and became insecure affecting infrastructure and resources. In general, total 
agricultural R&D spending exhibited a slight average growth after 1998, after total spending 
had decreased considerably during the first half of the 1990s given sharply declining 
government contributions. Although fte researchers have increased in number, fte 
researchers dedicated to cotton have decreased slightly from 2001. In 2008, public 
agricultural R&D expenditure was higher (0.42) than in 2001 (0.27) and back to what it was 
in 1980 (ASTI).  
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Ethiopia  
Agricultural research in Ethiopia only began in 1947 when the Ambo and Jima Junior 
Colleges of Agriculture were established. However, what was to be the primary Ethiopian 
agricultural research unit until 1966, the Debre Zeit Agricultural Research Center (DZARC) 
of the Imperial College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts (now AU), was only created in 
1953. Following came the Ethiopia Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) as the first 
nationally coordinated agricultural research system in the country; absorbing the scattered 
research activities of the Ministry of Agriculture. EIAR became responsible for the national 
agricultural research policy and conducted research on crops, livestock, and natural 
resources. The Institute underwent several restructurings in the 1970s and 1980s but only in 
the early 1990s was it reformed substantially and decentralized with a number of EIAR 
centres being transferred to the respective regional governments, thus becoming independent 
research centers. Finally, in 1997, the Debre Zeit Agricultural Research Center and other 
remaining federal IAR research centres were merged into the newly created Ethiopian 
Agricultural Research Organization (EARO) which had the purpose of coordinating the 
agricultural research activities of the federal and regional research centers and the higher-
education agencies. EARO falls under the administrative responsibility of the Ministry of 
Rural Development. 
EARO is still the main agricultural research entity accounting for about two-thirds of total 
agricultural spending. The Ethiopian agricultural research system consists of EIAR, Regional 
Agricultural Research Institutes-RARIs, and Higher Learning Institutions-HLIs. EARO 
comprises all institutions undertaking agricultural research. EARO directly manages a 
network of fifteen federal research centres inherited from the EIAR, which are partly 
autonomous in setting financial and human resource policy. EARO funds the budget 
requirement of research projects that have national implications and are approved by a 
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national review forum; regional governments fund the remainder of research projects that 
focus on the specific agricultural problems of the regional agroecological zones. EARO also 
collaborates with neighboring countries and is engaged in collaborative projects with various 
international agricultural research centers. In 2003 Regional Agricultural Research Institutes 
(RARIs) have been established in the six regions of the country funded by the regional state 
governments, with the objective of solving inherent agricultural problems. EIAR programs 
are organized under five directorates and five departments. The directorates include crop 
research, livestock research, soil and water research and farm mechanization. 
There are seven higher-education agencies (ASTI). The Alemaya University (AU) was 
responsible for about half of research activities conducted in higher education agencies. 
Research activities are managed at the Alemaya University Agricultural Research Center 
(AUARC) and focus on crops, livestock, dryland agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquatic 
resources, socioeconomics, and postharvest issues. Other institutions forming the higher-
education sector in Ethiopia are the University of Addis Ababa’s Faculty of Veterinary 
Science, Mekele University’s Faculty of Dryland Agriculture and Natural Resources, and 
three colleges—Awassa College of Agriculture, Jimma College of Agriculture, and Wondo 
Genet College of Forestry. 
Agricultural R&D performed by the private sector in Ethiopia is limited and only two private 
companies have been identified, employing only one fte researcher each in 2000, and 
together accounting for less than half of one percent of total agricultural R&D investments. 
Many of the private companies do not employ their own research staff but instead contract 
EARO and other agencies to conduct research on specific issues. One of these is the Birale 
Agricultural Development Corporation (1991), which predominantly focuses on cotton 
research.  
Research in cotton is coordinated by EIAR under one of its five directorates and 
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departments, particularly in the Werer Agricultural Research Centre. The crops research 
directorate has five teams of which cotton is covered under pulse, oil and fiber crops 
research group. Cotton research is implemented under two projects “Adoption, 
Development and Promotion of Improved Cotton Production Technologies for Irrigated 
Areas in Ethiopia” and “Adoption, Development and Promotion of Improved Cotton 
Production Technologies for Rainfed Areas in Ethiopia” which are both coordinated from 
the Werer Agricultural Research Centre, a unit of excellence for cotton research in the 
country. Testing and registartion of any newly developed variety or hybrid is conveyed by the 
National Variety Release Committee (NVRC). There is no public or private seed company 
involved in cotton seed multiplication and distribution in the country which are conveyed by 
large private commercial cotton growers who have the capacity to multiply and prepare 
delinted cotton seed for further distribution. As a short-term solution, the cotton breeding 
section started a participatory seed multiplication scheme on farmers’ fields with the aim of 
training them on how to maintain varietal genetic purity. EIAR has substantial and continued 
funding from the government and cotton research projects receive their share annually from 
the budget allocated to EIAR by the government. 
Agricultural research in Ethiopia is mainly funded by the government; during 1993–2000, 
government contributions accounted for about eighty percent of funding for research at the 
federal level and ninety percent for regional research centers. The rest comes from bilateral 
and multilateral donors as the World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD). 
Investments in Ethiopian public agricultural R&D have been growing at a steady pace since 
the early 1990s and the total number of public agricultural researchers increased at EARO as 
well as at the regional research centers. Agricultural research spending doubled between 1993 
and 2000, and then doubled again during 2000–01 (ASTI). The increased expenditures were 
driven by considerable growth in both government and donor funding, and in particular the 
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World Bank. Data on fte researchers dedicated to cotton are in line with the increasing trend 
in total expenditure in human resources, although the relative proportion on total researchers 
slightly diminished (Figures 1, 2). 
 
Tanzania 
Agricultural research in Tanzania was introduced by German colonisers as early as in the late 
nineteenth century. Laboratory facilities were established within the botanical garden and 
trial farms across the region to study crop plants and husbandry. In the 1920s, with British 
rule agricultural R&D was suspended and only a few decades later were research stations 
established as part of the Departments of Agriculture and Veterinary Sciences. Until World 
War II agricultural research was largely the domain of the local colonial government but later 
the British government decided to increase its participation and created two institutes (the 
East African Marine Fisheries Research Organization and the Tropical Pesticides Research 
Institute of East Africa). In 1961 independent Tanzania inherited the research infrastructure 
created under British rule which mainly focused on export commodities such as cotton, 
coffee, and sisal, over food crops. With the establishment of new research stations, food 
crops and natural resources were included. From the late 1970s agricultural R&D in Tanzania 
has undergone various reorganizations, in particular in 1984 a new Directorate of Research 
and Training (DRT) was created which later absorbed the Tanzania Agricultural Research 
Organization (TARO), and the Tanzania Agricultural Livestock Research Organization 
(TALIRO). After a World Bank led re-organization in 1997, DRT was renamed Department 
of Research and Development (DRD). 
The Department of Research and Development (DRD) is under the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Security (MAFS) and is the principal agricultural research agency accounting for 
close to two-thirds of total research spending and fte researchers. The Department has 
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twenty-two agricultural research institutes and livestock centers led by a central institute in 
each of the seven agroecological zones. Research focus is on crops with two thirds of the 
DRD researchers involved (ASTI). Other significant crops in 2008 (ASTI) were soybeans, 
cotton, sorghum, vegetables, and wheat (recording shares of 5 percent each).  
In addition to DRD, five other government institutes are involved in agricultural research. 
They have semi-autonomous status which enables them to set their own research programs 
and seek funding other than from the government, at the same time maintaining secure 
government funding for staffing and basic facilities.  
There are a few private companies and non-governmental organizations which conduct 
adaptive research albeit using the government’s research facilities and in collaboration with 
the DRD. There also are two non-profit research institutions established through the 
privatization of research activities that had previously been responsibility of DRD - the 
Tanzania Coffee Research Institute (TACRI) and the Tea Research Institute of Tanzania 
(TRIT) which are both are funded by a cess on tea and coffee production as well as 
government and donor contributions. 
Agricultural research in Tanzania is mainly funded by the Tanzanian government, loans from 
the World Bank, and African Development Bank (ADB) and contributions from other 
donors. Prior to 2005 spending was highly dependent on donor funding but thereafter 
funding to agricultural R&D from the government started increasing with a particular raise in 
2008 showing the government’s committment to develop the country’s agricultural sector. 
Funding through commodity levies is also relatively high in Tanzania since agencies are 
allowed to retain internally generated revenues, through the sales of produce and other.  
Tanzania expenditure on agricultural R&D as a percentage of agricultural Gdp has increased 
in time. However, agricultural research investments per researcher and as a share of AgGDP 
remain very low, in part because government employees earn very low salaries relative to 
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their colleagues at nongovernmental organizations or in other countries. 
Research in cotton is conducted in the two areas where cotton is grown: at the Lake Zone 
Agricultural Research Development Institute (LZARDI) particularly at the Agriculture 
Research Institute Ukiriguru, in the Western Cotton Growing Area  (WCGA); and at the 
Ilonga Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) in the Eastern Cotton Growing Area (ECGA). 
Both institutes are government owned. The mandate of the Ukiriguru ARI is to carry out 
research -relatively to cotton- on breeding, entomology, agronomy, pathology, fibre 
technology and soil. The Ilonga Agricultural Research institute is located in Morogoro 
Region and also deals with breeding, entomology, agronomy and social economics however 
not exclusively relatively to cotton. Other research includes soil fertility. 
Other government institutions which play a critical public role in the cotton sector, include 
the Tanzania Official Seed Certification Institute (TOSCI), Tropical Pesticides Research 
Institute (TPRI), the National Environment Management Council (NEMC) and the 
Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS). The Tanzania Official Seed Certification Institute 
(TOSCI) takes care of National Performance Trials (one year) and Distinct Uniformity and 
Stability-DUS tests when a new variety is breeded. Further, the Seed Release Committee 
analyses results. In case of approval, the variety is registered for use in Tanzania according to 
the identified ecological areas.  
Seed multiplication is conveyed by the Tanzania Cotton Board (TCB). Before the seed can 
be distributed to farmers TCB agrees with the ginners to treat and pack the quality seed. It is 
expected that in the near future there will be a company, which will multiply, treat and pack 
the seed for farmers as is happening already in the Western Cotton Growing Area where the 
Quton of Zimbabwe company won the tender. 
Technology transfer takes place through the Zonal Information and Extension Liaison Unit. 
The Tanzania Cotton Board and other stakeholders disseminate new technologies through 
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field days, extension forums, training of extension workers, agricultural shows and printed 
material. Local governments at district level also train farmers particularly in the WCGA. 
Cotton specific funding comes from the Government of Tanzania, the Cotton Development 
Trust Fund, the Tanzania Gatsby Trust and occasionally chemical companies. Among the 
various commodity levies set up by the government, the Cotton Development Fund was 
established in 1999, and collects a levy of three percent on the production value of cotton 
lint (ASTI). Half of this levy officially funds cotton research activities, mainly at DRD’s 
agricultural research institutes at Ukiriguru and Ilonga.  
Fte researchers in cotton have shown to slightly decrease from 2001 to 2008, thus not in line 
with the increased expenditure on agricultural R&D and increased capacity.  
 
Zambia 
Agricultural research in Zambia began in 1922 with research focus on cash crops (cotton and 
tobacco). Later, other crops were gradually introduced. In 1953, the Department of 
Agriculture was re-organized and its research activities were from then on to be conveyed by 
the ad hoc created Research Branch. In the same year, the Central Research Station in Mount 
Makulu and three substations were established. During the early 1960s, several other regional 
research stations were established. 
Following independence in 1964, the focus of the Research Branch shifted slowly from 
commercial crops towards the problems of small-scale subsistence farmers. However, until 
the 1970s, the Research Branch was organized by discipline and research remained heavily 
focused on the problems of large-scale commercial farmers. During the early 1980s, the 
Research Branch was re-organized with the objective of a greater sensitivity towards the 
problems of smallholders, who dominate the country’s agricultural sector. 
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Nowadays the main agricultural research agency is the Zambia Agriculture Research Institute 
(ZARI) from a transformation of the Soils and Crops Research Branch (SCRB) of the 
Department of Research and Specialist Services (DRSS), under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food, and Fisheries (MAFF). In 2008 eighty-two percent of researchers were employed at 
the ZARI (ASTI). Its mandate is to generate and adapt soil and crop technologies to increase 
the sustainability of agricultural production and serve the needs of poor farmers. Research 
focus is on crops; in 2008, more than half fte researchers focused on crop research (ASTI) 
among which is cotton although it only comes after maize.  
Higher education agencies in Zambia also conduct agricultural research. Four units under the 
University of Zambia (UNZA), together accounted for eleven percent of the country’s 
agricultural research staff in 2000.  
The private-sector research is active in the country, in 2000 it represented fourteen percent 
of agricultural research spending (ASTI). There are three private enterprises are involved in 
agricultural research in Zambia: ZamSeed and the Maize Research Institute (MRI) - maize 
research- and Dunavant which focuses on cotton research. Dunavant and ZamSeed77 are 
controlled by foreign capital, while MRI is a Zambian- owned enterprise. Since the late 
1990s, the role of the private sector in agricultural research has increased the Government of 
Zambia being particularly active in developing public–private partnerships.  In this view, four 
research trusts were created: the Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust (1997), the 
Cotton Development Trust (CDT, 1999), the Livestock Development Trust (2002), and the 
Lyambai Agricultural Development Trust (2002).  
Cotton research in Zambia is conducted on a public-private basis. The Cotton Development 
Trust is the main cotton research institute in Zambia. It was created in 1999 as an initiative 
                                                
77 ZamSeed was established in 1980 as a private company, though the Government of Zambia maintained an 
initial forty percent shareholding, which was later reduced to 37.5 percent. ZamSeed remained the country’s 
primary seed company until 1991, when the seed market was liberalized and several other seed companies were 
established, including Dunavant. 
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of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO) and the private sector driven 
cotton industry. The objetive of the CDT is to improve low yields and poor fibre quality 
through research, seed production and maintenance, extension and training programmes. 
The CDT carries out research at the Magoye station but research trials are also replicated at 
the ZARI research stations. It has been succesful in releasing four commercial varieties with 
superior yields and ginning out-turn ratio. In 2007/08 an integrated pest management (IPM) 
department was set up with assistance from the WB. The CDT also is responsible for testing 
all available foliar fertilizers on the market in Zambia and thus convey recommendations to 
the private sector. The technologies finalized by the CDT are passed on to the private sector 
and the Cotton Association of Zambia for dissemination to cotton farmers. The main source 
of funding for the Trust is a yearly government grant and contributions from the private 
sector. CDT works in collaboration with other research organizations such as the ZARI, the 
Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust, the Conservation Farming Unit and fertilizer and 
chemical companies.  
Other research on cotton is implemented by the private cotton company Dunavant which 
established a R&D unit in 1995 which focuses entirely on cotton including breeding, 
agronomy, and entomology. However, after the CDT was established the company is doing 
very little research.  
Seed multiplication is done by ginners on behalf of the CDT which provides pre-basic and 
basic seed to companies (ginners) to produce certified seed, then supplied to farmers by the 
ginning companies. 
Agricultural research in Zambia is funded by the government, numerous international 
donors, and loans from the World Bank. The first World Bank supported project began in 
1987 with counterpart funding from the government and contributions from the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD). The 
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Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) has been a major contributor to Zambia’s 
agricultural research. A second World Bank-supported project, ran from 1995 until 1999 
with the objective to liberalize markets, privatize state-owned industries, diversify production 
etc. with the consequent establishment of four research trusts in the late 1990s - among 
which the CDT -which has proven successful in encouraging public–private partnerships, 
improving the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of research, and developing opportunities for 
non-government funding. 
Long-term trends indicate a serious decline in investment in agricultural R&D in Zambia: 
public agricultural R&D spending has more than halved in 2005 compared with the average 
investments during the 1990s. Although there was a slight recovery in expenditures, spending 
was still low in 2008. However, there has been a rise in the number of agricultural researchers 
(ASTI). The number of fte researchers dedicated to cotton seems to follow the overall trend 
of investments the proportion on total fte researchers falling from 1.42 to 0.64 (ASTI). 
 
Togo 
 
Agricultural research began in Togo in the 1940s through French agricultural research 
institutes. After independence in 1960, the institutes were not nationalised because of a lack 
in national agricultural researchers, and two additional French research institutes were 
founded in 1967. The system resulted in a fragmented organisation of agricultural R&D 
across a number of stations and four ministries. In 1991, under recommendation of the 
World Bank, the National Agricultural Research Directorate (DNRA) was established to 
coordinate the country’s agricultural R&D activities in an effort to reform its fragmented 
organisation. In 1994, DNRA also took over the administration of the Cotton and Exotic 
Textiles Research Institute (IRCT). By 1997 all units of DNRA were merged into the 
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Togolese Agricultural Research Institute (ITRA): the National Food Crops Institute (INCV), 
the National Nutrition and Food Technology Institute (INTA), the National Soil Institute 
(INS), the Cotton and Exotic Textiles Research Institute (IRCT). 
ITRA is the country’s principal agricultural R&D agency. In 2008, it accounted for close to 
two-thirds of Togo’s agricultural R&D expenditures and capacity. It is the country’s only 
government agency involved in agricultural R&D. It is responsible for research in agricultural 
systems, crops, livestock, fisheries, natural resource management, and food technology. 
ITRA is placed under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MAEP). It runs 
several agricultural research centers (CRAs) located in each of the country’s four 
agroecological zones: coast, forest, humid savannah, and dry savannah. The institute is 
governed by a board consisting of two representatives from the government, one from the 
Technical Advice and Support Institute (ICAT), one each from the coffee/cocoa and cotton 
commodity organizations, one from the organization of agricultural input importers, and five 
from various producer organizations (World Bank 2003).  
The higher-education sector also plays an important role in Togo’s agricultural research, 
accounting for one-third of its agricultural R&D capacity and investments (ASTI). The 
higher- education agencies involved in agricultural R&D fall under the University of Lomé. 
Among them the Advanced School of Agronomics (ESA) is involved in research on cotton 
and carries out research in two laboratories: LVBV (research on plant virology and 
biotechnology) and LARPSAD (research on poverty and sustainable food security). Other 
research activities are soil fertility management, farm mechanization, and post-harvest 
conservation. The Faculty of Science’s R&D program primarily deals with the conservation 
of plant genetic resources, entomology, and vegetal biotechnology. 
Research in ITRA is especially oriented to crop research. More than half of full time 
equivalent researchers in the ASTI agency sample in 2001, conducted crop research and in 
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2008, sixty-one percent of ITRA’s researchers focused on crop research. The most 
researched crops are maize and cotton. The higher education sector and particularly the ESA 
has cotton lower down in its preference scale being at the fifth place after other food crops, 
with 6.3 percent of fte researchers dedicated to its research in 2008.  
As far as the private R&D sector goes, no private company results to be conducting 
agricultural R&D work and private companies tend to purchase services from ITRA which 
also carries out research on behalf of the New Togo Cotton Company (NSCT). 
Research on cotton is conveyed by the Center for Agronomic Research of Humid Savanna 
(Centre de Recherche Agronomique de la Savane Wet-CRA-SH) which is under the ITRA. 
Here new varieties are developed through mass selection and pedigree method. They are 
evaluated with respect to production, ginning performance and fiber quality characters like 
length, strength and fineness of fiber. The research institute then passes on the breeder seed 
to the New Cotton Company of Togo (Nouvelle Societe Cotonniere du Togo) receives 
breeder seed from the research institute for multiplication and distribution to cotton growers 
of the country and distributes it to specialized farmers’ groups.  
In Togo agricultural R&D, be it ITRA or higher-education agencies, is mainly financed by 
the national Government, (foreign) donors, and to a smaller extent by producer 
organisations and self-generated resources. ITRA’s budget is primarily derived from 
government subsidies, regional projects administered by networks or international 
agricultural research organizations, and other partners under various research conventions. 
However, the amounts by the different funding sources has shown to be significantly 
fluctuating. In 2008 the Togolese Government met more than half of the institute’s expenses 
(ASTI), donor funding accounted for twenty-nine percent, and internally generated resources 
represented fifteen percent. When ITRA was created it was largely dependent on World 
Bank loans through a project launched to create the research institute, but the World Bank’s 
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loans finished when the project was concluded in 2003 and no new significant donor projects 
have taken place until 201178 and ITRA was forced to generate income from other sources 
such as selling services and research products -as for the cotton company-, but to date it has 
only had partial success (ASTI). Funding in general has proved to be very unstable with 
negative consequences on ITRA’s research activities. In any case in 2004 the Government of 
Togo has moved the institute’s budget under the State budget which remains ITRA’s main 
source of funding along with the resources it generates internally. Producer organisations 
finance a share of ITRA’s budget (an average of eleven percent during 1998–2001- ASTI).  
Total agricultural R&D expenditures exhibited a downward trend during 1971–2008 (ASTI). 
Although expenditure for higher education agencies has grown, these have been more than 
offset by the declining trend of the national government expenditure in funding of 
government agencies. Donor funding has been volatile depending on timely suspensions of 
the main donor programme from the WB, and has definitely fallen in 2003 with the 
completion of the project. Public expenditure for agricultural R&D calculated as a share of 
AgGDP also shows a declining trend and has fallen from 1.97% in 1981 to 0.47% in 2008; 
although agricultural gross domestic product (AgGDP) has grown during the same period 
(ASTI). 
The negative trends seen in financing of agricultural R&D are reflected in the overall 
declining trend of agricultural research capacity from year 2000. The negative trend is due to 
the heavy capacity losses in ITRA which has seen its number of researchers decrease by one 
third during 2001-2008. Higher education instead, has revealed a positive trend though not in 
terms to offset ITRA’s losses. Researchers dedicated to cotton have followed ITRA’s 
negative trend going from 6,20 fte in 2001 to 5,35 fte in 2008. 
 
                                                
78 when the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP), a new programme funded on a World 
Bank loan, was on the way 
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Kenya 
 
 
Formal agricultural research in Kenya was initiated in 1903 with the establishment of the 
Department of Agriculture under the British colonial government, which set up an 
experiment station at a government farm in Kabete. In the following years research capacity 
slowly developed and a number of other agricultural research stations were established 
throughout the country. Agricultural research was the domain of the local colonial 
government until WWII, during which time the British government sought a more active 
role in the promotion of science and technology in its colonies. With independence in 1963, 
all national agricultural research agencies were transferred, to the newly independent 
government. In the first two decades agricultural research was reorganized into a number of 
semi-autonomous parastatal institutes, and this led to the creation of the Kenyan Agricultural 
Research Institute (KARI), Kenya’s major research agency, as well as other four institutes 
that also conduct agricultural research. Reforms were financially supported by a World Bank 
loan and various contributions by other donors as part of the National Agricultural Research 
Project (NARP).  
In 2000 KARI accounted for more than half of both total agricultural research spending and 
staff. Its mandate covers a broad spectrum of agricultural research but excludes forestry and 
fisheries. KARI’s research activities are organized into programs by commodities and factors 
(meaning issues that cut across commodities). Research focus is mainly on crops, major 
crops being vegetables, maize, coffee, and fruits. In 2008, crop research involved thirty-eight 
percent of total fte agricultural researchers in Kenya.  
There is also a large number of higher- education agencies involved in agricultural research. 
About half of higher education research activities fall under the University of Nairobi’s 
Faculty of Agriculture and Faculty of Veterinary Medicine.  
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Private agricultural R&D in Kenya is small. ASTI surveys identified three companies 
involved in agricultural research: two national companies—the Oserian Development 
Company and the Kenya Seed Company— and one multinational company, Del Monte.  
In Kenya research on cotton followed a similar path to agricultural research in general, with 
variety evaluation research activities taking place as early as in 1912 in compliance with early 
attempts to establish the cotton crop in the country between 1912 and 1923. However, it was 
not until the 1950s that proper and systematic cotton variety evaluation trials were started. 
Actually, cotton research in Kenya was started around 1950 under the direction of the 
Cotton Research Corporation (CRC), then called the Imperial Cotton Growing Corporation. 
Over the four and a half decades of cotton research in the country, a considerable amount of 
research activity has been conducted in the areas of breeding and variety evaluation, 
agronomy, and crop protection (Ikitoo). Variety evaluation work conducted during the 1950s 
especially concentrated on selecting varieties that were better than the commercial varieties in 
terms of yield and resistance to pests and diseases while fibre quality characteristics were not 
much considered. In 1975, the CRC was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
Scientific Research Division, and in 1988 was moved to the newly established Kenyan 
Agricultural Research Institute (KARI). The KARI carries out agricultural research and 
technology transfer of cotton among other agricultural crops and livestock. In particular, 
cotton falls under the Horticulture and Industrial Crops Division. There are two centres 
responsible for cotton research: KARI Mwea, in charge of cotton research and program 
coordination east of the Rift Valley; and KARI Kibos, in charge of cotton research west of 
the Rift Valley.  
Cotton planting seed production, importation or export is guaranteed by the Kenya Plant 
Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS). Seed multiplication is conveyed by KARI in 
collaboration with the Cotton Development Authority and under the supervision of 
KEPHIS. The country is in the initial stages of establishing public and private seed 
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companies (ICAC, 2012). 
Technologies developed by research scientists are disseminated to farmers through on-farm 
trials, demonstration plots, farmer field schools, farmer group or individual visits to research 
centers, printed and electronic media, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, quarterly and annual 
reports and agricultural books printed by the Agricultural Information Resource Centre. 
Agricultural research in Kenya is funded by the government, and a number of donors. 
Donors are primarily the World Bank, followed by donor contributions from the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development (DFID), and others. During the 1990s, government 
contributions accounted for about half of KARI’s total funding, while the combined World 
Bank loan and donor contributions accounted, on average, for slightly less than half during 
the 1990s (ASTI). From 2001 to 2008 KARI’s main source of funding was the government, 
accounting for fifty-five percent of total funding; donors and development banks provided 
thirty-six percent of funding, while the sale of goods and services provided a nine percent 
share (ASTI). Sources for agricultural R&D funding in Kenya also include  proceeds from 
the sale of goods and services, and commodity levies.  
As of ASTI, the overall trend for 2001–08 for KARI appears to be an increasing reliance on 
government support rather than donor funding. This shift is in contrast  with the 1994–2000 
period, when donor funding exceeded government funding in some years. However, 
although the support of donor support fluctuated year-to-year, agricultural research 
continues to rely heavily on external donor funding (ASTI). 
In terms of capacity, while KARI’s total number of researchers diminished during 1991–
2000, total public agricultural R&D research capacity has shown a gradual increase since 
2000. FTE researchers dedicated to research in cotton reflect this trend going from 4 fte 
researchers in 2001 to 5.78 fte researchers in 2008 (ASTI). Total fte researcher numbers in 
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the higher-education sector increased considerably over the past three decades. 
Overall, Kenya has among the highest research intensity ratios in the region and continues to 
attract large sums of donor funding (ASTI); Kenyan agricultural research is relatively well 
funded compared with many other African countries. Its intensity of research is close to the 
average for the developed world. However, fte researchers dedicated to research on cotton 
do not outperform in number other cotton producing countries in SSA. 
 
Uganda 
Agricultural research in Uganda began in the early colonial era in the 1920s with research 
stations established under the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Veterinary 
Services. Makerere University initiated its agricultural training in the 1920s and its agricultural 
research in the late 1950s. Until after World War II, the responsibility for agricultural 
research was mainly with the local colonial government. Following the years after 
independence in 1962, all the national agricultural research agencies were transferred to the 
national government, and no major organizational change occurred until the 1980s. The 
regional research organizations remained—with little changes in their operational structure—
until the collapse of the East African Community79 in 1977 and the Ugandan government 
inherited two major agencies of the East African region. Research continued to be heavily 
focused on the principal export commodities - cotton, tea, and coffee - although the mandate 
gradually broadened to include food crop research. After independence, the Ugandan 
research agencies continued to be highly dependent on British researchers but these were 
replaced completely by late 1970s, as more Ugandans graduated in the agricultural sciences 
                                                
79 The East African Community is an inter-governmental organisation comprising five countries in East Africa: 
Burundi, Kenya,Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda founded in 1967. It collapsed in 1977, but was officially revived 
in 2000. In 2010, the EAC launched its own common market for goods, labour and capital within the region, 
with the goal of a common currency by 2012 and full political federation in 2015.  
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from the Makerere University and universities abroad. Agricultural research budgets 
decreased dramatically over this period. Furthermore, research infrastructure was severely 
damaged as a result of the 1979 liberation war. During the 1980s, the government strived to 
revamp Uganda’s agricultural research infrastructure as part of a national plan to rebuild the 
country and its economy, but attempts failed because of continued guerilla warfare occurring 
in the countryside. 
In 1992, the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) inherited the six existing 
research institutes from the Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, and 
Cooperation, which focused on crops, livestock, fisheries, and forestry research with the 
mandate to guide and coordinate all agricultural research activities. Since its establishment, 
NARO has directed its efforts toward building its institutional infrastructure and training 
staff, moving away from a scientist-driven research agenda toward an approach focusing on 
farmer needs. NARO comprises fifteen public agricultural research institutes (PARIs), which 
fall into two categories: National Agricultural Research Institutes (NARIs) and Zonal 
Agricultural Research and Development Institutes (ZARDIs).  
Research in cotton started formally in 1949 when of the Namulonge Agricultural and Animal 
Production Research Institute (now The National Crops Resources Research Institute - 
NACRRI) was created by the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation of Britain. It is one of 
the research institutes under the guidance of the National Agricultural Research Organisation 
(NARO). It was established to solely investigate problems related to cotton production 
within the countries of the British Empire. It served the Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Malawi, Swaziland, Nigeria, Uganda and to some extent the Gambia and Yemen. Uganda 
was chosen to be the regional centre because it was centrally placed and with the exception 
of India, Uganda was at the time the largest producer of cotton in the Commonwealth. The 
Cotton Research Corporation handed over Namulonge to the government of Uganda in 
1972. The Institute continued as a cotton research station under tha name National Semi-
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Arid Resources Research Institute-NaSARRI until the 1980s when research on other 
commodity crops, animal production, agroforestry, and weather data collection was 
introduced in addition to cotton. The present mandate is to increase productivity of crop and 
livestock production. Specific objectives are genetic improvement, pest and disease control 
and management of mandate crops and feed resource development and management for 
livestock. Release of new varieties and seed multiplication permission are responsibility of 
the National Variety Release Committee established in 2006. The National Seed Certification 
Services under the MAAIF’s provides for genetic purity and the Cotton Development 
Organisation (CDO) provides seed to growers. The Source of funding for Cotton Research 
in NARO include the Government, the Cotton Development Organisation (CDO), 
Competitive Grants from pooled “basket” funding by the Government and Development 
Partners accessed through competitive research proposals developed by scientists on Cotton; 
and loans from development partners as the World-Bank and others.  
Producer organizations exist for various crops including cotton. However, these 
organizations, neither conduct nor fund research since they have been reluctant to commit 
funds to research. They convey extension services instead. The coffee and cotton 
organizations are public institutions and receive most of their funding through taxes levied 
on export proceeds.  
Agricultural R&D performed by the private sector in Uganda is very small; accounting for 
only two percent of total agricultural R&D investments in 2000 (ASTI). Many of the larger 
private companies do not employ own research staff, but contract research out to NARO 
and other researchers, often through short-term informal personal contracts. 
The primary funding sources for agricultural R&D in Uganda are the national government, a 
large number of multilateral and bilateral donors, and development bank loans. In 2008, 
NARO accounted for seventy-three percent of Uganda’s  public and private research 
  
157 
spending and sixty-three percent of its fte research staffing. In recent years government 
contributions to NARO have increased substantially, as the main source of funding for 
NARO shifted from primarily donors before 2007 to the government in 2008 when donors 
provided forty-six percent of NARO’s total funding, and the national government provided 
fifty-two percent instead (ASTI). The World Bank has been the main source of funding for 
agricultural research in Uganda. World Bank support will continue with the new Agricultural 
Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services (ATAAS) project, which began in June 2010 
(World Bank 2010). A small amount of funding is derived from the proceeds of the sale of 
goods  and services or from commodity levies which are currently being collected on coffee, 
tea, cotton, oilseeds, horticultural, livestock, and fisheries exports,  but almost all of these 
revenues are being used for non research purposes, such as marketing, extension, and 
administration. 
Total research capacity at Uganda’s main higher education agency, Makerere University, also 
grew in recent years, strengthening the role of this sector in the performance of agricultural 
R&D. 
Public R&D spending data were only available for the period 1995−2000 during which it 
increased seventy-five percent from 1995. This increase was mainly the result of World Bank 
funding to NARO through the first Agricultural Research and Training project (ARTP-I) 
and increased research activities at the higher education agencies. However, ASTI data on 
cotton fte researchers seem to withstand the positive trend since the proportion over total fte 
researchers has diminished instead. 
In 2008, Uganda invested $1.40 in agricultural R&D for every $100 in agricultural output. 
The intensity ratio fluctuated from year to  year during the 1995–2008 period, following 
varied trends in agricultural R&D spending combined with relatively static AgGDP levels. 
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Figure 1. Full time equivalent researchers in 2001 and 2008. 
 
 
Source: ASTI 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Fte researchers in cotton in selected SSA cotton producing countries 
  
 
Source: ASTI 
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Figure 3. Cotton fte (fuul-time equivalent) researchers percentage over total fte researchers in 
agriculture in selected SSA cotton-producing countries, 2001 
 
 
Source: ASTI 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Cotton fte (full time equivalent) researchers percentage over total fte researchers in 
agriculture in selected SSA cotton-producing countries, 2008 
 
 
Source: ASTI 
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Conc lus ions 
 
6.1 Financing SSA R&D in agr i cu l ture  
 
Agricultural R&D in SSA, including R&D in cotton, is primarily public. However, the 
governments in the region are heavily dependent on external international donors. ASTI 
show falling investments in agricultural R&D in SSA although there is much variation among 
countries, but especially those countries which are more dependent on donor funding have 
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shown a decreasing pattern in investments. Infact, this decreasing pattern is found to be due 
to the general decrease in contributions from donors especially due to the completion of 
large donor-funded programmes and the general decline in World Bank loans since the late 
1990s-early 2000s (Beintema and Stads, 2009).  
The World Bank was an extremely important contributor to agricultural research activities in 
Africa through loan-supported projects in the 1990s. After peaking at US$120 million in 
1991, total World Bank funding in support of African agricultural research declined 
precipitously during 1991–2002, reaching US$8 million in 2002 (in 1993 prices). Total 
funding by USAID similarly declined from a high of US$80 million in 1982 to just US$4 
million in 1999 (IAC 2004). R&D needs long term stable funding.  
Agricultural R&D is particularly susceptible to fluctuations in funding due to the long lags 
between investments and results that characterize it. Thus, uncostancy in funding has 
negative effects and can determine the loss of gains achieved. The decreasing pattern in 
public expenditure for agricultural R&D, the fluctuations in government funding, the highly 
instable inflow of donor and development bank funding and their short term characteristics, 
mine the system stability, the financial and institutional efficiency and the overall quality of 
research outputs. Such general instability also results in difficulties for agencies to retain 
senior staff, train new staff, coordinate with other agencies and sustain research programs 
(Beintema and Stads).  
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Figure 5. Public agricultural R&D expenditures as a percentage of agricultural GDP in 
selected SSA cotton-producing countries, 1980-2008 
 
 
Source: ASTI 
 
 
6.2 R&D in Cotton 
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purchasing research products from government R&D agencies.  
From ASTI data on fte cotton researchers in 2001 and in 2008 no particular trend can be 
identified. However, data in absolute terms and in relative (to the total of fte researchers in 
agriculture) terms are mostly in line with the importance the cotton sector is given in each 
country here considered. 
In confirmation of this Mali and Tanzania have in absolute terms the most cotton fte 
researchers both in 2001 and 2008. However, looking at the proportion of cotton fte 
researchers on total fte researchers in agriculture it is Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali that stand 
out dedicating respectively 10.2; 8.5 and 7.5 percent of their total agricultural R&D capacity 
to R&D in cotton in 2001(Figure 4). Except for Côte d’Ivoire things don’t change much in 
2008 although Mali is among all the observed countries, the only one which increased fte 
cotton researchers both in absolute and relative terms showing committment of the 
government to the sector. Nevertheless, Togo remains the country with the higher relative 
number of cotton fte researchers also in 2008. Notably, Côte d’Ivoire shows a fall in cotton 
fte researchers both in absolute and relative terms passing from 8.5 to 4.6 percent of total fte 
researchers in agriculture in 2008. This can be explained by the break out of civil war in 2002 
the country has witnessed during which particularly the cotton research station in Bouaké has 
been affected, leaving cotton researchers completely without facilities. The effects of the war 
can also be seen on production which has been significantly affected plummeting from 
700,000 bales80 in 2002 to 225,000 bales in 2008. 
All countries in the sample except Côte d’Ivoire, have seen the absolute number of 
agricultural fte researchers increase. However only Ethiopia, Kenya and Mali have also 
increased the number of cotton fte researchers in absolute terms and none except Mali have 
increased the relative number of cotton fte researchers which have decreased instead. 
                                                
80 1 bale = 480 lb 
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Chapter  IV  
 
The Quali ty  Issue in Cotton  
 
Introduct ion 
In literature the failure of reforms of the cotton sector in SSA is generally primarily ascribed 
to the falling apart of the input provision system consequent to the impossibility of 
coordination in competitive systems. As mentioned in chapter II, cotton is an input intensive 
crop and the failure in the SSA financial market makes it necessary for the farmers to be 
provided with input credit before the growing season. While vertically integrated systems 
solved the issue with ginners providing the necessary inputs on credit knowing they would be 
paid back at harvest; it is by now acknowledged that this does not work in a competitive 
organisation of the sector where the numerous ginners scramble for cotton and farmers can 
free-ride avoiding to pay for their debt thus making the input credit system impossible to 
work.  
It is acknowledged that another problem ememerged with liberalisation is a decline in export 
quality as also seen in other SSA liberalised sectors as coffee, cocoa and tea. However, the 
subject is not often tackled in literature if not just mentioned as a secondary side-effect of 
reforms. In my view, the plummeting of quality is just as serious a consequence to 
liberalization since in the cotton sector it has both short term and long term lasting negative 
consequences on the sector. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the origin and 
importance of quality in the cotton sector and to analyze the contingent effects a 
liberalization of the sector has had on such feature.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 1 considers where the demand of quality is 
originated; section 2 gives an exhaustive primer on the features of cotton that “make” the 
quality of cotton; section 3 analyses where in the value chain quality is “built”; section 4 
explains how cotton is priced and how quality impacts prices; section 5 purpose is to analyze 
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with econometric analysis the impact of liberalisation on the SSA cotton sector. 
1 The or ig in o f  Demand for  Qual i ty  
Cotton is a natural and seasonal product. Cottons are not all equal and characteristics can 
vary considerably. There are many different types of cottons, referred to as growths or 
varieties, and many other varying characteristics determine its use. Like all commodities, 
cotton is differentiated by quality parameters for the purpose of trade.  
The quality parameters by which cotton is differentiated and that consequently determine its 
value are determined by the consumer of cotton lint i.e. the spinner and the textile 
manufacturer, who transform the raw material into yarn and then into fabric (Estur). Cotton 
quality requirements can vary substantially depending on the final product, and the quality 
differences affect the value that spinners can get from the cotton lint and thus the price that 
manufacturers are prepared to pay. In general, manufacturers are interested in the 
performance of cotton in the manufacturing of textile: better fiber quality translates into 
better yarn quality as well as in higher processing efficiency. 
Resisting the apparent descending trend in quality demand as seen in the processing 
industries of other commodities, i.e. in the coffee, cocoa and tea sectors; the spinning 
industry has instead been demanding growing lint quality from ginners. The reasons for this 
are to be ascribed to the increasing market pressure that is being placed on the textile supply 
chain on the one hand; and to the innovation in the spinning technology on the other. 
Growing competition in the textile industry results from the combined effect of cotton 
market saturation due to the plentiful production (mainly from China and the US) and of the 
growing pressure from manmade fibres. Within the sector, cotton competes with various 
international growths with spinners searching to attein particular blends giving scope for 
differentiation rather than standardization. In the fibre market cotton strives to compete with 
the advantages of artificial fibres (notably polyester). Manmade fibres have the advantage of 
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being homogeneous, verstaile, clean (e.g. all synthetic fibers within a given lot are identical 
and totally free of contamination) and stronger than a natural fibre; they are easier and hence 
less costly to process. Thanks to these features and to the relatively lower prices, manmade 
fibres have gained a growing share in the textile market as confirmed by the loss in market 
share of cotton to the advantage of chemical fibres (figure 1).  
Contrarily, cotton is a natural product and varies widely in its fibre characteristics, both 
physical and chemical (mainly physical), because of genetic, environmental, and processing 
factors. This variability in the fibre impacts its processing performance, costs, and quality. 
The increasing quality and performance demands placed on the textile value chain has made 
chemical fibre performance become the benchmark by which spinners judge cotton, 
requiring the same characteristics of cleanliness and homogeneity as offered by artificial 
fibres. 
Figure 1 - Cotton and non-Cotton World Consumption, 1960 - 2013 
 
Source: ICAC 
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raise in minimum quality requirements in cotton being that the physical, chemical and related 
characteristics of cotton lint, including the type and amount of contamining non-fibrous 
matter and ‘fibre configuration’ (preparation, neps etc.), determine its textile processing 
performance and behaviour, in terms of processing waste and yarn and fabric quality. 
Additionally, machine stoppages and spinning breaks - which can partly be ascribed to yarn 
defects, as in the case of weaving end-breaks- have become increasingly costly making the 
undesirable properties of cotton further burden on the determination of its price81.  
Cotton fibre represents fifty to seventy percent of manufacturing costs of yarn and as a result 
of competition and innovation, alongs conventional parameters, new quality attributes have 
assumed increasing importance in the determining of the price of cotton. Among fiber 
properties, staple length has the greatest influence on spinning performance. According to 
the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC), the world cotton supply can be 
divided into six categories based on commonly perceived competitive relationships between 
cottons of differing quality, variety, and geographic origins: extra-fine, fine, high-medium, 
medium, coarse count, and waste/padding. The categories are roughly parallel to staple 
length categories but are designed to incorporate more than just staple length information 
because two cottons of equal length might actually have significantly different spinning 
characteristics. 
 
2 Features  o f  Cotton that  Determine Qual i ty  for  Spinners  
The most commonly produced and traded cotton lint variety in the world belongs to the 
species Gossypium hirsutum, which is also known as upland cotton. Extra Long Staple (ELS) 
cotton used for producing very fine yarns comes from another species and accounts for less 
than 5 percent of world cotton trade. 
                                                
81 Some twenty to thirty percent of weaving machine stops are attributed to yarn defects, the repair of each end-
break costs about seventy US cents. 
  
167 
Following is a review of cotton features taken into account by spinners because they affect 
processing, performance, utilization and value. Together they determine the quality of 
cotton.  
Leaf Grade- Leaf refers to small particles of the cotton plant’s leaf which remain in the lint 
after the ginning process. Upland leaf grades are identified as numbers 1 through 7, all 
represented by physical standards. Upland leaf grade 8 (Below Grade) is used to identify 
samples having more leaf than leaf grade 7. Leaf is determined by plant condition, harvest 
preparation, weather conditions at harvest, and weeds present in the field at harvest. Use of 
hairy leaf varieties, poor defoliation prior to harvest, hard freezes on rapidly growing plants, 
and harvesting damp cotton can also be causes of high leaf grade.  
Regardless of the cause, high leaf grades can result in significant price discounts.  
Upland leaf grades are determined by human classers who compare a lint sample to 
Universal standards for the grades and cannot as yet be measured instrumentally. 
Fiber l ength  - is the average of the longest half of a fiber bundle and is reported in 
hundredths of an inch and 32nds of an inch. The official standards for fiber or staple length 
range from 26/32 inches upward, generally in graduations of one thirty-seconds of an inch. 
A length above 28 mm is desirable in most cases, although this depends upon the spinning 
system and yarn count (desired for ring spinning and weaving). The mean length (ML) or 
50% span length is generally regarded as providing a better measure of spinning performance 
and yarn quality. 
Fiber length is primarily determined by cotton variety, but growing conditions as optimum 
temperatures82 and fertility (adequate levels of Potassium and nitrogen) can affect length as 
well. Deficit or excess soil moisture levels can also cause reduced fibre length. The first 16-20 
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days following flowering determine fiber length.  
Fibre length characteristics can be deteriorated by ginning and textile processing conditions 
in terms of fibre breakage.  
The upper half mean length of fiber can be measured instrumentally in hundredths of an 
inch and length is converted to thirty-seconds of an inch. 
Length uni formity  - is a measure (uniformity index) of the degree of uniformity of the fibers 
in a sample. It is the ratio between the mean length of fiber and the upper half mean length 
expressed as a percentage.  
Low uniformity values are related to fibers that are more easily broken. Among causes of low 
uniformity are weathering of cotton, ginning at improper moisture levels (less than 6%), or 
excessive lint cleaning. Excessive fibre length variation tends to increase manufacturing waste 
and to adversely affect processing performance, including spinning performance and yarn 
quality.  
Related to length uniformity is the short fibre content (SFC) defined as the percentage, by 
weight, of fibres shorter than ½" (12.7 mm). The SFC level is generally a function of the 
staple length (UHML).  
An increase in SFC increases spinning end breaks, processing waste and causes deterioration 
in yarn and fabric properties, notably yarn strength and evenness.  
Fabric strength and abrasion resistance also tend to deteriorate with an increase in SFC. An 
SFC below 8% (by weight) is desirable. 
Length, length uniformity and length distribution, including short fibre content, are probably 
the most important cotton fibre properties, being the best criterion for ring spinning 
performance and spinning limits; and often also of yarn strength.  
 
Strength – It is important to draw a distinction between absolute fibre strength (uncorrected 
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for cross section or fineness) and fibre tenacity (corrected for cross section or fineness). The 
strength of individual cotton fibres is determined by the fineness of the fibres. 
Cotton fibre tenacity, is generally measured on fibre bundles, by clamping and breaking the 
bundle of fibers with a 1/8-inch spacing between the clamp jaws. Results are reported in 
terms of grams per tex (g/Tex) to the nearest tenth. A tex unit is equal to the weight in 
grams of 1,000 meters of fiber. Therefore, the strength reported is the force in grams 
required to break a bundle of fibers one tex unit in size.  
In terms of spinning performance, the effect of fibre strength is small, whereas fibre tenacity 
is virtually linearly related to yarn and fabric strength, all other factors being constant. Fibre 
tenacity is particularly important for rotor spinning. 
Elongat ion-  means extension at break and is measured at the same time as fibre strength. It 
is determined by genetic and environmental factors. 
An increase in elongation is associated with an increase in yarn and greige fabric elongation 
and nep formation which significantly affects weaving efficiency. The relationship between 
yarn elongation and fibre elongation is a function of fibre length and yarn twist and linear 
density. Yarn elongation. An increase in fibre elongation can sometimes reduce spinning 
end-breakage but also yarn strength.  
A level above 7% is desirable.  
 
Micronaire  (also called mike) - is a function of both maturity and fineness and is generally 
used as a measure of the latter. Although it is usually important to measure maturity and 
fineness separately particularly when different cotton varieties and growing regions are 
involved; for Upland cottons, micronaire is considered as good as, if not better than, 
maturity measures.  
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Micronaire is determined both by variety and environmental conditions, although 
environmental conditions play a greater role. Micronaire develops after the full fiber length is 
obtained that is from 16-20 days to 40-45 days following flowering and is negatively affected 
(low mike) by cool and/or dry weather and low fertilizer use.  
Micronaire affects processing waste (lower micronaire fibres break more easily during 
mechanical action), creation of neps (lower micronaire fibres are generally more flexible and 
entangle more easily to form neps), short fibre content, spinning performance, yarn and 
fabric quality, dyability and neppiness in particular.  
Micronaire is important to spinners because it predicts yarn quality and dyeability. Low 
micronaire refers to fine fibers and is usually a predictor of low dye uptake and possible end-
breakages during spinning; while high micronaire refers to coarse fibers and is a sign of good 
dye uptake. However, very high micronaire also causes reduced yarn strength.  
The ideal micronaire range is between about 3.8 and 4.2; or below 3.8 provided the cotton is 
mature. It is generally considered that both too-low and too-high cottons should be avoided 
consequently values below 3.5 and above 4.9 are discounted, while premiums are paid for the 
most desirable mike readings. 
Maturi ty - Fiber maturity is related to the amount of cellulose deposited during boll 
development, the relative wall thickness of the fibre, ratio of the cell wall thickness to the 
overall ‘diameter’ of the fibre. It is primarily a function of variety, culture, and weather.  
Cellulose is the element of the fiber that is dyed in the textile process and the more cellulose 
present, the better dye uptake. In general maturity affects fabric appearance and defects more 
than any other fibre property. It particularly affects nep formation, dye uptake, dyed 
appearance and lustre. Maturity should be considered not only in its average but also in its 
distribution being that variations in maturity can lead to differences in dyed appearance and 
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even a small percentage of immature fibres which may not significantly affect the average 
maturity, can significantly affect the yarn and fabric appearance in terms of neppiness and 
white flecks. Immature cottons also have greater scouring and finishing losses because their 
non-cellulosic contents are higher; and can also be associated with stickiness and roller 
lapping because of excessive plant sugars.  
Maturity is commonly measured by the double compression airflow test. The most popular 
means of expressing maturity are percentage maturity (Pm) and maturity ratio (M), a level of 
at least 0.9 (preferably 0.95) for M and 80% for Pm being desirable.  
However, relatively immature and fine fibres can be removed with combing.  
Neps  - are generally defined as hopelessly entangled masses of fibres. Neps can be 
distinguished either in ‘seedcoat neps’ – which have a piece of the seedcoat attached to the 
fibres– or ‘shiny neps’ – which consist of dead fibres, with insufficient cellulose to even 
absorb dye. 
Neps may exist in unprocessed cotton, being related to certain fibre properties, but the vast 
majority of neps are caused by handling and processing. Almost any mechanical process can 
cause the formation of neps, especially harvesting (meaning machine harvesting; while cotton 
carefully removed by hand fom the seed contains very few neps), ginning, and mechanical 
treatment conditions in the spinning mill.  
However, some cotton fibres are more susceptible to nep formation than others. 
Susceptibility tending to increase when maturity decreases, length increases, and with either 
very high or very low moisture content. Nep formation is also directly proportional to trash 
content due to the consequent necessary over cleaning which causes more neps to be 
formed. 
Nep testing should be separated, i.e. before and after processing but also to be able to 
measure the different types of neps, e.g. seed coat neps and fibrous neps. 
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Neps are responsible for up to fifty percent of yarn defects. If neps are incorporated into the 
yarn, it is quite likely they will survive into the fabric causing imperfections and unevenness, 
and if neps exceed a fairly low threshold (20 neps/gram) the resulting fabric is not suitable 
for high-quality textile products. Neps also cause spinning end-breakages. Seed coat 
fragments are particularly problematic.  
However, neps can be removed from the cotton fibres by the carding machine and the 
combing machine. A well-adjusted carding machine can remove about ninety percent of the 
neps. 
Short  f ibres-  fibres less than 1/2" long. Shorter fibres are negatively correlated with good 
yarn properties (e.g. strength and elongation) and positively correlated with bad yarn 
properties (e.g. thin and thick places and hairiness).  Even a slight elevation of very short 
fibres (say, less than 1/4") is likely to disproportionately damage spinning performance and 
yarn quality. Short fibres are one of the causes for an increased tendency toward nep 
formation. 
 
Contaminat ion- is a measurement of non-lint material. It commonly comprises plant and 
non-plant matter as fragments of leaves, bark and grass, as well as particles of sand and dust. 
It includes stickiness and synthetic fibers. Stickiness is caused by insect sugars on the fiber 
forming sticky deposits on the surfaces of mill machinery with which cotton comes into 
contact. They can make ginning very difficult, but also carding, drawing and spinning 
difficult for mills. Stickiness mostly comes from late harvest, incentives for early picking were 
offered to farmers which have led to stickiness virtually disappearing. 
Once this material gets into the gin or the mill, it is distributed throughout the fibers and is 
difficult to remove because when this material gets ground up, it can resemble fibers and is 
difficult to separate from the cotton. It is very difficult to detect until the fabric has been 
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dyed. Fibre contamination is a serious and expensive problem for the mills. 
Growing, harvesting, storage (field), and ginning conditions determine levels of 
contamination since foreign matter can during these stages enter into the cotton. Seed coat 
fragments, with tenaciously clinging fibres, are an important cause of yarn faults, also 
adversely affecting spinning and yarn performance. In particular plastic materials represent a 
serious source of contamination being undetectable before the fabric has been dyed - picking 
polypropylene (ppp) bags and tie downs have been major source of fiber contamination.  
Most foreign matter can be removed, but cleaning is associated with fibre breakage and 
consequent nep formation.  
Classers look for grass and bark while grading or the measurement is made by the 
instrumental video trashmeter which measures the percentage area and particle count of 
trash on the sample surface. This measurement provides an estimate of the total amount of 
trash in the bale. 
Colour - colour measurements are in terms of grayness and yellowness. Grayness (Color Rd) 
indicates how light or dark the lint sample is, and Yellowness (Color +b) indicates how much 
yellow colour is in the lint sample. Cotton is generally white when the boll opens, but 
continued exposure to weathering and micro-organisms can cause the cotton to lose its 
brightness and to become darker. Cotton may also become discoloured or spotted by the 
action of insects, fungi, plant diseases and soil stains, or when affected by frost or drought. 
Storage under high humidity conditions can cause yellowing and reduce brightness. color is 
usually not affected by variety (although it is known that WCA cotton is yellower than US 
Upland). 
Colour has little effect on processing but affects dyeing and finishing of fabric. Bleaching is 
often able to reduce, or even eliminate, differences present in the raw cotton. Average 
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colour; colour variability; and spottedness can all affect processing and dyeing performance 
and fabric appearance.  
Colour is generally measured by instrument, in terms of its greyness, reflectance or 
brightness (Rd) and yellowness (+b). Typically +b is about 9.0 and Rd 75%. 
 
Table 1. Comparison for fibre properties   
Fiber Property
  
Cotlook A Index Typical African  
upland cotton 
Lint for finer yarns 
Grade Middling-white Strict low middling  
to Good middling 
Strict Middling-
white 
Staple length 1-3/32” (27.8 mm) 1-1/6 to 1-3/16 
inches 
(27-30.2mm) 
≥1-1/8” (28.6mm) 
Micronaire 3.5-4.9 3.5-4.5 3.8-4.2 
Fiber strength 25-30 grams per 
tex 
27-32 grams per tex ≥30 grams per tex 
Source: Éstur (2008) 
 
2.1 Where are the qual i ty  f eatures  created 
Quality of cotton is achieved in almost every stage of the value chain. We may consider 
dividing the value chain into two parts, i.e. before and after the cotton boll opens. In this way 
we may consider pre-production stages and post-production stages in the value chain.  
Variety determines grand part of lint quality parametres and actually the first stage that 
affects cotton quality is research and development where variety is originated. This stage 
takes care of a number of issues starting from researching varieties that better adapt to 
specific environment conditions. Follow seed breeding and multiplication which are 
implemented so that seed used is of good quality (use of old or stressed seed have 
detrimental consequences on cotton quality); soil fertility management (crop rotation, tillage, 
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animal draught, area specific fertilizers); pest management (integrated pest management 
practices, research of optimizing pesticides) and extension advice so as to maximize the 
varietal potential properties (chapter III considers research in cotton more in depth). 
The next step that can affect quality of cotton is input provision. In order to maximize the 
potential properties of variety, inputs need to be of good quality (previous stage) and used in 
a timely fashion. Late sowing (which may be due to difficulties in obtaining seeds), like 
fertilizer and pesticide improper use (too little or too late) all have detrimental consequences 
on harvest quality. 
Other than R&D and input timely provision, only production management practices are left 
that can affect the optimal expression of potential fibre properties before the cotton boll 
opens. Production management is affected by extension services the objective of which is 
teaching growers the production practices so as to optimize intrinsic fibre properties and 
harvest, i.e. timely sowing; soil fertility management; and pest management. 
When the cotton boll opens it is at its best in terms of fibre properties and subsequent action 
can only change it to the worse. 
After the boll opens, quality of cotton is mainly affected by post-production management, 
i.e. harvesting methods, storage, and ginning practices. Following is a description of each 
stage and how it can affect fibre quality. 
Harvesting methods - Cotton can be either harvested by hand or mechanically. In terms of 
quality, seed cotton picked by hand is cleaner, and the fibre obtained has fewer neps and a 
lower short fiber content than cotton picked by machine which contains between six percent 
and thirty percent of plant parts depending on the type of harvester used83. Particularly 
                                                
83 Two types of mechanical harvesting equipment are used to harvest cotton: the spindle picker and the cotton 
stripper harvester. The spindle picker is a selective-type harvester; the cotton stripper is a nonselective harvester 
that removes not only the well-opened bolls but also the cracked and unopened bolls along with the burs and 
other plant parts. 
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bothersome in machine picked cotton is leaf material, one of the most difficult types of trash 
to remove. Machine picked cotton consequently needs to undergo more thorough cleaning 
procedures (which negatively affect quality as explained later) at the gin. However, 
handpicked seed cotton often gets contaminated during picking, storage, handling, or 
transport, and the presence of foreign matter in the fiber offsets the theoretical advantage 
conferred by manual picking. Particularly detrimental to quality is the use of polypropylene 
picking bags which can contamine cotton with own fibre which is detectable only at the 
dying stage thus affecting textile. As a result, handpicked cotton has lost its advantage over 
the past twenty-five years and now trades at a discount to machine picked cotton which is 
considerred more reliable in its outcome (Estur, 2008). Nevertheless, only three countries 
(United States, Australia and Israel) harvest 100% by machine.  
Storage - Moisture content, length of storage, amount of high-moisture foreign matter, 
variation in moisture content throughout the stored mass, initial temperature of the seed 
cotton, temperature of the seed cotton during storage, weather factors during storage 
(temperature, relative humidity, rainfall), all affect fibre quality. Thus, adequate storage 
facilities are essential to keep cotton protected from weathering which reduces its quality. 
Seed cotton may be stored in piles on the ground, or in sheds, storage houses, trailers or 
modules so long as it is protected from environmental damage and from excessive ground 
moisture.  
Cotton is then transported to the ginner. At the ginner a number of processes can 
significantly affect cotton quality in terms of fibre length, uniformity, seedcoat fragments 
content, trash, short fibres and neps. The two ginning practices that have the most impact on 
fibre properties are the regulation of fibre moisture during ginning and cleaning and the 
degree of saw-type lint cleaning used. 
Cleaning involves the removal of both moisture and trash. While cotton contamined (over a 
certain threshold) with leaf is discounted, cleaning also means the loss of some marketable 
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fiber and thus a loss of profit since premiums consequent to the extra cleaning do not 
compensate for the loss of marketable weight (ginning out-turn ratio). Lint cleaning also 
adresses the problem of seed-coat fragments in the lint which can be caused by harvesters, 
by high-impact gin machinery or by worn gin saws and ribs; but the procedure results just in 
a reduced volume of SCF present in the cotton since their number tends to remain 
unchanged. 
Other than marketable fibre, cleaning also negatively affects staple length: each lint cleaner 
reduces staple by up to 1/32 of an inch and this is worsened if excessive drying has 
weakened the fiber. It also causes the creation of short fiber and neps. 
Over-cleaning is related to over-drying which additionally causes loss of marketable weight 
(water content). Furthermore, it causes loss of strength in the fibre and creation of short 
fibers which overvalue the benefits of trash removal.  
The type of gin used is known to affect cotton fibre quality. Roller ginning, when compared 
to saw ginning, produces a superior fiber with excellent spinning potential because it is more 
gentle when separating the fiber from the seed. Roller ginning has better outturn (less waste 
thus less cotton is lost) and produces lint that is longer, has fewer short fibers, seed coat 
fragments and neps. However, saw ginning is much faster than roller ginning which is a 
slower and more expensive process that can only be used for ELS cottons and medium-long 
upland varieties. Roller ginned lint contains more trash as saw ginned lint is cleaner, but 
contains finer particles of trash that are more difficult to remove. 
Mechanical processing in terms of roping and twisting of the fibre, and poor maintenance of 
the gin all affect fibre; the less mechanical processing that the fiber receives, the lower will be 
its nep content and roughness in preparation84. 
                                                
84 Rough preparation refers to the appearance of cotton and causes increased waste to be produced during 
textile processing. Processing cotton while it is wet, transporting cotton in pipes with excessive air speeds, and 
  
178 
3. Grading 
The afore seen intrinsic (in variety) and induced (by production management and post-
production handling) quality features altogether determine the grade of cotton. Cotton 
grading is also significant in the quality performance of cotton. It plays a role in terms of 
information flow in the cotton value chain. Actually, classing and grading give producers the 
necessary feedback on the quality of their harvest which ideally acts as an incentive so as to 
implement all the necessary (labour intensive) operations to further improve the quality of 
cotton, particularly relative to care in hand harvesting. In SSA this happens when grading is 
implemented at the primary market stage; a practice that has died out after liberalization, 
being postponed to the export port to the detriment of the information flow to producers. 
Grade is determined after classification (or grading) which is the application of official 
standards and standardized procedures developed for measuring the physical attributes of 
raw cotton that affect the quality of the finished product and the processing efficiency. This 
can take place in two ways: either through manual classification or instrumental classification. 
The traditional method of cotton classification is through manual grading. This is based on 
appearance and feel, and includes determinations of color grade, leaf grade, staple length, 
preparation, and contamination; and is implemented by trained cotton classers based upon 
visual comparisons with physical and descriptive standards. A shortcoming in manual 
classing is that there are limits on the number of quality factors that can be measured by 
human sight and feel; and it depends on human perceptions of sight and touch, making 
results somewhat subjective. Furthermore, manual classing methods are not harmonized 
undermining reliability and precision of its outcomes. Nevertheless, it is still the actual base 
for trading cotton (Éstur, 2008).  
                                                                                                                                            
feeding too much air into air-fed cylinder cleaners can cause the twisting, knotting and roping that are 
recognized as poor preparation. 
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Instrumental classification is implemented through High Volume Instruments (HVI) which 
were introduced in 1980 in the US where they subsequently proliferated: in 1991 the entire 
US crop was classed with HVI systems. HVI classification increased the number of quality 
factors that can be measured and has also improved the measurements which were 
previously performed manually allowing for improvement in establishing absolute reference 
standards. The HVI yields seven major measurements- length, strength, uniformity index, 
micronaire, reflectance (Rd), yellowness (+b), and trash; and reports some qualities as length 
with far greater precision (to the 100th of an inch) compared with the human classer's staple 
length of 32nds of an inch). Furthermore it measures strength, uniformity index and 
micronaire, none of wich can be measured manually and are important to the textile industry. 
Rd and +b are combined to obtain an HVI color grade that replaced the human classer color 
grade in 2000. The only measurements still not performed by HVI are leaf grade and 
extraneous matter. Another deficiency in instrumental classing is that in most cases it tests 
samples so the outcome may not always be exhaustive of the overall quality. Furthermore 
test results have shown to be variable depending on different laboratories they are carried out 
in. Nevertheless, virtually every bale of cotton produced in the U.S. is subjected to 
mandatory HVI. 
The outcome of the classing stage is the grade of cotton based on its quality. Cotton grading 
from coarse to premium is a critical economic issue for the mills; consequently based on its 
grade achievement, cotton fetches a higher or lower price over or below the world price 
expressed in the Cotlook A Index. 
However, classing be it manual or instrumental seem to both have shortcomings such that 
spinners notably still rely on origin (of cotton) and thus country reputation for purchasing 
cotton (Éstur, 2008). 
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4. Pri c ing Cotton 
4.1 The Cot look A Index 
The guiding light for prices of cotton is either the Cotlook A Index or the latest prices 
quoted for the nearby futures contract on ICE Futures U.S., Inc. in New York. However, 
while futures prices are not always good indicators of international price trends or prices of 
cotton from countries other than the United States; Cotlook85 A Index has the purpose of 
being representative of the level of offering prices on the international raw cotton market on 
the basis of price information from both buyers and sellers of cotton from many origins, 
which makes it the unrivalled barometer of international cotton price movements as 
acknowledged by the trading fraternity, governments, and international organisations such as 
UNCTAD and ICAC. 
Cotton Outlook, Cotlook Ltd, is a private company in Liverpool, United Kingdom which 
has been publishing representative prices for the principal growths of raw cotton from 1966. 
Prices are calculated from the prices at which cotton is offered to the final consumers, i.e. 
mills; as an average of the cheapest five quotations86 from a selection (at present nineteen in 
which only two African Franc Zone countries are allowed) of the principal upland cottons 
traded internationally. This is a means of identifying those growths which are the most 
competitive, and which therefore are likely to be traded in most volume. The selection of 
cottons considered in the calculation can change solely to reflect shifts in the cottons most 
frequently traded. However, Cotlook quotations are intended to reflect the competitive level 
of offering prices, not the level at which business has been arranged. 
                                                
85 In the attempt to provide a device that shows the potential influence of movements in futures on prospective 
offers to mills; Cotlook decided last year to introduce an ‘intra-day’ Index value, which adjusts the individual 
component values of the A Index by the extent of the movement in futures. The adjustments are based on the 
historic 12-month moving averages of the typical price relationship for each growth with the relevant NYBOT 
trading month, and the A is then re-calculated. This ‘intra-day’ value, which we have given the title ‘Cotlook A 
Index Plus’ (AIP), will therefore move in sympathy with futures. 
86 This practice is a proxy for weighting, which is impractical, owing to the absence of timely data by which it 
could be calculated. 
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The base quality of cotton considered in the A Index is Middling 1-3/32″ which allows for 
the widest possible selection of growths to be monitored. The terms quoted are Cost and 
Freight (CFR), Letter of Credit at sight, including one percent agent’s commission and 
notional profit.  
As of 2003 Cotlook has been calculating the A Index based on Far Eastern quotations, 
previuosly was the North European, as a consequence to the change in trade flows in cotton 
since China’s accession to the WTO. The quality basis of the A Index FE is inaltered, namely 
Middling 1-3/32″. The Cotlook North European A and B87 Indices were discontinued 
instead, from August 1, 2008. 
Although the price of cotton, adjusted for inflation, is tending downward over the long run, 
a phenomenon common to many primary commodity industries; market for upland cottons 
with higher grades and finer cottons is growing and most profitable as a consequence to the 
fact that modern high-speed machinery requires better fibre characteristics to operate at 
maximum efficiency and spin high quality yarns. The importance of quality is reflected in the 
price cotton lint receives in the world market and is expressed by premiums or discounts 
over the Cotlook A Index. In general, prices for cotton that is finer, longer and stronger than 
the world average, but not as good as extra-fine, are above the Cotlook A Index by 10–15 
percent; while cotton that is classified as coarse cotton (cotton that is shorter, rougher and 
weaker than average) has a discount from the Cotlook A Index of 3–10 percent. However, 
the specific premiums and discounts for each lot of cotton bales can vary due to a number of 
issues, as explained in the following paragraph. 
 
 
                                                
87 For coarser cotton 
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4.2 The “Making” o f  the  Cotton Pri ce   
The price of cotton is detrmined by a number of factors.  
On a general level, by world demand and supply. The world cotton market is particularly 
influenced by China which has for long been at the centre of the global cotton market it 
being the world’s largest consumer and importer of cotton from 1994 (Faostat). Particular 
market influence derives from its cotton reserve policy since it is now expected that its 
cotton stocks are around half of total world stocks. Consequently, any decisions involving 
Chinese stocks is expected to impact the direction the world cotton price gets, as witnessed 
in the 2010 world cotton price surge88. Among other issues influencing world supply are 
subsidies most developed countries support their cotton sectors with (particularly the US89 
and the EU once). 
On a specific level, by the quality features explained earlier. The benchmark for Upland 
cottons (the type of cotton grown throughout SSA) is currently California San Joaquin Valley 
Acala which is long (1.15 inch 1-1/8”), very strong (32-34 gpt), and has 4.2 micronaire; 
followed by Australian SM 1-1/8”. These machine-picked cottons fetch premiums of about 
ten and nine cents respectively, over the Cotlook A Index. The market segment for upland 
cottons that is growing fastest and is most profitable is for higher grades and finer cottons, 
especially used in the production of ring spun combed yarns for the woven and knitted 
apparel sector. There is actually a global trend towards improving yarn quality, confirmed by 
the rising market share of medium and higher grades which account for an estimated 
seventy-five percent of world trade (Éstur, 2008); and the decline of 
shorter (“coarse count”) upland cotton share. In addition to requiring longer, cleaner, whiter, 
brighter, stronger, and finer fibre, this higher segment of the market is demanding additional 
                                                
88 Consequent to droughts and floods, China’s cotton production fell by as much as seventeen percent from 
2008 to 2010 (USDA). In addition world cotton supply was also hit by droughts followed by floods in Australia 
and Pakistan. The combination with a growing demand of cotton world-wide and especially in China gives a 
rationale to the world cotton price surge.   
89 One example is given by the Brazil–United States cotton dispute was a World Trade Organization dispute 
settlement case (DS267) on the issue of unfair subsidies on cotton won by Brazil in 2004. 
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fibre properties, as elongation and neps; greater uniformity of length; and lower short fiber 
content. As explained in section 1, better fibre characteristics are required for the modern 
high-speed machinery to operate at maximum efficiency and spin high quality yarns. 
However, among the various quality features of cotton, staple length is ceteris paribus the 
most important; and SSA has been able to follow the market trend toward longer fibre as 
most African production now reaches the typical benchmark of 1-1/8” thus emphasizing its 
comparative advantage.  
Qulaity is, as mentioned, expressed in grades and when these are truthful, mills pay for 
quality in the form of premiums (or discounts for lower quality) over (or below) the Cotlook 
A Index.  
A number of other issues which are hardly measurable. The way cotton is marketed and 
shipped for example, has significant influence. The spinning industry is especially concerned 
about consistency in shipments: homogeneous and reliable year-round shipments, with 
consistent cotton characteristics, and standardized bales (same size and density) wrapped in 
cotton cloth are prefered. The homogeneity of deliveries also depends on seed cotton 
grading (HVI gives information per bale), and bale allotments. In this particular issue, SSA 
cotton suffers a disadvantage for various reasons. SSA shipments of upland cottons have 
longer transit times than those from their major competitors; in addition they are considered 
less reliable. The grand part of SSA cotton producing countries lack instrumental classing 
facilities, manual classing being implemented instead, which causes consequent homogeneity 
and consistency faults in terms of quality and packaging. The afore mentioned upland cotton 
benchmark, California Acala cotton, is for example shipped year-round, deliveries are very 
consistent, it is wrapped in cotton cloth, and has bale per bale HVI classification, short 
transit time and very reliable shipments. 
Lastly, price is influenced also by reputation. In this particular issue, perception often shows 
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to be more important than fact. Trust and reputation matter in the cotton business and the 
market rewards origins and shippers that have a strong record of delivering certain quality 
characteristics with consistency, while respecting contract terms for quantity and other. 
Premiums and discounts attached to internationally traded cotton are acknowledged to 
derive partly from the reputation of national origins. This particularly works for discounts, 
which are usually applied indiscriminately to all cotton originating from an area or a country 
considered to be affected by contamination (real or perceived). In confirmation of reputation 
importance is also that cotton is sold on types (generally national types) and not on 
description, types being defined by each country based on its own criteria.  
Following is a formalization of these points in the detrmination of the export cotton price: 𝑃!"! = 𝑃! + 𝜔!"𝛼!" + 𝑢!" 
Where 𝑃!"! is the export cotton price for country j at time t; 𝑃! is the world cotton price; 𝜔!" 
is the share of premium quality cotton; 𝛼!" is the quality premium; and 𝑢!" is a measurment 
disturbance error. 
 
5. Does Liberal izat ion Affe c t  the  Qual i ty  o f  Cotton? 
A generally accepted central concern about liberalization is that it can deteriorate quality. 
However, supporters of liberalization argue that this should not be influent a consideration 
since quality should not be undermined by sector design change unless it is a feature no 
longer interesting on the world market (Gilbert, 2009 for example) and as such consequently 
inifluent.  
As explained, the quality of cotton ceteris paribus detrmines the obtainable price on the 
world market, thus the feature remains central when considering cotton. After having 
described the features that determine the quality of cotton, where they are created, and the 
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origin of quality demand; my purpose is to verify the assertion that a liberalization90 of the 
SSA cotton sector has negatively affected its quality performance: the objective is to observe 
whether a change in sector organisation has affected the quality of cotton. 
To pursue my purpose I need to consider some SSA cotton producing countries that have 
liberalized (not just privatized) their cotton sector and other countries that have not 
liberalized instead.  
Drawing a comparison among SSA cotton producing countries is possible because SSA 
cotton has homogenoeus fiber characteristics across the region despite the fact that it is 
grown without irrigation and by small farmers. This homogeneity is mainly due to similar 
growing conditions and the low number of varieties91 planted in most countries - it would be 
more difficult if for example among compared countries some produced LS or ELS and 
others Upland cotton.  
Based on U.S. universal standards, classification of upland African cottons ranges from Strict 
Low Middling to Good Middling, and most production is classed as Middling or Strict 
Middling. Staple length ranges from medium to medium long (1-1/16 to 1-3/16 inches) and 
most production is classed 1-1/8 inches. Micronaire is within a rather narrow range (3.5 to 
4.5) and fiber strength varies from resistant to very resistant (27 to 32 grams per tex) (Éstur, 
2008). 
I measure the quality performance of the cotton sector by the estimated average premium (or 
discount) over (or below) the Cotlook A Index (in US cents per pound of lint). This allows 
for comparison among performances in terms of premiums or discounts.  
                                                
90 by liberalization of the cotton sector, I mean the complete opening to competition and not just a privatization 
of the sector. 
91 As there are no major differences in basic fiber parameters between SSA cottons, price differentials between 
different origins primarily reflect their level of contamination. 
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5.1 The Data  
My source of data is Cotlook Ltd., in the form of two bulletins with Index A average prices 
for cotton from 1970 to 2003 the first, and 2003 to 2012 the second. Both report average 
premiums or discounts for a number of SSA countries per type of cotton exported by the 
country (in general middling 1-1/32” and 1-1/8”). However, the data is not complete for all 
countries and considering my purpose, I could only take account of Tanzania among 
countries which have a liberalized cotton sector; and for countries that have not liberalized 
their cotton sector I grouped data for the African Franc Zone (AFZ), the time series for 
single AFZ countries being too short.  
Nevertheless, both time series perfectly fit my purpose. Tanzania has a structural quality 
advantage deriving from its processing half of its cotton production by roller gins (the other 
half being saw ginned); and roller ginning cotton fetching a premium of one cent per pound 
over saw ginned cotton with the same grade and type. Furthermore, the cotton sector was 
liberalized in 1995 and had excellent production performance before that, fetching a 
premium price of 4 cents per pound  (according to TCB). For the AFZ I consider grouped 
data on average premiums and discounts from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Mali that can be thought of as a representative country with non liberalized 
cotton sector. 
5.2 Methodology and Econometr i c  analys i s  
I rearranged data since as mentioned, the Cotlook bulletins distinguish data per type of 
cotton grown in each country, for example Bela 1-1/32” and Kaba 1-1/8” for Benin and 
similarily for other countries; thus, I calculated the average of type premiums so as to have 
one piece of data per country and year. For the AFZ I have done this grouping all data 
available, i.e. data on Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali from 2003 
to 2012 and data on the AFZ for previous years (already grouped by Cotlook). Subsequently, 
I have further arranged data calculating the difference between export value and Index A so 
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as to see clearly premiums or discounts (I call these “crude data” time series). In addition, 
considering there is an intrisic growth in Index A and country values, I have calculated the 
ratio between the premiums or discounts and the Index A obtaining to see the premiums or 
discounts in terms of percentages of Index A prices (I call these “percentage data” time 
series).  
Thus for the Tanzania time series and the AFZ time series, I wish to determine: 
-­‐ if there is a change in contingent trend in the Tanzania premiums  -­‐ if there is a trend in the AFZ premiums -­‐ compare the AFZ and Tanzania trends if any 
I will do this by running two regressions. 
 
Tanzania premiums analys is  
The objective is to highlihght whether the time series of cotton premiums for Tanzania, 
shows some trend or structural break that is attributable to the liberalization of the  cotton 
sector of the country. In order to test the Tanzania premium time series I run an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression.  
However, an initial plot of the Tanzania “crude data” time series shows there is notably an 
outlying data point (a particularly low premium) in 2011 (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Cotton premium time series for Tanzania (calculated from an avrage of the two 
types of cotton SG1 and RG1 produced in the country) 
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The outlier is attributable to difficulties the sector suffered in the 2010/11 cotton campaign. 
Therefore, in order for results not to be biased by the outlying data, I introduce a dummy 
variable for 2011.  
In order to test for a change in the contingent trend I introduce another dummy variable, i.e. 𝐷𝐵! which is zero for years before liberalization (i.e. before 1995) and 1 after liberalization of 
the sector has taken place (after 1995).  
I thus tested  
 
 
 
where  
 𝑃_𝑡𝑎𝑛! is the premium for Tanzania cotton at time t, the explained (or dependent) variable Year is the explanatory (or independent) variable 
 for t=2011 and 0 otherwise  
 
  for t<1995  and 1 for t≥1995 otherwise 
   𝑢!  is the error term 
The hypothesis I want to test is that liberalization has a significant effect on the Tanzania 
premium time series. The hypotheses are thus H0 that there is no effect on the time series, 
and H1 that there is a structural break instead. 
H0 :  βDB*Y= 0 
H1 :  βDB*Y≠ 0 
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Tanzania Resul ts   
Dependent Variable- Tanzania Premiums 
 Constant Y (years) D2011 
(Dummy 
Variable for 
2011) 
DB (Intercept 
Dummy 
Variable for 
Change in 
Trend) 
DB*Y  
(Slope Dummy 
Variable for 
Change in 
Trend) 
Coefficient 10.5141 
(3.1162)*** 
-0.0594 
(0.2272) 
-36.6601 
(7.9439)*** 
24.8044 
(11.7989)** 
-0.9040 
(0.4179)** 
 
Adj Coeff of determination 56.02% 
Number of observations 41 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% 
level. Homoskedasticity has been tested for with Breusch –Pagan test (22.868%); non-normality has been tested 
for with Jarque Bera (37.034%); and serial autocorrelation has been tested for with Durbin-Watson (1.8127) 
 
Results for the OLS regression for the Tanzania time series, show that the 𝐷2011!  is 
significant (p valule=0.037) and the dummy was thus due. Notably the slope dummy DB*Y, 
where DB is zero before the liberalization year (1995) and 1 after that; is negative and 
significant. I can therefore reject H0 and confirm there is a change in the slope which takes 
place in the liberalization year (1995/96) after which the slope parametre is negative, thus 
expressing a downward trend thereon as can be seen by visual inspection from figure 3.  
Figure 3. Tanzania “percentage premiums data” time series plot showing structural break after cotton 
sector liberalization year (1995) 
 
The econometric analysis of the data on Tanzania confirms a deterioration in premiums and 
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thus in the quality performance of exported cotton lint. Among causes reported by the TCB 
is that in the competitive system, grading has disappeared at the first point of purchase. As a 
consequence different grades are purchased and ginned together. In addition, ginners 
purchase seed cotton regardless of quality giving priority to volume in the attempt to avoid 
overcapacity. Following liberalization, there has also been a collapse in input provision and 
consequent mixing of seed varieties with subsequent losses in terms of lint quality. Actually, 
the proportion of upper grade cotton on total production fell from forty-five percent in the 
early nineties, to a low of seventeen percent in 1994/95 after liberalization.  
Tanzanian cotton now has the reputation of being among the most seriously contaminated 
origins in the world as confirmed by ITMF surveys (2011; already considered seriously 
contamined in 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 surveys). In addition, non fulfillments of 
contracts eventually lead to blacklisting of some local cotton companies by the International 
Cotton Association in Liverpool which to a great extent tarnished the image of Tanzanian 
Cotton Industry to the world cotton business family. The combined effects have resulted in 
the suffering of the reputation of Tanzanian cotton, with a consequent shift in exports to a 
lower segment of the market (Éstur, 2008).  
Tanzanian cotton is also characterized by low productivity with yield level standing at an 
average of 750kg per hectare while the existing potential is of over 2,500kg per hectare. The 
TCB giustifies this with low utilization of inputs due to lack of credit at the disposal of 
farmers. Contract-farming has been tested for some years in specific cotton growing areas 
and the intention (TCB) is to extend the programme since it has proven succesful.  
The time series for Tanzania shows an outlying data point (particularly low premium) in 2011 
which is attributable to difficulties the sector suffered in the 2010/11 cotton campaign.  
Cotton output drastically dropped to 163,517 tons from 267,004 tons of seed cotton 
produced in the preceding 2009/2010 marketing season, a thirty-nine percent decline. 
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Underlying reasons go from the failure of the Voucher-Input system, that resulted in the 
total failure on provision of inputs, especially insecticides to farmers; to localized droughts 
and more than average rainfall in other areas instead. Eventually, ginners were not able to 
fulfill their contractual obligation of supplying bales to external buyers. In addition, cotton 
resulted seriously contamined: as reported by ITMF, cotton from Tanzania was 100 percent 
seriously contamined in 2010 (especially by organic matter -leaves, feathers, paper, leather 
and oily substances - grease and oil). Confirming the low value in the data, TCB reports that 
classification results for the year 2010/2011 indicate that only 47.5 percent of the cotton 
classed was of good grade (i.e GANY and above).  
 
	  
AFZ and AFZ/Tanzania premium analys is  
In analyzing AFZ and AFZ/Tanzania time series I have used ARIMA methodology. ARIMA 
models are a very general class of forecasting models that include random walk models and 
more elaborate models whose forecasting equations may include lags of the differenced time 
series, auto-regressive or "AR" terms, and/or lags of the forecast errors, moving-average or 
"MA" terms. If the model succeeds in extracting all the "signal" from the data, there should 
be no pattern at all in the errors: the error in the next period should not be correlated with 
any previous errors, (the bars on the autocorrelation plot therefore should all be close to the 
zero line). Otherwise if the random walk model has significant positive autocorrelation in the 
residuals at lag 1, setting AR=1 is necessary, so-called ARIMA(1,1,0) model; or significant 
negative autocorrelation in the residuals at lag 1, setting MA=1 is needed , ARIMA (0,1,1) 
model; (autocorrelation lag=2 will give (2,1,0) etc.) 
 
AFZ premiums analys is  
The AFZ time series results from the average of premiums and discounts for Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali; in percentages over the A Index. Among 
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these only Benin and Côte d’Ivoire have attempted a liberalization of the cotton sector; in 
both cases they soon after retrieved to former integrated design (zoning in case of Côte 
d’Ivoire). Mali, Chad and Cameroon have not even attempted a liberalization of cotton. As 
such, the time series fits the role of being representative of non-liberalized cotton sector 
quality performance. What I wish to find is that there is no negative trend (which would 
show a decrease in achieved premiums) in this time series. 
Thus, the hypothesis I verify is wheteher there is some trend in the AFZ achieved premiums 
for cotton, i.e. in the AFZ cotton sector quality performance. My null hypothesis H0 is that 
there is no change in the trend (meaning no growth and no decrease), while H1 is that there 
is a change in the trend of achieved premiums. Controlling there is no autocorrelation in the 
residuals, i.e. no lags show to be significant, I have applied the constant mean forecasting 
model to the first difference of the series (i.e. putting the order of non-seasonal differencing 
to 1). Thus I get a (0,1,0) model with constant i.e. a random walk with drift model.  
AFZ Resul ts   
Although visual inspection of figure 4 suggests there is a positive ternd in the AFZ premium 
time series, and the coefficient of the constant is actually positive (.745); the significance 
found is low (p=.25). Thus the data do not show a significant underlying trend (low 
significance of results show there is no evidence of a trend). However, this can be due to the 
small size of the tested sample. All in all, although on the one hand this does not allow me to 
claim there is a positive trend in the AFZ premium time series, it does on the other hand 
allow to say there is –notably- no negative trend and thus that there is no negative trend in 
the AFZ cotton sector performance (which has remained vertically integrated and statal). 
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The estimation sample is: 1984 – 2012; percentage differences time series 
AFZ Model Summary AR (0,1,0) 
           Fit Statistic Mean 
MAE 2,186 
 
           
             
 Estimate t Sig. 
Constant ,745 
(,633) 
1,178 ,250 
Difference 1   
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.  
 
Figure 4. AFZ percentage premiums time series, ARIMA plot 
 
 
 
The non-negative cotton sector performance can be explained by a number of reasons. To 
begin with, all countries considered in the AFZ group have improved in terms of staple 
length living up to the demand of spinners; Burkina Faso for example has increased its 
proportion of cotton classed 1-1/8” rising  from  twenty percent in 1995/96 to eighty 
percent in 2005/06. In addition, almost all countries are virtuous in terms of contamination 
as confirmed by ITMF surveys where Cameroon (except in 2003) and Chad have been listed 
among the least contamined cotton origins from 2000; followed by Benin (except in 2003 
and 2009.); and Côte d’Ivoire (except 2007 and 2011). However, contrarily to the rest of the 
group, Burkina Faso and Mali have always been listed among the most contamined cottons 
insetad. Nevertheless, Mali eventually improved and was listed among least contamined 
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cottons in the 2011 ITMF survey. Notably, the type of contamination affecting cotton from 
the AFZ reflects the problem of providing farmers with inadequate picking bags made of 
polypropylene which is by now known to be a problematic contaminant in cotton. However, 
it also means that other contaminants are taken care for by producers who cannot avoid ppp 
contamination instead. The ppp contamination problem can actually only be avoided by 
using cotton picking bags and wraps for cotton bales. One step in this direction has been 
taken by adopting coloured ppp picking bags (in place of white ones) so that contingent 
contaminants can be detected more easily.  
Overall the quality of the AFZ cotton is considered good but not reliably so. The quality 
performance of cotton from Benin, which has remained regulated and carried out by the 
government, is for example reported as irregular by Éstur (2008). Nevertheless it has fetched 
an average premium of 2.41 cents a pound almost every year from 2003 to 2012 (except 2010 
when a discount of 14,11 cents per pound is reported the biggest discount among the AFZ 
countries in that year; if we consider this value then the average premium falls to 0.57 cents 
per pound, the least among the AFZ countries) (Cotlook Ltd.). It is reported to be the 
world’s sixth least contamined cotton origin in the 2011 ITMF survey. Burkina Faso is 
considered to have improved significantly cotton quality along the enormous growth in 
production; it also progressed in reducing contamination and in 2009 was listed among least 
contamined origins by ITMF. However, in 2011 Burkina Faso was listed back among most 
contamined origins. Grading which is implemented manually and visually by the major 
ginning company (SOFITEX) although in one location, is still considered lax and the 
proportion of seed cotton classed as first grade is higher than it should be (Éstur finds 
underlying reasons in inspectors who prefer avoiding conflict or personally take advantage 
from upgrading the seed cotton). From 2003 cotton from Burkina Faso has been fetching an 
average premium of 2.81 cents per pound., Mali is the origin with the worse quality 
performance, fetching an average premium of 1.95 cents per pound from 2003 (this is if we 
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do not consider the heavy discounts suffered by cotton from Benin and from Cote d’Ivoire 
in 2010). Actually grading of cotton in Mali is described as very lax and contamination as 
serious, as confirmed by the fact that its cotton is listed among most contamined in every 
ITMF survey from 2001 to 2009. An additional concern comes from consistency problems 
often encountered as a consequence to that grading is implemented in three different 
locations although all national lint production is classified (manually and visually) by CMDT. 
Grading was considered stricter when it was based on lint classification results. 
Contaminants of cotton from Mali are varied but most often reported are plastic materials. 
This is consequent to the widespread use of plastic materials in the picking, storing, 
transporting, and baling of cotton which sums to other contamination. An improvement in 
this direction has been the expanded use of colored plastic materials, which are easier to 
detect visually than white plastic materials. In 2011 ITMF survey, Mali was listed as fifteenth 
least contamined origin indicating a strong improvement. Like much of WCA, has increased 
its average staple length and the proportion of cotton classed 1-1/8” was 96 percent in 
2005/06. 
Cameroon and Chad are the best quality performers in the AFZ group. Chad has been 
fetching the highest premiums over the A Index every year except for 2009 with the highest 
premium in 2010, 42.95 cents per pound, and the highest average premium (10.47 cents per 
pound). Cameroon is the second best quality performer with an average 4.38 premium from 
2003. This is in line with the stricter grading implemented in Chad and Cameroon and of it 
being consistent with lint grading. In addition, in Cameroon micronaire tests for each bale 
are carried out unlike most other African countries. However, Cameroon cotton was very 
affected by stickiness in the early 1990s and suffered discounts prices were sharply 
discounted. In response to this, SODECOTON developed a quality improvement strategy 
which has been paying off. As stickiness mostly comes from late harvest, incentives for early 
picking were offered to farmers which have led to stickiness virtually disappearing. Yet, the 
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reputation of stickiness is persisting among spinners (Éstur), which confirms that it is 
difficult to regain a good reputation once it has been lost. 
AFZ/Tanzania premium analys is  
Figure 5. AFZ/Tanzania premiums time series comparison, using ARIMA  
 
 
Nafter having tested the Tanzania and AFZ premiums time series separately, I want to test 
the ratio AFZ/Tanzania premiums time series to see whether the numerator (AFZ premium 
time series) and the denominator (Tanzania premium time series) diverge, i.e. to see whether 
the performances of their cotton secors diverge since this is not clear as a consequence of 
the blurry (i.e. not clearly a positive trend is found) results in the single analysis for the AFZ 
premium time series. My null hypothesis H0 is that there is no trend (i.e. no divergence in the 
two time series); H1 is that there is a positive trend in the ratio (i.e. that there is divergence in 
their performance).  
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AFZ/Tanzania Resul ts  
AFZ_Tanzania 
ARIMA (2,1,0) Model Parameters 
Fit Statistic Mean 
MAE ,073 
 
  Estimate 
Constant 
 
 0,017* 
(0,011) 
AR Lag 1 -0,792*** 
(0,216) 
 Lag 2 -0,695** 
(0,341) 
Difference 1  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% 
level. 
The test of the ratio highlights that the two time series move in different directions and I can 
reject the null hypothesis. In the Afz/Tanzania analysis the model identifies an average 
upward trend (in ARIMA models the negative sign means there is a positive trend) which 
can also be detected by visual inspection of figure 4. The meaning of this is the better 
performance of the AFZ group of countries compared to Tanzania. We can sum this to the 
previous AFZ analysis results which were a non-negative92 trend in the premiums time series. 
The divergence is particularly evident in 2011 due to the particularly bad year for cotton in 
Tanzania. However, an outlying data point in 2011 is also present in the AFZ group where 
Benin and Cote d’Ivoire suffered severe discounts in that year (-14,11 and -12,61 cents per 
pound respectively), but the effects of the discounts are ruled out by the high (42.95 cents 
per pound) premium fetched that same year by Chad.  
Tanzania’s bad performanace is exacerbated by the fact that half of its cotton is roller ginned 
and thus can ceteris paribus fetch a premium.  Compared to saw ginning, roller ginning has a 
higher ginning out-turn, and produces fibre that is longer and of a better quality, and 
consequently commands a premium of up to 2 cents per pound, but the process is only 
suitable for ELS and medium-long upland varieties. Cotton from AFZ instead, has a 
                                                
92 the sign of the coefficient is actually positive, but I cannot say there is a positive trend because significance is 
low; however this could be due to the small size of the sample 
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disdvantage in this sense since it is exclusively saw ginned (although staple length would be 
enough for it to be roller ginned). Notably, expectations of better performance in non-
liberalized cotton sectors are confirmed.  
 
 
6 Final  Remarks 
Liberalization is considered here not as solely a privatization of the sector but as a complete 
opening of the sector to competition. The distinction is due since there are countries which 
have privatised succesfully their cotton sector as in the case of Zimbabwe which was listed 
among least contamined cotton in 2009 (ITMF); though remining in the realm of duopsony 
or oligopsony at best.  
As mentioned a liberalization of the cotton sector is often accused of failure due to the 
subsequent collapse of input credit provision. However, liberalization causes a more 
extended dismemberment of the cotton value chain particularly affecting information flow to 
producers which is needed to incentivize careful production and post-production 
management. In addition, increased competition makes quantity prevail on quality when 
ginners purchase cotton in the attempt to avoid overcapacity, with a consequent detrimental 
effect on quality. 
Contrarily to other crop sectors that have also been undergoing liberalisation in SSA; in 
cotton low quality gives origin to detrimental consequences for the sector survival. A first 
short term, direct negative impact on the premium resulting in a lower price received by 
producers and processors consequently affecting production in terms of quantity. A second, 
long term impact on country reputation from which premiums and discounts also partly 
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derive, and that is much considered by international merchants when deciding where to 
purchase cotton lint and at what price. Moreover, it is aknowledged that it is easier to destroy 
this kind of good reputation than to establish it, let alone re-gain it.  
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the ongoing debate on the liberalization 
of SSA cotton sectors.  
The declared rationale for a liberalization of the SSA cotton sector is that the cotton 
parastatals are claimed to be an unsustainable burden on the relative country budget and the 
banking system, absorbing scarce public resources and jeopardizing national financial 
budgets. Moreover, in the monopolistic cotton systems, farmers are claimed to receive a 
price for cotton that is lower than the world price93. The general view is that the state 
monopolies, on average, function poorly and furthermore they impede private sector 
development which would instead enhance efficiency and higher producer prices. Thus, the 
objectives of IFI when promoting a liberalization of the SSA cotton sector were: 
• increase producer prices so as to help farmers exit poverty 
• enhance efficiency in the industry (by increasing competition) 
• eventually increase production in response to the higher producer prices and 
considered that SSA cotton has a comparative advantage in the production of cotton 
Consequently, reforms of the cotton sector have been implemented in almost all of SSA 
cotton producing countries in the nineteen nineties. Although reforms have resulted in a 
raise in the share of producer price on the f.o.b. export price, and efficiency has grown in the 
processing industry; they are nonetheless thought to have fallen short of expectations in 
some cases causing a depletion of the sector. In literature, the failure of reforms is generally 
primarily ascribed to the collapse of the input provision system consequent to the failure in 
coordination in competitive systems (which goes to the detriment of certain stages in the 
cotton value chain) as compared to a vertically integrated organisation. This dissertation 
                                                
93 This is controversial because cotton system in SSA are accused of burdening the state budget by guaranteeing 
a panseasonal price for cotton which can be higher than the world price it cannot anticipate. 
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seeks to widen the realm of causes of the disappointing performance of liberalization in the 
SSA cotton sector lingering on critical features in the cotton production value chain other 
than input provision.  
The first chapter gives a snap shot of the SSA cotton sector through a value chain analysis 
that fleshes out the criticalities and shortcomings of the sector, thus providing a rationale for 
future intervention. Whereas the value chain usually considered in literature when dealing 
with cotton in SSA generally ends with ginning, here the analysis comprises the textile and 
garment manufacturing stages – from cotton to garment value chain. The analysis of the 
shortcomings of the latter part of the value chain allow to clear why the grand part of the 
value added is not achieved in the production region, thus also giving a rationale to future 
investments in specific branches. Attention is also drawn on the fact that although investing 
in the fibre-to-garment part of the chain is critical, it is more appropriate to invest in some 
facilities than others (e.g. preferably in knitting than in other types of weaving machines; and 
for example it is not recommendable to invest in dyeing plants because of the structural need 
of water in such process, making it inadequate to most SSA countries). The chapter further 
identifies structural shortcomings outside the cotton sector that undermine the smooth 
operating of plants, affecting efficiency of production and most critically, future investment. 
Overall the picture conveys the idea of a sector that has yet to exploit its full potential with 
multiple fragilities consequent to shortcomings identified inside the value chain and others 
that are outside the cotton value chain but with which the cotton sector needs to deal. 
In chapter two the given bird’s eye view of the dynamics of the sector draws me to identify a 
“design sensitive” feature of the SSA cotton sector other than input provision, which in my 
view have a say in reform outcomes, i.e. quality performance. Notably, the comparison 
drawn with other successful SSA cash crops, which are considered to have succesfully 
reformed their previuosly vertically integrated sectors, reinforces the intuition on the 
criticality of quality performance specifically to the cotton sector. 
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In chapter 3, R&D in cotton is considered; a subject seldom tackled when considering 
reforms of the sector. However, much of the outcomes of production (variety determines 
fibre potential and yields for example) depend on this stage of the value chain. As explained 
in the chapter, R&D in cotton in SSA is mainly public and is funded by governments 
although these rely in grand part on donor funding; this makes it vulnerable to decisions 
taken outside the sector and outside the country. There is very little data available related to 
R&D in cotton and it is not possible to identify a trend in expenditure specifically for 
research in cotton related to the undertaking of reforms of the sector. However, the available 
data shows that countries with vertically integrated cotton sectors have a greater proportion 
of fte researchers related to the total number of researchers in agriculture, confirming the 
commitment of governments of those countries to cotton and the critcality of this stage to 
the performance of the sector. 
Finally in chapter 4, I test if quality performance is sensitive to the liberalization process as I 
suggest in this dissertation. I firstly explain where the demand for quality originates, as it 
distinguishes cotton from other SSA cash crops, which have a declining quality demand 
instead and have contrarily to cotton been succesfully reformed (chapter 2). Eventually an 
econometric analysis is drawn so as to suggest if liberalization has affected the quality 
performance of the SSA cotton sector. Quality performance of the cotton sector can be best 
measured by the average premiums or discounts achieved by exported cotton; thus, I draw 
an analysis of average premium or discounts time series for a liberalized cotton sector, for a 
non-liberalized cotton sector and finally their comparison.  
The contr ibut ion o f  this  thes is  
From an analytical point of view, a part from explaining the reasons why the grand part of 
the value added in the cotton value chain is not achieved in the producing countries; this 
research sheds new light, in turn giving the right weight to the neglected feature of quality in 
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cotton; highlighting it is an outcome of concerted actions throughout the cotton value chain 
and particularly important in the determination of the price achieved on the world cotton 
market which is very competitive.  
The intuition on quality is tested empirically to observe whether a liberalization of the sector 
has consequences on this feature. The data sample available is not very broad so conclusions 
need to be cautious. Nonetheless, the outcomes of tests show a negative trend in Tanzania’s 
premium for cotton after 1995 (the year of the sector liberalization) while the test for a trend 
in the premiums calculated for the whole African Franc Zone shows a non−negative trend 
instead. Thus, considering the features of the cotton sector in SSA, reflections on the policy 
direction to be taken in the sector organisation, can in my opinion be attempted.  
A few considerations first. 
The cotton sector benefits of a comparable advantage of SSA in growing cotton (climate and 
low cost labour), and the sector is acknowledged to be critical (by IFI also) in the economics 
of SSA cotton-producing countries - at the country level it contributes to national economic 
growth, to employment, and is a source of revenue and foreign exchange; at the household 
level it involves the rural poor (the poorest among poor) and is consequently recognized as a 
means of fighting poverty, enabling smallholder farmers to access cash which contributes to 
household food security but also notably enables purchase of non-food goods (school and 
health). Furthermore, cotton is important not only for producers but also for those in 
associated activities: UNIDO states that millions of people in SSA derive their livelihood 
from the cotton sector.  
However, the SSA cotton sector is acknowledged to be vulnerable in relation to the very 
competitive world cotton market, as a consequence to a number of reasons among which are 
the subsidies of major cotton producers to support their cotton sectors (the U.S. new doesn’t 
show to have decreased its subsidies to the cotton sector –Farm Bill 2014; and China for 
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example); these have an acknowledged plummeting effect on the world cotton price which 
sums up to its general negative trend (not unusual for commodities in general). 
The SSA cotton sector is further affected by the acknowledged macroeconomic vulnerability 
of the countries of this region (lack of rule of law, financial markets failure etc.). 
Now, the criticality of the SSA cotton sector has brought, as mentioned, IFI to call for a 
liberalization; however, considering the outcomes to date, the real question should be 
whether the conditions for the sector to be succesfully liberalized are there or not. To find an 
answer we can draw inspiration from Kikeri et al. (1994) who list the pre-conditions for a 
succesful privatization. Kikeri et al. list the “country and economic conditions” due to be in 
place before privatization or liberalization of state owned enterprises (SoEs) are 
implemented. Notably, these are  
“developed capital markets, competitive goods and services markets, and effective regulatory 
capacity”.  
Even more sticking to the SSA cotton debate, the author’s statement that  
“Privatizing SOEs that operate as monopolies is more complex and the regulatory 
capabilities of the country become a crucial factor.” 
moreover 
“privatizing utilities and natural monopolies is most difficult in least developed countries, 
where institutional and regulatory capacities are weakest.” 
The author further adds that  
“For low-income countries, a precondition for successful privatization is to create an 
enabling environment in which the private sector can effectively operate.”  
Among other conditions he mentions  
“macroeconomic reforms, improving regulatory frameworks, strengthening the financial 
system, and improved governance.” 
Kikeri et al. (1994) recon that privatization is made difficult by problems of post-
privatization regulation and competition policy as well as implementation and political 
constraints, thus not necessarily yielding the desirable outcomes.  
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Were this not sufficient, further inspiration for action in the design of the SSA cotton sector 
can be drawn from Mahoney’s table “Predicting the Organisational Form of Vertical 
Control” (Appendix 1) where the non separability feature of cotton production in relation to 
quality is enough to give scope for a vertical integration, be it through a relational contract or 
a unified governance, as the author puts it. 
These reflections actually give a rationale to the considerable experience of liberalization 
accumulated by SSA cotton sectors which has given disappointing outcomes whether it has 
been implemented in a big-bang fashion or a gradual fashion.  
So what is to be pursued?  
If on side it is true that a vertically integrated design of the sector has brought it to be an 
African success story, it is also undeniable that negative aspects of vertical integration have 
grounded rationale for liberalization intervention.  
Zimbabwe’s relatively succesful privatization of the cotton sector can be considered as a mile 
stone and be a rationale to reconsider the terms of liberalization from competition to 
privatization safe-guarding regional monopolies for example. However these are now in the 
hands of multinationals. 
Furthermore, recognising the important role in sector coordination, farmers’ cooperatives 
should be encouraged and sustained. Moreover, farmers cooperatives have the welcome 
quality of being reputation-sensitive, thus giving a rationale for the necessary extra effort for 
quality implementation among producers.  
Concluding, in general I think inspiration can be drawn from List’s “National System of 
Political Economy” a historical description of what developed countries have done to 
become what they are today, and more recently but in the same mood, Chang and his 
“Kicking Away the Ladder”, who give a rationale to focus on the right time to implement a 
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liberalization (of the cotton sector), in line with outcomes on reflections with Mahoney and 
Kikeri et al. (1994). 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Figure A1. Cotlook A Index 
 
 
Source: ICAC 
 
 
 
 
Cotton Country Figures 
 
Source USDA 
Production – 1000 480 lb. bales 
Area Harvested – 1000 HA 
Yield – Kg/Ha 
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Figures A2. Benin 
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Figures A3. Burkina Faso 
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Figures A4. Cameroon 
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Figures A5. Chad 
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Figures A6. Centra l  Afr i can Republ i c  
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Figures A7. The Congo 
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Figures A8. Côte  d ’Ivo ir e  
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Figures A9. Ethiopia 
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Figures A10. Ghana 
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Figures A11. Guinea 
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Figures A12. Kenya 
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Figures A13. Malawi 
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Figures A14. Mal i  
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Figures A15. Mozambique 
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Figures A16. Niger  
 
 
 
0	  200	  
400	  600	  
1950	   1960	   1970	   1980	   1990	   2000	   2010	   2020	  
Area	  Harvested	  
Area	  Harvested	  
0	  100	  
200	  300	  
1950	   1960	   1970	   1980	   1990	   2000	   2010	   2020	  
Yield	  
Yield	  
-­‐100	  0	  
100	  200	  
300	  
1950	   1960	   1970	   1980	   1990	   2000	   2010	   2020	  
Exports	  
Exports	  
0	  10	  
20	  
1960	   1970	   1980	   1990	   2000	   2010	   2020	  
Production	  
Production	  
  
222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures A17. Niger ia  
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Figures A18. Tanzania 
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Figures A19. Togo 
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Figures A20. Uganda 
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Figures A21. Zambia 
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Figures A22. Zimbabwe 
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Coffee Figures 
 
Figures A23. Ethiopia - Green Coffe Production and Exports (1000 60 KG BAGS) 
 
 
Source USDA 
 
Figures A24. Togo - Green Coffee Production and Exports (1000 60 KG BAGS) 
 
 
Source USDA 
 
 
 
Figures A25. Uganda - Green Coffee Production and Exports (1000 60 KG BAGS) 
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Tea Figures 
 
Figures A26. Kenya -Tea Production (tonnes) 
 
 
Source: Faostat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cocoa Figures 
 
Figures A27. Côte d’Ivoire - Cocoa Production (tonnes) 
 
 
Source: Faostat 
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Predicting the Organizational Form of Vertical Control 
from ”The Choice of Organizational Form: Vertical Integration versus other Methods of 
Vertical Control”, Mahoney 1989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5
Predicting the Organizational Form of Vertical Control
Task Programability Nonseparability Asset
Problem Specificity
Case 1:
Case 2:
Case 3:
Case 4:
Case 5:
Case 6:
Case 7:
Case 8:
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low High
Low High
High Low
High Low
High High
High High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Predicted
Organizational
Form
Spot market
contract
Relational
contract
Relational
contract
Unified
governance
Spot market
contract
Relational
contract
Inside
contract
Unified
governance
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
DP_AFZ_WCA
Value df Sig.b
1 .233 .179 1.690 1 .194
2 .180 .176 2.739 2 .254
3 .174 .173 3.762 3 .288
4 .225 .169 5.527 4 .237
5 .214 .165 7.199 5 .206
6 .223 .162 9.106 6 .168
7 .130 .158 9.786 7 .201
8 .148 .154 10.709 8 .219
9 .004 .150 10.709 9 .296
10 .094 .146 11.119 10 .348
11 -.113 .142 11.749 11 .383
12 .042 .138 11.843 12 .458
13 -.001 .134 11.843 13 .541
Lag Partial Autocorrelation Std. Error
1 .233 .189
2 .133 .189
3 .115 .189
4 .159 .189
5 .120 .189
6 .122 .189
7 .003 .189
8 .038 .189
9 -.133 .189
10 .012 .189
11 -.232 .189
12 .032 .189
13 -.026 .189
Series:DP_AFZ_WCA
Lag
Autocorrelation Std. Errora
Box-Ljung Statistic
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise).
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation.
Series:DP_AFZ_WCA
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Model Type
Model ID DP_AFZ_WCA Model_1 ARIMA(0,1,0)
Model Summary
Model Fit statistics
MAPE MAE MaxAPE MaxAE Statistics DF Sig.
DP_AFZ_WCA-Model_1 0 651.086 2.186 14221.878 11.643 16.266 18 .574 0
Estimate SE t Sig.
Constant .745 .633 1.178 .250
Difference 1
Model Fit statistics
Stationary R-squared Statistics DF Sig.
DP_AFZ_WCA-Model_1 0 .099 11.322 14 .661 0
Model Description
 
Model Statistics
Model
Number of Predictors
Ljung-Box Q(18)
Number of Outliers
ARIMA Model Parameters
 
DP_AFZ_WCA No Transformation
Model Statistics
Model
Number of Predictors
Ljung-Box Q(18)
Number of Outliers
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AFZ_Tanzania
Value df Sig.b
1 .393 .179 4.795 1 .029
2 .175 .176 5.785 2 .055
3 .225 .173 7.488 3 .058
4 .087 .169 7.750 4 .101
5 .129 .165 8.356 5 .138
6 .114 .162 8.849 6 .182
7 .090 .158 9.171 7 .241
8 .083 .154 9.461 8 .305
9 -.068 .150 9.663 9 .378
10 -.043 .146 9.750 10 .463
11 .007 .142 9.752 11 .553
12 -.165 .138 11.179 12 .514
13 -.098 .134 11.722 13 .551
Lag Partial Autocorrelation Std. Error
1 .393 .189
2 .025 .189
3 .175 .189
4 -.073 .189
5 .121 .189
6 -.006 .189
7 .054 .189
8 -.007 .189
9 -.142 .189
10 .008 .189
11 .008 .189
12 -.176 .189
13 .019 .189
Series:AFZ_Tanzania
Lag
Autocorrelation Std. Errora
Box-Ljung Statistic
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise).
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation.
Series:AFZ_Tanzania
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Model Type
Model ID AFZ_Tanzania Model_1 ARIMA(2,1,0)
Model Summary
Stationary R-squared .459
R-squared .341
RMSE .134
MAPE 6.687
MaxAPE 33.310
MAE .073
MaxAE .560
Normalized BIC -3.647
Model Fit statistics
Stationary R-squared Statistics DF Sig.
AFZ_Tanzania-Model_1 0 .459 8.143 16 .944 0
Estimate SE t Sig.
.017 .011 1.582 .127
Lag 1 -.792 .216 -3.668 .001
Lag 2 -.695 .341 -2.040 .053
1
Model Description
 
Fit Statistic
Mean
Model Statistics
Model
Number of Predictors
Ljung-Box Q(18)
Number of Outliers
ARIMA Model Parameters
 
AFZ_Tanzania-Model_1 AFZ_Tanzania No Transformation Constant
AR
Difference
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Appendix 3 
 
Test ing the  AFZ sample  wi thout  the  f i r s t  observat ion 
Time Series Modeler 
   
     
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
The AFZ premiums time series (encompassing the first observation) (Appendix 2) test 
results showed a positive trend, however with low significance (p=.25), thus only enabling 
me to state that the AFZ premiums time series has a non-negative trend. 
  
237 
Testing of the AFZ premiums time series without the first observation (above) still results in 
a positive non significant trend, as can be seen from results reported above (coefficient 
estimate=.297, p=.528). 
Furthermore, the used testing programme (Expert Model) points out the contingent 
existence of outliers and in both cases it has not observed such data.  
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